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© 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

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Presentation on theme: "© 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin."— Presentation transcript:

1 © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin

2 Introduction In 1970s: – Expansion of loans to Eastern bloc, Latin America and other LDCs. Beginning of 1980s: – Debt moratoria announced by Brazil and Mexico. – Increased loan loss reserves – Citicorp set aside additional $3 billion in reserves for example

3 Introduction (continued) Late 1980s and early 1990s: – Expanding investments in emerging markets. – Peso devaluation and subsequent restructuring U.S. loan guarantees under Clinton Administration More recently: – Asian and Russian crises. – Turkey and Argentina Argentina’s focus on fiscal surplus – Economic growth in the 2000s and reduction in external debt. – MYRAs – Brady Bonds

4 Were Lessons Learned? U.S. FIs limited exposure to in Asia during mid and late 1990s – Not all: Chase Manhattan Corp. emerging market losses $150 million to $200 million range – Poor earnings by J.P. Morgan. Losses in Russia with payoffs of 5 cents on the dollar

5 Credit Risk versus Sovereign Risk Governments can impose restrictions on debt repayments to outside creditors. – Loan may be forced into default even though borrower had a strong credit rating at origination of loan. – Legal remedies are very limited. Need to assess credit quality and sovereign risk

6 Sovereign Risk Debt repudiation – Since WW II, only China, Cuba and North Korea have repudiated debt. – Recent steps to forgive debts of most severe cases conditional on reforms targeted to improve poverty problems Rescheduling – Most common form of sovereign risk. – South Korea, 1998 – Argentina, 2001

7 Debt Rescheduling More likely with international loan financing rather than bond financing Loan syndicates often comprised of same group of FIs versus large numbers of bondholders facilitates rescheduling Cross-default provisions Specialness of banks argues for rescheduling but, creates incentives to default again if bailouts are automatic

8 Country Risk Evaluation Outside evaluation models: – The Euromoney Index – The Economist Intelligence Unit ratings Highest risk in countries such as Iraq, Zimbabwe and Myanmar. – Institutional Investor Index 2006 placed Switzerland at least chance of default and Liberia as highest. U.S. not the lowest risk.

9 Web Resources To learn more about the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country ratings, visit: The Economist www.economist.comwww.economist.com

10 Country Risk Evaluation Internal Evaluation Models – Statistical models: Country risk-scoring models based on primarily economic ratios.

11 Statistical Models Commonly used economic ratios: – Debt service ratio: (Interest + amortization on debt)/Exports – Import ratio: Total imports / Total FX reserves – Investment ratio: Real investment / GNP – Variance of export revenue – Domestic money supply growth

12 Problems with Statistical CRA Models Measurements of key variables. Population groups – Finer distinction than reschedulers and nonreschedulers may be required. Political risk factors may not be captured – Strikes, corruption, elections, revolution. – Corruption Perceptions Index

13 Problems with Statistical CRA Models (continued) Portfolio aspects – Many large FIs with LDC exposures diversify across countries – Diversification of risks not necessarily captured in CRA models Incentive aspects of rescheduling: – Borrowers and Lenders: Benefits Costs – Stability Model likely to require frequent updating.

14 Using Market Data to Measure Risk Secondary market for LDC debt: – Sellers and buyers Market segments – Brady Bonds – Sovereign Bonds – Performing LDC loans – Nonperforming LDC loans

15 Key Variables Affecting LDC Loan Prices Most significant variables: – Debt service ratios – Import ratio – Accumulated debt arrears – Amount of loan loss provisions

16 Pertinent Websites BIS www.bis.orgwww.bis.org Heritage Foundation www.heritage.orgwww.heritage.org Institutional Investor www.institutionalinvestor.comwww.institutionalinvestor.com IMF www.imf.orgwww.imf.org The Economist www.economist.comwww.economist.com Transparency International www.transparency.orgwww.transparency.org World Bank www.worldbank.orgwww.worldbank.org

17 *Mechanisms for Dealing with Sovereign Risk Exposure Debt-equity swaps – Example: Citibank sells $100 million Chilean loan to Merrill Lynch for $91 million. Merrill Lynch (market maker) sells to IBM at $93 million. Chilean government allows IBM to convert the $100 million face value loan into pesos at a discounted rate to finance investments in Chile.

18 *MYRAs Aspects of MYRAs: – Fee charged by bank for restructuring – Interest rate charged – Grace period – Maturity of loan – Option features Concessionality

19 *Other Mechanisms Loan Sales Bond for Loan Swaps (Brady bonds) – Transform LDC loan into marketable liquid instrument. – Usually senior to remaining loans of that country.


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