1. After the Cold War

2. 4 Post-Cold War periods

3. First Period,
Triumph of global capitalism
Russia’s transition crisis
The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak
The eastward expansion of NATO and EU
Formation of the global neoliberal regime

4. Second Period,
The Islamist challenge and the Bush response
Rise of new power centers
Russia’s resurgence
Relative decline of US hegemony

5. Third Period,
The Great Recession in the global economy
The US attempt to shore up hegemony by liberal means
The crisis of European integration
The rise of China as a global power
“Reset” in Russia’s relations with the West

6. Russia’s pushback vs. Western containment
Fourth Period, 2013-…
Russia’s pushback vs. Western containment
Ukraine: the most serious geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West since the early 1980s
a sense of zero-sum game
deadlocked political dialog
Information war
economic war
winding down of Russia-West security cooperation
heightened military preparations on both sides
Destabilization in the Middle East, and Russia’s return to the region in a more
Progress in Eurasian integration (EAU, SCO)
US-led containment of China

7. Russia’s transition crisis:

8. Russia’s Great Depression:
GDP - fell by 45%
Industrial output – fell by 49%
Agricultural output – fell by 32% :
Textile, leather and fur, and footwear industries:
Output fell by nearly 10 times,
Garment industry - by 5 times,
Meat and dairy industries - by 3 times.
The share of high-tech products in GDP fell
from 45.3 to 25 percent of the GDP.
In 2000, labour productivity in Russia was 5 times lower than in the United States
Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor: Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Millen, Alec Irwin and John Gershman (Eds.), Common Courage Press, Monroe, 2000
Facts and Figures: Raw Materials Exporter. - Ekonomika i zhizn, No. 43, 2000

9. A double blow to the livelihoods of most Russians:
The social impact:
A double blow to the livelihoods of most Russians:
a decline in their incomes and savings
a drastic reduction of social services for which they depended on the state.

10. In 1999, the incomes of over 40% of the population (60 million people) were below the official subsistence level of 1,138 roubles a month, which was the equivalent of about US$40.[i]
The official (government-determined) minimum wage in 2000 was 132 roubles (US$ 4,74) a month.[ii]
The average monthly salary was 2,403 roubles (US$86).[iii] About half of all families with one child lived below the subsistence level.
In 75% of families with three children, each family member had less than a dollar a day to live on.[iv] [i] Izvestia,
[ii] Moscow Times,
[iii] AFP,
[iv] Moscow Times,
[v] VCIOM, Press-vypusk

11. Social inequality
In the last years of the Soviet Union, the gap between the rich and poor was estimated to be 4:1.
It is usually assumed that if the gap grows beyond 10:1, society becomes unstable.
In 1999, the gap in Russia was 15:1, according to official statistics.
According to the estimates of the Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the actual gap was much wider:
Total income of the 10% richest households was 44 times higher than that of the poorest 10%.[ii]
[i] Izvestia,
[ii] Moscow Times,

12. The world’s billionaires, 2011, Forbes Magazine:
Total – 1,210
US – 412
Russia – 101
China – 95
India – 55
Germany – 52
Brazil – 40
Turkey – 38
Hong Kong – 36
UK – 33
The Wealth Report, 2012:

13. Former Russian billionaire No.1 – Mikhail Khodorkovsky

14. Khodorkovsky’ letter from jail, 2004:
“Russian liberalism has suffered a defeat because it ignored two things: first, some key elements of Russia’s historical experience, second, vital interests of the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. And it was mortally afraid of telling the truth.
I do not want to say that Russia’s liberal leaders set it as their goal to deceive the people. Many of the liberals who came to power with Yeltsin were convinced that liberalism offered the only right solution for Russia, and that a “liberal revolution” was needed in this exhausted country which had historically tasted so little freedom. But they understood this revolution in a very peculiar, elitist way. They cared about the conditions of life and work of those 10% of Russians who were ready to embrace decisive social change and to abandon government paternalism. But they forgot about the 90%. And they covered up their failures with lies.

15. …They deceived most Russians about privatization
…They deceived most Russians about privatization. They gave everyone a privatization voucher, promising that at some point, one would be able to buy two cars with it. Well, if you were an enterprising financial dealer with access to insider information and the brains to analyze it, you would probably be able to buy ten cars with your voucher. But the promise was given to everyone. They closed their eyes to the social realities of Russia, as they carried out privatization. Ignoring the social costs of it, they called it painless, honest and fair. But we do know what the people think of this privatization.
…No fundamental reformation of society is possible without social stability and social peace. But the Russian liberals chose to disregard it and created a chasm between themselves and the people. And they used the information-bureaucratic pump of PR technologies to fill the chasm with liberal myths…”
“Vedomosti”, March 29, 2004

16. Contraction of Russian power

18. NATO enlargement,

20. 1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power
Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end of the Cold War:
1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power
Territorial losses
Economic depression (loss of 50% of the GDP)
The military crisis
Ideological neutralization
after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20th century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right
2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces with minimal regulation by the state
3. Political affiliation with the West
4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony

21. Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in the Cold War sense:
Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal regime
RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist, cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions, seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies

22. RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR
The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:
The nuclear risks
Possibility of a totalitarian backlash
Potential for civil war
Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space
Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US (not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other states) – or:
Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US hegemony (a problem for the US)

23. The economy*
GDP, PPP - $3.56 trln. (No.7 in the world)
World’s 10th biggest exporter
GDP per capita - $24,800
Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9% in 2009, 4,5% in 2010, 4.3% in 2011, 3.4% in 2012, 1.3% in 2013, 0.6% in 2014, -3.7% in 2015
Public debt (2013 est.) – 13.4% of GDP
Unemployment rate – 5.1% *

29. Under Yeltsin, Russia became a capitalist country, but its state was in disarray, and its economy in deep depression
Under Putin, Russian capitalism was consolidated through rebuilding of state authority
Russia achieved relative stability and recovered the status of a Great Power
The costs:
Stymied democratic development
Rise of bureaucratic (or state) capitalism

30. Russia continues to need major changes
Troubles in the global economy have exposed Russia’s economic fragility
The Russian economy needs major modernization to compete successfully
The post-Soviet Russian state has many flaws and needs major reforms to help meet the challenges faced by Russia
The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality

31. Social inequality, OECD data, Dec. 2011

35. The challenges
Modernization of the economy – from hydrocarbons to hi-tech
Rebuilding infrastructure
Social investments: health, education, other social programs to improve quality of life

36. Since Putin’s coming to power in 2000, Russia has been in a conservative phase
The new ruling class is determined to maintain its wealth and power
A soft authoritarian regime with elements of democracy
Rising influence of the Russian Orthodox Church
Rejection of some elements of Western liberalism

37. The bureaucracy is bigger, more powerful, more corrupt, and less accountable
Among the bureaucrats, security and military elites have gained commanding positions
Competition between them and other elites
Rule of law remains very weak

38. Levada Center opinion poll, November 2012:
57% - Russia needs reforms
20% - need for decisive change in the system of government
10% - ready to live under “existing stability”
19% - the rulers are doing enough to reform the state

39. Geopolitics of Eurasia, according to Nicholas Spykman

40. From Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard

41. http://urbandemographics. blogspot

43. Russia’s foreign policy compass
The Western vector - US, EU, NATO
The Eastern vector – Asia-Pacific
The Southern vector - the Muslim world, India
The Northern vector - the Arctic

48. Pew Research global polls, March-May 2013 and Spring 2015

52. Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009: http://surveys. globescan

53. The main elements of Russian foreign policy thinking
Primacy of national interests
Attempts to increase the degree of national sovereignty
Wariness of Western support of opposition forces in Russia
A drive for re-integration of Eurasia
Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other international actors
The Eastward drift
Primacy of trade and investment issues
Growing security concerns and major investments in military power
Readiness for international cooperation to work out joint solutions to problems

54. Russia’s military budget
Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of Soviet GDP
Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991
Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year
: a new state armaments program
Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion).
63% allocated for the procurement of modern weapons and equipment
27% towards defense research and development.
2014 – defence spending accounted for 3.5% of Russia’s GDP (CIA est.)

55. NATO
Russia
Tanks
12,332
22,950
APCs
31,420
25,080
Submarines 84 66
Principal surface combatants
194 57
Bomber/fighter ground attack
1,905
1,648
Deployable military personnel
3,579 mln.
1,200 mln. (+ active reserve of 0.75 mln.)
Military spending, 2010
$1,085 trln.
$56 bln.

59. Russia’s place on the Global Firepower Index:

60. Russian elite interests
The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class, product of the post-communist transformation
Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms
Dependent on the West, primarily the US
Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it
Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR
Assertive in the political sphere
Seeks economic opportunities worldwide
Intertwined with state bureaucracy

61. The bureaucrats
The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites
Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get their property
Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West
Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis
Federal civilian bureaucracy
Interested in whatever protects and increases their power
Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests

62. The national bourgeoisie
Well below the ranks of the oligarchy
Gets little from the West
Feels dominated by the oligarchs
Is nationalist and protectionist
The politicians
1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United Russia” – the ruling party under Putin
The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis

63. “Which countries should Russia develop cooperation with in the first place?” Levada poll, Jan. 2013
USA 31 18
Germany, France, UK, other West European countries 49 48
Japan 27 22
India, China 30
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, other CIS countries 53 46
Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea 11 10
Hard to say 16

64. “Which of these countries should Russia build good relations with for the long term?” Levada poll, Dec. 2014
May 2004
April 2008
April 2013
December 2014
China 9 12 21 47
CIS countries, such as Ukraine and Belarus 34 35 28
West European countries, such as France and Germany 25 20 8
USA 13 7 4
Moslem countries 1 2 3
Others
Hard to say 14 19 27