1. Territorial Disputes in East Asia
International Relations of East Asia

5. East China Sea Two disagreements over territory and boundaries:
Territorial dispute over the Senkaku islets, administered by Japan, but also claimed by China and Taiwan;
Maritime sovereignty dispute between China and Japan. While China claims the whole continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough, Japan claims the same shelf to a median line between its undisputed territory and that of China

6. Three main questions:
Did Japan incorporate the islets as part of or separately from the Sino-Japanese War?
Should the islets be considered to be part of territories that China ceded to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the Sino-Japanese War?
Were the islets included in the arrangements under which Japan returned Taiwan to China in 1945, at the end of World War II?

7. Senkaku/Diaoyu(tai)
Ming Dynasty – considered the islets part of its maritime territory;
Qing Dynasty – islets put under the jurisdiction of Taiwan;
During the first Sino-Japanese War, Japan incorporates the islands citing the principle of Terra Nullius of International Law (incorporated under the administration of Okinawa);
April 1895: Treaty of Shimonoseki – China cedes all islands belonging to Formosa to Japan (“…Taiwan together with all the islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa”). No mention to the Senkaku/Diaoyu;
Japan has claimed from this that its incorporation of the Senkakus was an act apart from the Sino-Japanese War. In contrast, China and Taiwan argue that Japan used its victory in the war to annex the islands;

8. After WWII, the US controls the islands as part of the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands until May, 1972, when the US terminates occupation and returned Okinawa to Japan (Okinawa Reversion Treaty);
Japan-China Diplomatic Normalization (1972) set aside the dispute (Peace Treaty 1978);
Since the 1990s, both the PRC and Japan have accused each other of breaching this understanding of setting aside differences;

9. The US position has been neutral until 2010, when China and Japan clashes over Japan’s arrest of a trawler captain;
Secretary of State Clinton states Senkaku Islands are within the scope of application of Article 5 of US-Japanese Security Treaty;
The US appears to be supporting Japan’s sovereignty over the islands legally as well as politically;

10. The PRC asserts its claim to the full continental shelf that is a natural extension of China’s mainland, beyond 200 nautical miles to the middle of the Okinawa Trough (and East of a Median Line);
The PRC contends that its oil and gas projects are in its continental shelf (which is not in dispute) and that joint developments may be negotiated for some areas;
In 2009, the PRC submitted to the U.N. Secretary General its “Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles,” a claim extending to the Okinawa Trough;
Then, on December 14, 2012, it submitted its formal claim to the extended shelf. Japan has proposed a Median Line that would divide the rights to the overlapping EEZ. Beijing has rejected Japan’s proposal;

14. Since the 1970s China has been exploring and building pipelines in the disputed waters;
In the 2000s, China and Japan began to pursue a bilateral agreement over the exploitation of the undersea hydrocarbon resources;
2008: the two sides announced an agreement on joint exploration for gas and oil (cooperation in the Chunxiao gas and oil fields);
No progress in implementation of the agreement;

15. Rising tensions
There’s been a series of flare-ups in tensions over the Senkakus since 2010;
Tensions were further heightened on November 23, 2013, when the PRC announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the East China Sea that covers the Senkakus and that overlaps with the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan;
The PRC also issued new rules for all the aircrafts flying in the ADIZ, regardless of whether they enter China’s airspace, with a vague threat of actions by the PLA in the event of noncompliance;

16. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated on November 23, 2013, that the ADIZ was a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo and would not change how the U.S. military conducts operations;
Secretary of State John Kerry said that the United States does not recognize efforts by any State to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter national airspace. (The US does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its airspace, but there is no international law or treaty governing practices in ADIZs). The Secretary of State urged China not to implement its “threat” to take action against aircraft;

18. South China Sea More than 750 islets in the South China Sea;
48 islands are occupied by military forces from: Vietnam (24), PRC (10), ROC (1), Malaysia (6), Philippines (7);
Oil and gas reserves – estimated to reach 23 billion tons and 7.5 trillion m3, respectively;
Commercial fishing – more than 10% of the world’s total catch;
Shipping lane – more than half of the world’s supertanker traffic and 1/3 world merchant fleet;

22. Clashes between China and adjacent countries:
China and Vietnam (1974, 1988, 2011);
China and the Philippines (1995);
Efforts to prevent conflict:
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (1992);
ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC, 2002);
Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC (2011);
Facing Chinese growing assertiveness, backed by the buildup of a robust blue water navy, ASEAN needs the American support and intervention;

23. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (1992):
– signed in Manila by ASEAN’s 6 members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei) supported by Vietnam too;
– called on the concerned parties to settle the dispute by peaceful means, exercise restraint and cooperate in applying the principles enshrined in the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), as a basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea;
– China, however, reiterated its position on its refusal to accept multilateral discussion concerning the disputes over the Paracel and Spratlys islands;

24. The Declaration:
Emphasizes the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;
Urges all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;
Demands, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South China Sea (e.g. safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combatting piracy and drug trafficking);
Commends all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea;

25. ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea (2002):
‘the parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force’
– Major shift in China’s approach to the SCS dispute, multilateral embrace as part of the wider “peaceful rise” strategy;
– Beijing adopts the principles of the 1992 Declaration, but no legal or coercive power enshrined in the DOC, so who’s socializing whom?

26. Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC (2011): from DOC to COC?
– Signed in July 2011 during the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, as a further step towards the establishment of a stricter Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea;
– Entails the expansion of mutual consultations, confidence-building measures, and cooperation activities based on consensus and on the voluntary participation of the countries involved;
– China agrees in principle to the gradual drafting of a coercive COC, but latest developments have been slowed down by what Beijing perceives as “dangerous intrusions” of external Powers in the issue;

27. – US has refrained from expressing interest in the issue other than confirming its support for the principle of freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes;
– In July 2010 (ARF), Secretary Clinton underscores the US national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to maritime commons, and respect for international law in the SCS:
Oppose the use of force by any claimant;
Take no side on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the SCS;
Support 2002 ASEAN-China DOC and facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures;

28. East Asian Summit in Bali (November 2011):
– Japan supports the US position that any dispute in the area should be resolved through multi-national cooperation and dialogue;
– Australia expresses its interest in the area as a maritime country using the sea lane and supported the freedom of navigation
– China opposes the multilateral approach and declares that any dispute over the possession of the SCS should be resolved bilaterally, not through multi-national forums (therefore no third parties).
I cinesi sono disposti a discuterne multilaterlmente con l’ASEAN ma non con attori terzi come gli USA

29. Extension of the Continental Shelf
1994 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gave parties the right to make formal claims that extend beyond 200 nautical miles from a coastal state (Extended Continental Shelf), under certain geological conditions;
In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submit claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf which extends their EEZ to 350 nautical miles;
China files objections immediately and issues a stern warning to countries not to claim the islands under Chinese sovereignty;
China submits a claim to the Commission with a map of U-shaped boundary that includes 80% of the area

30. Under UNCLOS the sea has been divided in different zones
Under UNCLOS the sea has been divided in different zones. But to define the zones first there should be a baseline. So, we will start from the baseline.
1) BASELINE:- Normally a sea baseline follows the  low water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing island or is highly unstable, straight baseline may be used.
2) INTERNAL WATERS:- Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resources. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters.
3) TERRITORIAL WATERS:- It is mentioned in UNCLOS Part-II, section 2 Article 3. Territorial waters are 12 Nm from the baseline( 22 km, 14 miles). The coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use and use of any resources. vessels are given the right to innocent passage through any territorial water. Innocent passage is defined in section 3, article 17. It is defined as passing through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not prejudicial for the peace, good order or the security of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapon practice and spying are not innocent, and submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. nations can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of its security.
4) ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS:- The convention set the Archipelagic states in the part IV which also defines how the state can draw its territorial border. A baseline is drawn between the outermost points of outermost island, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one another. All waters inside this baseline are designated Archipelagic waters. The state has full sovereignty over these waters(like internal water) but foreign vessels have right to innocent passage(like territorial water).
5) CONTIGOUS ZONE:- It is defined in part II, section 4, article 33. Beyond 12 Nm limit, there is further 12 Nm from territorial sea baseline, the contigous zone, in which a state can continue to enforce law in four specific areas: Customs, taxation(fiscal), Immigration and Pollution(sanitary). Vessels carrying noxious substance or waste may be turned away on public health and environmental grounds.
6) EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES (EEZ) :- Defined in part V, article 55 to 57. These extend from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 Nm( 370 Km, 230 miles) from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.
7) CONTINENTAL SHELF:- It is defined in part VI, article 76. It is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin's outer edge, or 200 Nm from the coastal state's baseline whichever is greater.A state continental shelf may exceed 200 Nm until the natural prolongation ends.

32. The PRC contends that China was the first country to discover and name the islands in the South China Sea (which it calls Nanhai, or South Sea);
China asserts that it developed these landmasses, islets and shoals, and exercises political jurisdiction over them;
The PRC maintains that people from China started to fish around the Spratly Islands during China’s Ming Dynasty ( ), and that the Spratly Islands first came under the political jurisdiction of China during the Yuan Dynasty (1271 to 1368, when the Mongolian empire conquered and ruled China);

33. The PRC makes the most expansive claims of any of the South China Sea claimants, marking its maps with a broad U-shaped, nine-dash line that includes around 80% of the sea;
It adopted the dashed line from maps with an 11-dash line first drawn in 1947 under the pre-revolution Republic of China government, which are also the basis of Taiwan’s claim;
China has not clarified whether it is claiming sovereignty over the entire sea and seabed enclosed by the nine-dash line, or is making a more limited set of claims, such as to the land features within the line or to historical rights, such as fishing or navigation rights;

35. Chinese Buildings on the Islands
The speed and scale of China’s island-building spree have alarmed other countries with interests in the region.
China has focused its efforts on construction. So far it has constructed port facilities, military buildings and an airstrip on the islands, with two more airstrips under construction.
Several reefs have been destroyed outright to serve as a foundation for new islands, and the process also causes extensive damage to the surrounding marine ecosystem.
US sent a guided-missile destroyer, within 12 nautical miles of the islands,

38. Why is China Building Islands in the SCS?
China is building substantial new islands on different reefs: airbases or install civilian populations. Objective: Bolstering its sovereignty claims.
China, the Philippines and Vietnam all maintain small civilian outposts in the SCS as a way of legitimizing their claims (and deterring military actions by other claimants).
Building the islands an end unto itself? Part VII of UNCLOS specifies that “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Under this provision, even if China were to gain control over the Spratlys, its control would be limited to the 12 nautical mile territorial waters, without an accompanying exclusive economic zone.
If, however, China can create “islands” on top of previously submerged features and create conditions for these new islands to “sustain human habitation,” then China would have strongly bolstered its claims to the SCS.

42. Latest Developments
January 2013: after several standoffs with the Chinese navy near Jackson Atoll and Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines issue an arbitration case against the PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has been ratified by both the Philippines and the PRC, as well as 165 other states and the EU;
On October 29, 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration rules that it has jurisdiction to hear the case and finds the Philippines’ submissions admissible;
April–September 2015: China speeds up its constructions programs on Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, completing a 3,125 meter runway;
In the arbitration, Manila seeks rulings on three interrelated matters. First, none of the insular features in the South China Sea — be it the Scarborough Shoal in the northern sector of the Sea or the Spratly Islands in the southern sector — are capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). They are ‘rocks’ at best, which generate a territorial sea at most.
Second, as there are no overlapping entitlements in these waters, Beijing’s land reclamation activities in the southern sector of the South China Sea, and law enforcement actions across both sectors, have interfered with Manila’s sovereign rights and freedoms in its EEZ.
Finally, China’s claims based on ‘historic rights’ within the ‘nine-dash line’ have no basis in UNCLOS and under international law.
A ruling on the merits of the case, including a ruling of the legality of China’s “nine-dash line” is expected in May or June of this year.

43. October 2015: USS Lassen passes through waters around China’s artificial islands in the SCS, as part of Washington’s “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs);
February 2016: Satellite images show two batteries of eight missile launchers and a radar system on Woody (or Yongxing) Island in the Paracel, controlled by the PLA

44. On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issues a unanimous award favoring the Philippines in its maritime dispute against China, concluding that China’s nine-dash line claim and accompanying claims to historic rights have no validity under international law; that no feature in the Spratly Islands, including Taiwan occupied Itu Aba (or Taiping Island), is an island under UNCLOS; and that the behavior of Chinese ships physically obstructing Philippine vessels is unlawful.
Although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. The tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.
PRC, keeping to its position announced before the ruling, says that the Tribunal’s award is null and void and has no binding force. Beijing neither accepts nor recognizes it.

45. A “South China-centered” regional arms race?
Southeast Asian states led an arms race in reaction to China’s aggressive claims to islands in the South China sea

46. Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute
Two small islets in the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan) in addition to 35 smaller rocks;
Called Dokdo by South Korea, Takeshima by Japan and Liancourt Rocks by the West;
Rich fishing grounds and potential gas deposit;
Administered by the ROK as part of Ulleung-county, North Kyeongsang Province
Japan claims sovereignty, while Korea denounces it as colonialistic
Koreans view Dokdo as a symbol of victim to Japanese colonial invasion

48. Japan incorporates the islands in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, arguing the islands were “terra nullius”;
Korean Government Imperial Ordinance No. 41-Article 2 stipulates Dokdo as part of Korea;
After WWII: Gen. D. MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers:
- SCAPIN #677 – suspends Japanese administration over the Liancourt Rocks along with many other islands
- SCAPIN #1033 – prohibits Japanese ships and crew from entering the 12 nautical mile seas off the Liancourt Rocks (MacArthur Line);
In the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and former allied powers, the ownership of Dokdo was not settled in this treaty

49. With the announcement of the Peace Line in 1952 and the construction of a lighthouse with a coastal guard contingent in 1954, Korea has physically possessed Dokdo for more than 50 years;
Diplomatic normalization, 1965: Dokdo not included in the Basic Agreement. Both countries maintained a low-profile approach to the issue;
Japan scraps Fisheries Agreement with Korea in the middle of Asian financial crisis;
In 2005, Shimane Prefecture designates “Takeshima Day”, prompting Korean reaction to abandon quiet approach;
ROK’s President Lee Myung-bak visited the islets on August 10, 2012 (first presidential visit);
On August 21, 2012 Japan officially proposed to refer the dispute to the ICJ. This was officially rejected by South Korea on August 30