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Applied HRO David Allen, District FMO Sequoia – Kings Canyon NP

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Presentation on theme: "Applied HRO David Allen, District FMO Sequoia – Kings Canyon NP"— Presentation transcript:

1 Applied HRO David Allen, District FMO Sequoia – Kings Canyon NP
Safety Officer, CA Fire Use Team emeritus Kristy Lund, Interagency FMO Coronado NF, Saguaro National Park

2 Objectives Identify Challenges Facing IMTs
Review High Reliability Organizing (HRO) Concepts Present a Tool Box of Behaviors that enhance Incident Management Team Effectiveness We will not be teaching an entire HRO course. A full training class on HRO usually takes three days. Dave Allen’s anti-virus analogy (focus here) Want HRO to be running in the back ground like an anti-virus program. Protecting us from attack. With a good antivirus program you don’t even know it’s working. When we go operational, we should hardly know its going on. HRO helps shape team processes, team philosophy, and team dynamics

3 Why Highly Reliable Wildland Fire Operations?
All these accidents where organizational failures. A single person didn’t make one bad decision, but we had an organizational failure. In clear text, we want to prevent further accidents. We need to avoid more accident investigations. What’s the definition of insanity: Doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. Even when we have none of these catastrophic events, we need to do things differently by continually improving.

4 Challenges Extremely Dynamic Environment Lots of information
Complex, Variable, Nearly Unknowable Simplifying Decisions Need Robust Planning Documents Dysfunctional Momentum Extremely dynamic environment in which we make decisions. Decisions are situational that depend on temporal elements which are hard to predict with a high level of probability. Decisions are dependent on variables such as weather, fire behavior and resource available. The world we face is complex, variable, and nearly unknowable. Teams and individuals need to simplify at times to enable decision making. Yet, they need to be wary of simple explanations. Fire fighters use Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) to make decisions. Balance that reliance on experience using RPD with critical thinking to solve unfamiliar problems. Initiative Decision Making. This type of decision making is simplifying the world. We’re faced with a massive amount of data to process, so we must and will use this type of decision making. We’re not advocating switching decision making styles, but dealing with the pitfalls. Simplified decisions demission individual and organizational situation awareness. Teams must complete robust planning documents to facilitate and document decision making. These plans add value to the decision making process, but have pitfalls. “Plans guide people to search nearly for confirmation that plans are correct. Disconfirming evidence is avoided…….” Pg 26 All organizations suffer from “dysfunctional momentum” which is the inability to redirect ongoing actions once they are underway. Individuals and organizations

5 Prescribed fire operation - just before escape.
An Example: The Big Meadow prescribed burn in Yosemite National Park is an example of all these Challenges we are talking about. The burn was a 91 acre grass burn that escaped August The burn escaped just after this picture was taken. What we are seeing is a pre-escape photo minutes before the burn escaped. The fire fighter is spraying some spots fires. You can see the meadow burn in the back ground. Our goal is to recognize a small “f” failure before a big “F” failure. Imagine yourself on the Big Meadow prescribed burn. Imagine yourself as that fire fighter on the hose. Did he know that he was seeing a small “f” failure becoming a big “F” failure. Important note: The burn could have been shut down at this point with relative easy. They haven’t reached the point of no return. The organization can look at the spot fires two ways: 1) We’re paid to chase spot fire, so no problem. 2) Watch out…………something unexpected is about to happen.

6 Can Spot an Action Going Wrong, Rather Than One Gone Wrong
A Reliable Operation Can Spot an Action Going Wrong, Rather Than One Gone Wrong This picture of the Bid Meadow prescribed fire is minutes after escape. Everybody now recognizes that something has “Gone Wrong.” Our goal is take corrective in the previous pictures. Here’s the start of the Big “F” failure about 30 minutes after the previous picture. Defining failure before the operation. For example, two spot fires into the 1990v A-Rock fire scar is failure

7 Five Lessons Learned Watch for Weak Signals of Failure
Suspicious of Simple Interpretations Focus on Ongoing Operations Capacity to Flex and Bounce Back Locate and Defer To Expertise This version of the concepts focuses on “action” instead of theory. Spot fires across your line, problems with hoses, air district delaying ignition “We’re just burning 91 acres of grass” Problem was the jack pots of fuel just outside the unit They were focused on ongoing operations……maybe to much so. Burning a high end of prescription uses up the “slack” in the system. Did someone in the organization have some untapped expertise?

8 Situational Awareness (SA)
Our Model: An Individual Capacity Also an Organizational Capacity Detect and Overcome Blind Spots Anticipate Problems in Early Stages We primarily think about SA as an individual capacity – a person’s ability to bring their awareness of events and their surroundings as close to the reality of their surroundings as possible. However, an IMT manages a large, complex incident and, is supposed to do so in a unified way – everybody needs to be rowing in the same direction. To do that, team members require a common understanding of the incident – in other words, common SA. When we think about SA at the organizational level, we’re talking about a group of people sharing a perception of events and their surroundings that accurately reflects reality Organizational Situational Awareness. We all have blind spots. Teams need to detect and overcome blind spots. The information needed to successfully plan and suppress a fire often lies with an individual person’s ability to spot a subtle problem. An organizational culture that encourages comprehensive communications is critical.

9 HRO Goal: SA at the Organizational Level
Highly Aware Constantly Making Adjustments As They Update Info/Understanding The outcomes of taking SA to the organizational level (beyond the individual firefighter level) are that: The organization is highly aware and constantly making adjustments as they update their information and understanding of the event, conditions, and the operating environment By (1) seeing more (2) knowing more (3) understanding more, the organization can break the chain of dysfunctional momentum (which some people think of as breaking the error chain) This is a practical way of looking at the HRO principle known as “preoccupation with failure”

10 Many things diminish Organizational SA
For example We See…. What We Expect to See What We Have Labels For We Have Skills to Manage Example: When I do hiking in the woods, I see all the “dead and down wood” and I think we really need to do a prescribe burn. The family member doesn’t see the hazardous fuel problem. When my wife goes hiking, she finds all these archeological sites………………I don’t see them………….she’s an archeologist.

11 Toolbox of Behaviors Upfront About Nature of Plans
State Probability of Success Acknowledge Uncertainty in Briefing STICC Briefing So What Do We do about It? A Toolbox of Behaviors for Improving Situational Awareness at the Organizational Level and Fighting Confirmation Bias (Explain what this bias means) Acknowledge uncertainty and state right up front that your plan has a certain probability of success that is not 100%. Therefore, when you briefed your plan: “We want to hold North of the Kings River and we have a 70% probability of success.” Give your operational briefing in a style that (1) acknowledges uncertainty (2) balances advocacy with inquiry (3) helps you understand as well as be understood We like a briefing technique known as STICC because it acknowledges uncertainty (STICC briefing= Situation, Task, Intent, Concern and Calibrate) Situation - Here's what I see. Task - This is what I think we should do. Intent - This is why I think we should do it that way. (point out link to NWCG Leadership Curriculum) Concern - Here’s what I think we should keep our eyes on. Calibrate - Now, Does anyone see it differently? Am I missing something? Talk to me (Allude to concept of Inquiry)

12 HROs Are Full of Skeptics
HROs Develop Healthy Skepticism Skeptics See Blind Spots The Army has designated teams of skeptics call the “red team” who go around and question plans. Some Nuclear Power Plant Operations Center actually designate one person to be a skeptic at the beginning of the shift. Designating a Skeptic, Devil’s Advocate, or Lookout Your team will ask more questions than advocate for their position. More inquiry and less advocacy. Example: Designate a skeptic or lookout who will look for Blind Spots during a planning meeting or the operational period. The army has something called the Red Team. They travel around Iraq trying to respectfully prove Commanders wrong. Tactfully being skeptical helps detect weak signals.

13 Dysfunctional Momentum
How Do You Break It? By Spotting Things Going Wrong By Updating Your Understanding All organizations suffer from “dysfunctional momentum” which is the inability to redirect ongoing actions once they are underway.

14 An example of fire-induced psychosis
Video of a Type 1 burn in Sequoia National Park. Minutes before a significant slop over occurred. Notice how windy. Ignition Specialist expressed concerns about the fire intensity but the Burn Boss didn’t hear the concerns. Burn Boss wanted to complete by the end of the day because the “plan” said the burn would be done. The local air district wanted the burn to be done by the end-of-the day. You’re watching an “operation just about to go wrong”. Just after this video clip…………….a 15 acre slop over occurred and fire effects were unwanted. In this video clip there was an opportunity to break dysfunctional momentum, but it didn’t happen. How could the dysfunctional momentum have been broken? The Burn Boss should have given “voice” to the Ignition Specialist concerns. If the Burn Boss communicated differently and asked: “What am I missing?” “What the probability of failure?

15 How to Spot Things Going Wrong
Notice Clues That Seem Significant or New (Alertness) Make Effort to Notice Things Out of Place, Unusual, or Unexpected We can break “dysfunctional momentum” by giving voice to concerns and actively seeking alternative perspectives Having a process to update “Organizational SA” helps break dysfunctional momentum.

16 Toward a New Philosophy
Accept That Error And Failure Are Expected And Will Happen Build capacities in your team to anticipate and contain problems How does HRO translate into team dynamics? The team has a new philosophy driving the team’s process. The team accepts that error and failure are expected and will happen. Error and failure are internal and external to the team members. Examples of the dynamic nature of wildland fire. The Incident Action Plan is as accurate as the fire behavior forecast, which depends on wind speed, relative humidity, etc. Do I need to say more? The IAP becomes simply a starting point for the operational plan. In other words, the day’s operational plan changes before the ink dries on the plan. “The plan changes as soon as the first shot is fired.” You will develop team process to address this new philosophy. The team learns to anticipate the unexpected and builds skills to contain problems when they inevitably happen to recover quickly. 17

17 Toward a New Philosophy
Wildland Fire Environment Is Dynamic, So Our Plans Should Be Learn to Expect the Unexpected and Break the Dysfunctional Momentum that Draws Us Into Trouble

18 Enhanced Team Processes
Upfront About Nature of Plans State Probability of Success Acknowledge Uncertainty in Briefing Operational Briefing (STICC) Communicate Differently Designate Skeptic or Devil’s Advocate So What Do We do about It? Some suggestions for enhanced team behaviors that incorporate the ideas we’ve been talking about today Acknowledge uncertainty and state right up front that your plan has a certain probability of success that is not 100%. Therefore, when you briefed your plan: “We want to hold North of the Kings River and we have a 70% probability of success.” Give your operational briefing in a style that (1) acknowledges uncertainty (2) balances advocacy with inquiry (3) helps you understand as well as be understood We like a briefing technique known as STICC (STICC briefing= Situation, Task, Intent, Concern and Calibrate) Situation - Here's what I see. Task - This is what I think we should do. Intent - This is why I think we should do it that way. (point out link to NWCG Leadership Curriculum) Concern - Here’s what I think we should keep our eyes on. Calibrate - Now, Does anyone see it differently? Am I missing something? Talk to me (Allude to concept of Inquiry) Communicate Differently Use inquiry more than advocacy. Refer back to STICC as a way of achieving this Change in Culture: Designating a Skeptic, Devil’s Advocate, or Lookout Your team will ask more questions than advocate for their position. More inquiry and less advocacy. Example: Designate a skeptic or lookout who will look for Blind Spots during a planning meeting or the operational period. The army has something called the Red Team. They travel around Iraq trying to respectfully prove Commanders wrong. Tactfully being skeptical helps detect weak signals.


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