1. Presentation for POL 324
Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. Political Reform

3. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Why has the CCP remained in power?

4. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Threatened by Tiananmen Uprising events
Witnessed collapse of world communism ( )
No charismatic leader (before Xi Jinping)
Replacing “communism” with “capitalism”
Governing a “transformed society”

6. CCP: Atrophy and Adaptation
1) extensive study and analysis of collapse of communist regimes in USSR and EE
2) analysis of surviving communist regimes in Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea
3) analysis of non-communist parties in Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, WE socialist parties, etc.

7. CCP: Atrophy and Adaptation
Draw lessons and apply to CCP (where possible)

8. Summary of Lessons from collapse of Soviet Union
Strengthen and adapt ideology
Reform, restructure, modernize, “democratize” CCP
Continue economic reforms but deal with developing economic problems
Fight corruption
“Capture” and “co-opt” intellectuals

9. Summary of Lessons from collapse of Soviet Union
Create “reasonable” controls on media
Control ethnic, separatist claims
Combat Western “peaceful evolution” efforts
Avoid Western-style multiparty system

11. Components of Political Reform
1) CCP Stability (Regularization)
2) Restructuring and reform of CCP
3) Promotion of “inner-party” democracy
4) Improve ties between CCP and citizens

12. CCP Stability

13. CCP Stability “New Blood” Central Committee Turnover 1987/13th 68%

14. CCP Stability 1997 PBSC 2007 PBSC Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao Xi Jinping
Li Peng Wu Bangguo Li Keqiang
Zhu Rongji Wen Jiabao He Guoqiang
Li Ruihuan Zhou Yongkang Jia Qinglin
Hu Jintao Li Changchun
Wei Jianxing
Li Lanqing

15. CCP Stability JIANG ----- Hu Jintao HU ----------- Xi Jinping
MAO Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng
DENG Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin
JIANG Hu Jintao
HU Xi Jinping
XI ???????????

16. CCP Stability CCP Education
% CCP primary education or illiterate
% CCP had two year college degree or higher

17. CCP Stability CCP Education 4 Year Degree Politburo Central Comm.
% %
% %

18. CCP Stability: Other 1) Term limits 2) Age limits 3) Law of avoidance
4) Restraints on “princelings”

19. CCP Stability: Term Limits
Five-year terms for top party and government posts
No individual can serve more than two terms
Ten year “terms of service”
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao served ten years
Similar term limits for provincial party and government posts

20. CCP Stability: Age Limits
Members of PBSC and Premier and Vice-Premier must retire at 68
Ministers of State Council, provincial leaders, and top military officers must retire at 65
Deputies of the above must retire at 63

21. CCP Stability: Avoidance
Rotation of leaders at provincial and local levels to avoid “personal fiefdoms”
City/county party leaders transferred after ten years
Provincial party leaders transferred more frequently to another province or to central government

22. CCP Stability: Princelings
Efforts to restrict appointment of “princelings” (children of revolutionary generation) to high positions
GenSec Xi Jinping is considered a “princeling”

23. CCP Restructuring and Reform

24. CCP Restructuring and Reform
1) Rectification movement
2) New regulations for recruitment/promotion
3) Rebuild and recreate party
4) Party Education

25. CCP Reform: Rectification
(18 months) process of individual and group study, self-criticism and group criticism
70 million CCP members; 50,000 expelled
Maoist-era activity?

26. CCP Reform: Rectification
“intrusive type of witch hunt aimed at interrogating party members, exposing them to criticism and self-criticism and penalizing or expelling those found to be lacking”
No violence of the Mao era

27. CCP Reform: New Regulations
Whole series of new regulations for party recruitment and promotion
10% of applicants eventually join CCP
Promotion based on annual evaluations, interviews, exams, questionnaires, GDP performance, public feedback
Professionalize the entire process

28. CCP Reform: Rebuild
Following surveys, investigation, rectification outcome
Efforts to rebuild party organs in rural areas; $20 billion for party buildings at village level
Create party organs in private enterprises and civic organizations (presence more than control)

29. CCP Reform: Party Education

30. CCP Reform: Party Education
Many CCP members receive university education (many still do not)
2700 national, provincial and local party schools to improve training of party members
Effort to upgrade party schools which have existed since 1950s
2006 CCP Directive that all cadres must have three-month training every five years

31. CCP Reform: Party Education
Two tracks: supplement for high-level CCP members with university education and core training for party members without university degrees

32. CCP Reform: Party Education
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology
Party organization and history
Administration, management, leadership science
Economics, accounting, history, international relations, philosophy
Combine party education and practical administration skills

33. CCP Reform: Party Education
Mid-career training for mid-level/high-level CCP members
Equivalent of Executive MBA
From a few weeks to one year
Prepare next generation of top party leaders

34. CCP Reform: Party Education
Central Party School (Beijing)
60,000 graduates since late 1970s
10,000 entrepreneurs in short courses since 2001
Led by Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping in past
Think tank with research, publications, CCP speeches, new ideology components
Ideology, management, identify high-flyers, connections, collective leadership ethos, incorporation of businessmen

35. CCP Reform: Party Education
Central and provincial party schools are well funded
Further down the chain (2700 schools) much more uneven
Problems with corruption, weak instruction, diploma mills at lower level party schools

36. Components of Political Reform
1) CCP Stability
2) Restructuring and reform of CCP
3) Promotion of “inner-party” democracy
4) Improve ties between CCP and citizens x x

38. Inner-Party Democracy
NPC and CPPCC
CCP factions — populists vs. elitists/princelings
More candidates than seats
Village elections
Party elections at township level
Shenzen as possible “special political zone”

39. National People’s Congress
Little bit more than a rubber stamp legislature, but not much more
Top leaders have “retired” to head NPC, but its role has remained quite limited

40. Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress
2000+ delegates with 60% non-CCP members
Simply consultation with CCP – even less “dangerous” than NPC

41. Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress
Representatives from eight pre-revolution “democratic” political parties, trade organizations, ethnic groups, overseas Chinese
CCP has given greater emphasis to CPPCC in since 2000
CCP document calls for “further enhancing the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPPCC.” 

42. Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress
Hu Jintao and Politburo met with CPPCC a number of times in recent years  
Why? (pure symbolism ?)
--- does seem to fit with notion of party-controlled democracy

43. Either institution could develop into substantive legislature, but little sign of this happening yet

44. Two CCP Factions Populists Elitists/Princelings
“Checks and balances within party”

45. Two CCP Factions Populists Elitists/Princelings
Natural process instead of intentional policy

46. Two CCP Factions Populists Elitists/Princelings
Lots of questions about just how significant these divisions are

47. More candidates than seats
225 candidates for 205 seats for Central Committee at 17th Party Congress (2007)
Some princelings and others have been “voted down”

48. More candidates than seats
224 candidates for 205 seats for Central Committee at 18th Party Congress (2012)

49. More candidates than seats
Experimentation with similar “candidate choice” scheme at regional and local party organizations

50. Village Elections Begun in 1988, mandated for all villages since 1998
Partially free elections
A kind of grass-roots democracy; safety valve
Experiments with township elections but generally NO

51. Township Party Elections
Usually party head and officials chosen by county party leaders
Experiments with village/township party members electing township party leaders
Intra-party elections; non-CCP citizens DO NOT participate
Some choice within CCP

52. Shenzhen as “Special Political Zone”

53. Shenzhen as “Special Political Zone”
Experiment with democratic elections for mayor and other city govt. positions

54. Shenzhen as “Special Political Zone”
Drawn up plans but not yet implemented

55. Inner-Party Democracy
Meaningful changes?
More open and responsive party but not Western-style multi-party democracy
Most at very early stages and lowest level (villages)
Adaptation

56. Components of Political Reform
1) CCP Stability
2) Restructuring and reform of CCP
3) Promotion of “inner-party” democracy
4) Improve ties between CCP and citizens

57. Improve CCP-Citizen ties
1) Openness
2) Transparency
3) Previously mentioned factors

58. Openness Meetings and agenda of PBSC published in media
Three “internet chats” with Premier Wen Jiabao since 2009
Super-secrecy disappearing
“Public questioning” at local party meetings

59. Transparency 2007 national law on law open government information
2008 OGI regulations issued
Many exceptions based on national security

60. “…The Chinese government began implementing the country’s first national regulations on public disclosure of information. These OGI regulations grant individuals the important new right to request information from the government, and also instruct government agencies at different levels to disclose information of significant interest to the public – such as information related to government budgets, urban planning, food and drug safety, fees for public services, and the results of environmental investigations. The regulations have prompted a groundswell of citizen activity, widely covered by the domestic press, to take advantage of their new information rights.”
The Asia Foundation, 2009

61. “The absence of a clearly-defined demarcation between open government information, on the one hand, and state secrets, on the other, has resulted in official rejections of information requests from citizens. Yet, with mounting pressure from the general public and the media, this situation is beginning to change.”
The Asia Foundation, 2009

62. Political Reform
CCP is one of five remaining communist party regimes in world
Examined closely the failures of other communist states, especially USSR
While avoiding multi-party democracy, the CCP has undertaken a series of reforms to modernize itself and strengthen its ruling position
Fairly successful in this effort (so far)
Focus on Hu Jintao period

63. Political Reform
Xi Jinping regime’s focus is on major anti-corruption drive within CCP and enhancing his own personal power
Few new innovations in political reform are expected in coming years

64. The End