1. Nagarjuna (Part 2) (c. 150-250 AD)
The Fundamentals of the Middle Way
(Mulamadhyamaka-Karika)
(Text, pp )
Revised, 8/5/17

2. The Historical Evolution
of Buddhism

3. The Major Buddhist Traditions
Theravada (“The Way of the Elders”) - Sri Lanka & Southeast Asia
Mahayana (“The Greater Vehicle”) - China, Korea, & Japan (& Tibet & Mongolia)
Vajrayana (“The Way of the Diamond Thunderbolt”) - Tibet & Mongolia * * *
Vajrayana is a development within the Mahayana tradition.

4. & the Rise of Theravada (4th century BC - 1st century AD)
The Early Schools
& the Rise of Theravada
(4th century BC - 1st century AD)

5. Council at Rajagraha (483BC)
Council at Vaisali (383 BC)
Sthaviravada
Mahasamghika
Council at Pataliputta (247 BC)
Vibhajyavada
Sarvastivada
(c. 225 BC)
(c. 200 BC)
Theravada
Vatsiputriya
Golulika
Ekavyavaharika
Sammatiya Bhadrayamiya Dharmottariya Sammagurika
Lokottaravada
(c. 180 BC)
Bahushrutiya
Prajnaptivada
Mahisasaka Kasyapiya Dharmaguptaka
(c. 125 BC)
(c. 100 BC) * *
Vaibheshika
Sautrantika *
Caitika
(c. 50 BC)
Uttarashaila *
Aparashaila
*Contributed to rise of Mahayana

6. of Mahayana (& Vajrayana)
The Rise & Development
of Mahayana (& Vajrayana)

7. Mahayana Buddhism India China Japan Tibet * ** *Nagarjuna
Madhyamaka (2d-3d centuries AD)
Three Treatise School
San-lun
Sanron
Ashvaghosa (1st century AD) **
Consciousness-Only
Yogacara (3d-4th centuries AD)
Mei-shih
Hosso
Tantrayana (3d century AD)
Chen-yen
Shingon (True Word)
Vajrayana
Jodo-shu & Jodo-shin-shu
Sukhavati (Pure Land) (1st century AD)
Ching-tu
Ch’an
Ti’en-Tai (Lotus)
Hua-yen (Flower Graland)
Zen
Tendai
Nicheren Shoshu
*Nagarjuna
**Vasubandhu

8. The Spread of Buddhism * * Buddhism out of India by 1000 AD Theravada
Spheres of Influence *
Buddhism out of India by 1000 AD *
Theravada
Mahayana
Vajrayana

9. Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamaka-Karika (contains a dedication to the Buddha & 27 chapters)
Chapters contained in our reading (pp )
Causality (Ch 1)
What’s Happening? (Ch 2)
Arising, Enduring, & Dissolving (Ch 7)
The Agent & the Action (Ch 8)
Essence & Existence (Ch 15)
Self & Reality (Ch 18)
Emptiness & the Four Noble Truths (Ch 24)
Nirvana (Ch 25)
The 12-Link Chain of Interdependent Causation (Ch 26)

10. Nagarjuna’s Philosophy of the Middle Way
The “middle way” between what?
metaphysical essentialism & metaphysical nihilism
See footnote 4 on p. 157 of the Text

11. Because the central concept in Nagarjuna’s philosophy of the “middle way” (madhyamaka) is shunyata (“emptiness”),
his perspective is often referred to as “Voidism” or “Shunyavada” (“the way of emptiness”).
(The world -- and the selves & other entities that constitute the world -- are devoid or empty of essence.)

12. Through the method of “critical dialectic,”
Nagarjuna challenges the assumptions of essentialism & nihilism, attempting to demonstrate through rigorous logical analysis that both views are self-contradictory, absurd, & false.

13. If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then (according to Nagarjuna)
there can be no causes, no conditions, & no effects (Ch 1);
nothing can be happening (Ch 2);
nothing can arise, endure, or dissolve (Ch 7);
there can be no agents & no actions & thus no phenomenal world (Ch 8);
there can be no release from self & world, no nirvana (Ch 18, vv. 1-6);
the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha would be false (Ch 24) [why?].

14. Nagarjuna’s critical dialectic
is also directed against various realistic interpretations of the world that appears in experience.*
*Metaphysical realism (in this context) is the view that the phenomenal world is real.

15. Essentialism & Nihilism
Essentialism is the view that reality is made up of eternal, unchanging, independent, & substantial essences (self-essences as well as thing-essences).
Nihilism is the view that there are no such essences & that therefore nothing exists at all.
Essentialism & nihilism agree that only substantial essences can be “really real.”

16. Chapter 1 Causality
Does it make any sense
to imagine that there are causes without effects or conditions without that which is conditioned?
Don’t the ideas of cause & effect go together, i.e., mutually imply each other?
Isn’t that also the case with conditions & the conditioned?

17. Chapter 1.1
If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then “nothing whatever arises.”
Suppose that nihilism is true. Nothing can arise from nothing. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.)
Suppose that essentialism is true. Only eternal & unchanging essences are “really real.” Essences neither come into being nor pass out of being. Nothing can arise.
Now, whatever arises must be caused to arise. But if “nothing whatever arises,” then nothing is caused.

18. The same argument applies to the conditions from which things arise.
Chapter 1.2 & 1.5
The same argument applies to the conditions from which things arise.
If things do not arise, then there can be no conditions of arising.
If nothing arises, then the idea of conditions from which things arise has no application; conditions are not conditions.
So . . .
there are neither causes
nor conditions (1.4)
(if either essentialism or nihilism is true).

19. The argument of
1.6 Since neither being nor non-being can arise, neither can be caused or conditioned.
1.7 If absolutely nothing exists (nihilism), then there can be no causes (or conditions) since causes would be something rather than nothing.
1.8 Can there be uncaused & unconditioned events? If so, why do we need the ideas of cause & condition at all? What does “effect” mean? Doesn’t “effect” logically imply cause & condition? So that if there are effects, there must be causes & conditions, which makes both essentialism & nihilism (which imply no causes or conditions) false.

20. Chapter 1.9
1.9, line 1 If nothing comes into being (essentialism & nihilism), then nothing goes out of being.
1.9, lines 2-3 If nothing begins (essentialism & nihilism), then nothing is preceded by a precipitating (immediately preceding) condition.
1.9, lines 4-5 That which has ceased to exist cannot be a cause or condition of anything else. Is that true? If domino I causes domino II to fall & then ceases to exist, it is still the cause of domino II’s falling, isn’t it?

21. Chapter 1.10
Both essentialism & nihilism agree that if there are no substantial essences, then nothing really exists.
Essentialism holds that there are substantial essences; nihilism holds that there are none.
Either way, the ideas of cause & condition are rendered meaningless.
If nothing really exists (nihilism), then causes & conditions do not really exist.
If only substantial (i.e., unchanging) essences really exist (essentialism), then, again, causes & conditions, which are part of the process of change (becoming) do not really exist.

22. So if either essentialism or nihilism is true,
then the changing world we experience (the phenomenal world of causes, conditions, effects, & events)
is ontologically unreal, an ILLUSION.
(Does N. really disagree with this? If so, what is his position in contrast to essentialism & nihilism?)

23. How about metaphysical realism?
Does it fare any better than essentialism or nihilism, according to Nagarjuna?

24. According to the realist perspective,
the changing, pluralistic, & particularistic phenomenal world of causes, conditions, effect, events, and entities is real.
That world really exists, but it is neither Being (unchanging essence) nor Non-Being (nothing).
It is a world in which entities change as a result of causes & conditions (cause & effect relations). It is a world of Becoming.

25. Nagarjuna does not accept realism either.
In 1.1, he denies that
an event can be caused by itself,
or by something other than itself,
or by both itself & something other than itself,
or by nothing at all (i.e., neither by itself nor by something other than itself).
In 1.11, lines 1-2, he states that an effect cannot pre-exist in its causes & conditions. Why not? Is it because the pre-existence of effect in cause/condition obliterates the distinction between cause/condition & effect? Is it because such pre-existence makes the effect the cause/condition of itself, requiring it to exist before it exists (which seems absurd)?
But

26. in 1.11, lines 3-4, N. asks how
then why should a particular effect arise from any particular cause or condition?
Why should we think that it is caused or conditioned at all?
If the cause/condition is one thing and the effect is another thing, then why should THIS effect arise from THIS cause/condition?
Perhaps there are neither causes/conditions nor effects, but just EVENTS that come and go without being caused or conditioned.
an effect that does not pre-exist in its causes or conditions can arise from them.
That is, if the effect exists outside of its causes or conditions,

27. So (as N. states in 1.1)
events cannot arise from themselves,
nor can they arise from something other than themselves; and
they cannot arise from both themselves & something other than themselves since the mere combination of two non-causes does not produce a cause.
But, also, events cannot arise “without a cause,” i.e., from nothing, since nothing can arise from nothing; “nothing” cannot cause or give rise to anything.
Thus,

28. “nothing whatever arises” (1.1, line 1)
it seems that
“nothing whatever arises”
(1.1, line 1)

29. N. points out another problem with the idea of causality in 1.13:
If the conditions that give rise to an effect are not self-created, but rather are created by something other than themselves, which is in turn created by something other than itself, & so on to infinity, then the effect can never arise.
E cannot arise until C1 has arisen, but C1 cannot arise until C2 has arisen, but C2 cannot arise until C3 has arisen, but C3 cannot arise until C4 has arisen, & so on to infinity.
(infinite regress)

30. it seems that (contrary to metaphysical realism & common sense)
Again,
it seems that (contrary to metaphysical realism & common sense) *
“nothing whatever arises”
(1.1, line 1)
(See also 1.14) *
Isn’t this conclusion also contrary to the Buddhist doctrine of the interdependent origination of all things?

31. Chapter 2 What’s Happening?
2.1 & 2.2 Past, present, & future. Neither past nor future is Now; neither exists. Does the Now exist?
2.3 & Both essentialism & nihilism deny that anything can really happen. So if either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there are no happeners at all, & the now-happening cannot happen.
2.4 Realism holds that something is happening now (although what is happening might not happen, i.e., its happening is not necessary but contingent).

32. Realism is closer to ordinary, common sense experience on this matter.
Should we, then, accept the realist perspective instead of either essentialism or nihilism?
Nagarjuna rejects essentialism & nihilism, but he also rejects realism.

33. If realism is true, i.e., if something is really happening now,
then we can distinguish between (1) what is happening now and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5).
That is, in any happening, there are two happeners -- the happening & the happener (e.g., writing & writer) (2.6).
If we think of the happener and the happening as two distinct realities, then, it seems, there could be a happener without a happening (e.g., a writer but no writing) (2.10).
And doesn’t the happener as well as the happening happen (the writer as well as the writing) (2.11)?
Doesn’t this analysis also imply an infinite regress?

34. Nothing can begin to happen.
Take the distinction between (1) what is happening now and (2) the happening of what is happening now (2.5).
What is happening now cannot happen without the happening of what is happening now.
But the happening of what is happening now cannot happen without the happening of the happening of what is happening now.
And the happening of the happening of what is happening now cannot happen without the happening of the happening of the happening of what is happening now.
And so on, ad infinitum.
Nothing can begin to happen.

35. (2.6, 2.10, 2.11)
Consider also the distinction between happener & happening (e.g., writer & writing).
For the writing to happen, there must be a writer.
But the writer must also happen in order to write.
In the happening of the writer, there must be a happening of the happening of the writer, and there must also be a happening of the happening of the happening of the writer, and so on to infinity.
No writing is possible.

36. In 2.12-14 & 2.17, Nagarjuna considers
the beginning and the end (cessation) of what is happening now.

37. Where is the beginning of what is happening now?
It cannot be in the past or in the future since they do not exist.
Also, if the beginning of the present is in the past (common sense & realist view), then the present began before it existed (which makes no sense).
And the beginning of the present cannot be in the present since in that case the beginning of the present would follow its existence (i.e., the present would first exist & then begin to exist).
And . . .

38. where is the end (cessation) of what is happening now?
2.17
It cannot be in the present, for in that case the now-happening would end before it ends.
It cannot be in the past since then the now-happening would have ended before it began.
If the cessation of what is happening now is in the future (common sense & realist view), then what is happening now will never cease because the future never arrives.
His discussion seems to imply that . . .

39. whatever is happening now can neither begin nor end.
But what does N. mean by the following statement?
“Happening is the same as beginning to happen, and having already happened is the same as ceasing to happen.” (2.17, lines 5-6)

40. According to Nagarjuna,
According to Nagarjuna,
Neither happeners nor non-happeners are unchanging (“standing still”).
The idea of an unchanging happener (a happener that does not happen) is nonsensical (i.e., self-contradictory).
Non-happeners are not unchanging (permanent) because they do not exist.
[What about a Being (e.g., God) that neither happens nor changes - a non-happener that exists?]

41. The argument of
Either (A) the happener is identical with the happening, or (B) the happener is [ontologically] different from the happening (2.18).
If (A), then actor & action, deed & doer, are identical (which seems false) (2.19).
If (B), then there could be happeners without happenings and happenings without happeners (which also seems false) (2.20).
The idea that happener & happening are neither identical nor different is incomprehensible (2.21).
[What about both identical and different?]

42. That which is now happening
is not caused by its own happening (i.e., by itself) (2.22),
nor by a happening other than itself (2.23),
nor does its happening happen in the past, or in the future, or in the present (since it never begins) (2.24).
The same is true of non-existent happeners (2.24).
Therefore,

43. neither an existent nor a non-existent happener’s happening happens -- neither in the past, nor in the present, nor in the future. The happening, the happener, and the happened are all non-existent.
2.25

44. 7.1-7.3 Can anything arise? Chapter 7 Arising, Enduring, & Dissolving
7.1 Arising either arises or not. If not, then it cannot give rise to other, further arisings (nothing can arise from that which itself does not arise). If arising arises, then it must have the “three characteristics” of anything that arises, i.e., it itself must arise, endure for a time, and then dissolve.
7.2 The “three characteristics” must occur either separately or simultaneously. If they occur separately, then there is an infinite regress, & nothing can ever begin to arise (see next slide & fn 4 on p. 214 in the Text). If they occur simultaneously, then arising would arise, endure, & dissolve all at the same time, instantaneously, & thus nothing could exist.

45. The infinite regress problem implied in 7.2
If arising must arise, endure, & dissolve, then the arising, enduring, & dissolving of arising must each also arise, endure, & dissolve, & so on, ad infinitum.
If enduring must also arise, endure, & dissolve, then the arising, enduring, & dissolving of enduring must each arise, endure, & dissolve, & so on, ad infinitum.
Dissolving, too, must arise, endure, & dissolve, & the arising, enduring, & dissolving of dissolving must each arise, endure, & dissolve, & so on, ad infinitum.
Thus, nothing could ever arise in the first place.
(Other infinite regress passages in Chapter 7: See Text, 7.3 & fn 3 [p. 160], 7.14, 7.18, & 7.19, lines 1-2, & fns 3 & 5 [p. 160].)

46. The infinite regress problem can be avoidedIF
there is . . .

47. “a non-arising arising of arising,”
i.e., an ontologically foundational arising (“first cause”) that does not arise from anything else,
that just IS & ENDURES but neither arises nor dissolves,
and which is the original, primary Source of all arising, enduring, & dissolving (7.4-5).
7.19, lines 3-4: “But if that which gives rise to all arising is non-arising, then the now-arising could arise.”

48. But Nagarjuna does not accept this (“first cause”) solution. Why not
But Nagarjuna does not accept this (“first cause”) solution. Why not? See Text, 7.4-8, 7.13, & 7.17.
(Are his reasons for rejecting this approach good ones?)
Also,

49. Nagarjuna himself recognizes that the thrust of his arguments, i. e
Nagarjuna himself recognizes that the thrust of his arguments, i.e., that nothing arises, endures, or dissolves (7.14, 7.20),
seems to be inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of interdependent origination (which he accepts [see Ch 26]).
See

50. After focusing on arising, N
After focusing on arising, N. directs his attention to enduring & dissolving:
Passages on enduring: 7.22, 7.25, 7.27, & 7.28
Passages on dissolving: 7.21, 7.23, 7.24, 7.26, 7.29, 7.30, 7.31, & 7.32
He uses arguments similar to the ones we have been discussing to arrive at his radical conclusion in :

52. Chapter 8 The Agent & the Action
If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there are neither agents nor actions. If there are neither agents nor actions, then nothing arises. If nothing arises, then there is no phenomenal world. If there is no phenomenal world, then there is no liberation from it & Buddhism is false.
“It cannot be” verses based on the law of non-contradiction (which N. accepts & uses).
The principle of correlativity: no independently existing agents or actions; correlativity the key to understanding “all things.”

53. Chapter 9 Perceiver & Perception
The idea that perceiver & perception have separate existences (perceiver prior to perception)
9.4, 9.8, & 9.9 Absurd implications of that idea
9.3 & 9.6, 9.5, 9.7, 9.10, 9.11, & The true view: Correlativity of perceiver & perception
Chapter 9 is not in our text reading.

54. Chapter 10 is not in our text reading.
Chapter 10 Fire & Fuel
10.1 Fire & fuel are either identical or different (distinct realities)
& Criticism of the idea that they are different
10.4 Criticism of the idea that they are identical
Criticism of the interactionist theory
Criticism of the common sense view that fuel is more fundamental than fire
The true view: the relationality & interdependence of fire and fuel (correlativity again)
Implications of the fire-fuel relationship with regard to the nature of the phenomenal world (including the self)
Chapter 10 is not in our text reading.

55. Chapter 11 Non-Beginning (Samsara)
Chapter 11 is not in our text reading.
The nature of samsara
Is birth prior [i.e., ontologically prior] to, subsequent to, or simultaneous with aging & dying? [None of the above.] Is there, in reality, any birth, aging, or dying?
11.7 “If samsara has no beginning ” [then nada?]
11.8 Whatever is [IS], is without beginning.
(If either essentialism or nihilism is true, then there is no samsara, & that would negate the message of the Buddha.)

56. Chapter 15 Essence & Existence
& Implications of essentialism
Entities without (devoid of) essence? Shunyata vs essentialism
15.6-7, The Buddha vs essentialism & nihilism

57. Chapter 18 Self & Reality
The emptiness (shunyata) of the self & the consequences of realizing that
18.6 The true Buddhist position on the self (neither self nor no-self)?
18.7 Criticism of language & thought
18.8 A tetralemma: the ontological status of the [phenomenal] world
18.9 The nature of reality
The ontological status of interdependent entities

58. Chapter 24 Emptiness & the Four Noble Truths
Slide under construction….

59. 25.1-2 N’s problem: How can nirvana arise?
Chapter 25 Nirvana
N’s problem: How can nirvana arise?
25.3 & What nirvana is not
Nirvana not an existing phenomenon.
Nirvana not non-existent (non-being).
Nirvana does not both exist & not-exist.
25.10 & The true view: Nirvana is neither an existing phenomenon nor a non-being

60. Tetralemmas on the ontological status of the Buddha
Tetralemmas on the ontological status of the Buddha
The Buddha during his lifetime
did not exist
did not not-exist
did not both exist & not-exist
did not neither exist nor not-exist
The Buddha in nirvana
does not exist
does not not-exist
does not both exist & not-exist
does not neither exist nor not-exist

61. The equivalence of samsara & nirvana
The argument for the equivalence of samsara & nirvana (they are both equivalent to emptiness) (see fn 3 on p. 167 in the Text).
If Shunyavada is true, it is pointless to speculate about nirvana, the finite & the infinite, identity & difference, permanence & impermanence, etc. (If all things are empty [shunya] of essence, then there are no real predicates because there are no real subjects.)

62. Nagarjuna’s conclusion (25.24)

63. Chapter 26 The Twelve-Link Chain of Interdependent Arising
See next slide….

64. The Bhavachakra Becoming Wheel of 12. 1. Aging & Dying Ignorance 2.
11.
Impulse to Exist
Birth
Heaven 3.
10.
Con- scious- ness
Human Realm
Demon Realm
Becom- ing
Greed Delusion Hatred
Bhavachakra 4. 9.
Hungry Ghost Realm
Animal Realm
Mind- Body
Cling- ing
Becoming 8.
Six Senses 5.
Hell
Craving 6. 7.
Sensations
Contact

65. The End