1. Islamic State

2. Origins of Islamic State
Grew out of al Qaeda in Iraq; Founded 1999 from disparate groups opposing Bath’ist rule
Joins al Qaeda in 2003
Challenged Shi'ite led Iraqi government and US coalition forces
Anbar Awakening; AQI nearly defeated by and alliance of Sunni tribes and US forces
Resurgent in 2009

3. Anbar Awakening
‘With its penchant for extreme brutality and insistence on implementing a fundamentalist and very strict version of sharia, al-Qaeda in Iraq does have a habit of wearing out its welcome.’
2006, AQI attack on al-Askari mosque in Samarra, provoked retribution from Shiites.
US with an alliance of tribes produced the Sahawah al-Anbar (Anbar Awakening).
AQI was substantially weakened by this effort. AQI resurgent after US withdrawal

4. Expanse into Syria
2011 expands operations into Syria capitalizing on instability and protests
Attempts to absorb al Qaeda affiliate Jahbat al Nusra
2014, splits from al Qaeda and declares Islamic State.
Rapidly eclipses al Nusra and other rebel factions
challenging al Assad

5. Caliph Ibrahim Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (The Invisible Sheikh)
Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri
Phd in Islamic Studies (Baghdad)
Imprisoned in Camp Bucca Iraq during US invasion
Became leader of al Qaeda in Iraq following Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, 2010
Declared himself Caliph 4 July 2014

6. Legitimacy? Qualifications of the Caliph
Religious expertise
Decent from the Quraysh
Approved by scholars
Jihadist organizations have been reluctant to declare a caliphate, preferring the term emirate; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

7. Islamic State’s Rapid Expanse
1) Clear methodology for capturing territory
2) Use of the states existing security network to their own advantage
3) Attempts by some actors to use IS for their own interests

8. (1) Methodology Abu Bakr Naji 2004, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Phase Through Which the Umma Will Pass
Managing Chaos
persistent violent action directed towards the instigation of instability so as to create a zone of conflict which the state will ultimately prove incapable of controlling. As state power withers, jihadists can take advantage of instability filling the vacuum of power by either gaining popular support or at the least the submission of the populace through the provision of a secure environment.
Polarization
dragging the masses into the battle such that polarization is created between all of the people. Thus, one group of them will go to the side of the people of truth, another group will go to the side of the people of falsehood, and a third group will remain neutral, awaiting the outcome of the battle in order to join the victor.

9. (2) Redeploying State Security Networks
Haji Bakr and the Ba’thists
Infiltration of Syria: Established intelligence offices under the guise of Dawa centers
List of powerful families.
Name of powerful individuals in these families.
Find out their sources of income.
Size of regime forces.
Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.
Find out their illegal activities (according to sharia), which could be used against them if necessary.

10. Haji Bakr
Christoph Reuter, The Terror Strategist; Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State, Der Spiegel,
April 18, 2015,

11. Permissive Violence Serves 3 specific ends
Recruitment. Violence is permitted and encouraged. Along with inhumane methods of killing, sexual slavery is also condoned (IS Fatwa 64)
Terrify enemies. This was proven effective during 2014 when the Iraqi army fled Mosul leaving behind cashes of weapon and equipment.
Maintain obedience. As a totalitarian entity dissent must be quelled. Fear of the state must be persuasive.

12. Eschatology (End times Prophecy)
Role in legitimizing the IS method
The end of days requires human agency to be fulfilled, hence the establishment of the caliphate and sectarian aggression can be justified
End of times theology permits ignoring certain cultural norms and parts of sharia. Extreme violence and slavery can be justified.

13. Outcomes Will IS be resurgent?
What have been the benefits for al Qaeda?
How does this affect Russia’s position in the region?
Can the Iraqi and Syrian states survive as they are?
Implications for Kurdish independence?
Turkish security?
What are the implications for the Iran Saudi rivalry?
Is Russia the new jihadist target?