1. External Relations
Slides to support Chapter 21 of The Government and Politics of the European Union, 7th ed., by Neill Nugent

2. The EU as an international actor
The potential ability of the EU to be a major international
actor depends largely on two key factors:
Its size and resources - political
- economic
The extent to which it can act in a united, or at least coordinated, manner.
The applicability of these factors varies considerably across the major spheres of EU external policies. Only trade and foreign/defence policies will be examined here.

3. Trade 1: size and resources
EU accounts for about one quarter of world GDP
(US accounts for just over one fifth).
EU accounts for 17% of world exports and 18% of world imports (US accounts for 16% and 19% respectively).
EU internal market has a population of nearly 500 million
(US – 280 million).

4. Trade 2: ability to act in a united manner
The CET means the CCP must be completely common (unlike other so-called common policies such as the CAP and the CFP in respect of external trade.
The Commission conducts negotiations on behalf of the EU, on the basis of Council mandates and with agreements being subject to Council approval (both by QMV, if necessary).

5. Trade 3: how has this potentially very strong position been used?
To pursue a liberal international trading system (except agriculture?).
To conclude a wide variety of different types of trading agreements.
To increasingly incorporate political conditionality into trading agreements with non democratic countries.
To defend specific EU interests – which has led to trading disagreements, especially with the US.

6. Foreign and defence policies: 1 - development of the CFSP
Foreign policy coordination – under the name European Political Cooperation (EPC) – began developing from the early 1970s.
A treaty base was first established via the SEA, but outside the Community system and on an intergovernmental basis.
The Maastricht Treaty created the CFSP as pillar two of the new EU.
The Amsterdam and Nice treaties strengthened the potential of the CFSP.

7. Foreign and defence policies 2: size and resources
More military personnel than US.
Vast military hardware.
An extensive, and developing, institutional framework (that the Lisbon Treaty strengthened, notably with the creation of a more powerful High Representative and a new External Action Service).
Extensive diplomatic experience and skills.
Two nuclear powers.
Two of (the five) permanent seats on the UN Security Council.
Special links with many parts of the world.

8. Foreign and defence policies: 3 - ability to act in a united manner
The EU does succeed in developing a shared view, albeit
often in only general terms, on most major foreign policy
issues.
However, there are persisting and major problems of
political will and orientation, and huge differences in military
capacity. For example:
not all EU states are NATO members
some states are very concerned about sovereignty
differing views on the Atlantic partnership
differing interests in, and perceptions of, foreign policy
theatres

9. Foreign and defence policies: 4 – effectiveness of the CFSP
There is no shortage of activities framed within the (very
generally defined) treaty goals.
Activity relies primarily on a combination of diplomacy, Community instruments, and conditionality.
Effective action has tended to rely heavily on the big three states working closely with the High Representative.
There is institutional complexity.
EU foreign policy is best viewed as being part of a two level European foreign policy system: a system that does not always display cohesion.

10. Foreign and defence policies: 5 – the creation of the ESDP
Defence policy made its first formal appearance in the Maastricht Treaty.
The Amsterdam Treaty specified that the EU’s main external security concerns were with ‘soft’ security issues: the ‘Petersberg Tasks’.
In terms of practical action, nothing much happened until the 1998 St Malo Declaration.
The ESDP was, in effect, launched at the June 1999 Cologne European Council’, and was declared to be ‘operational’ at the December 2001 Laeken summit.

11. Foreign and defence policies: 6 – development of the ESDP (1)
Establishment of headline goals – notably of a 60,000 Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) (now downgraded), and of police
operations.
Institutional structures have been established: Foreign and
Defence Ministers, Political and Security Committee, EU
Military Committee, EU Military Staff.
Since 2003 there have been over twenty operations
of various kinds, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Congo. These have been essentially ‘civilian power’ crisis
management/peace keeping/reconstruction – operations.

12. Foreign and defence policies: 7 – development of the ESDP (2)
In December 2003 a ‘European Security Strategy’ – ‘A Secure Europe
in a Better World’ – was agreed. At its heart is:
An emphasis on ‘effective multilateralism’
A focus on conflict prevention and crisis management
Maintenance of close relations with NATO
Provision for a small strategic planning cell, and for
autonomous EU operations in certain circumstances
Overall, the Strategy is more modest (and more realistic?) than some
member states, including France, wanted. It makes clear that the EU
does not aspire to be more than a ‘soft security’ actor.

13. Policy ‘failures’ illustrating how far the CFSP/ESDP ‘falls short’?
• Iraq? But note, as Brian Crowe (International Affairs, 2003) has noted, the war raised fundamental issues:
- of peace and war
- of the legitimacy of military action
- of the viability of the UN
- of stability in the Middle East
- of the nature of the transatlantic relationship, and of the balance to be stuck between US leadership and EU independence
• Kosovo?
• Georgia?

14. Current and Future Challenges for the CFSP/ESDP
In addition to problems of political will and political capacity, specific challenges include:
• Translating the considerable military resources of member states into a more effective EU military capacity.
• Advancing long established policy issues, such as those for the Middle East and the Mediterranean area.
• Dealing with new, post-enlargement, policy challenges related to the ‘new neighbours’. (Is the ENP ‘working’?).
Avoiding too much differentiation and quasi-autonomous activities by groups of states – of the kind witnessed not just over Iraq but also Iran
Applying the Lisbon Treaty provisions effectively.

15. Conclusions: 1
There is still much in the well-worn description of the EU’s
position on the world stage as being one of economic giant
but political pygmy
A capability-expectations gap (Hill) still exists. The EU’s
weakness is primarily a consequence of five closely
interrelated factors, most of which derive from the fact that
it is not a state:
- a lack of consensus on key foreign policy orientations;
- a lack of clear leadership (Kissinger’s question);
- a weak decision-making capacity;
- a very limited military capability;
- a lack of political will that the capacity should exist (as exemplified by the lack of consensus over the need for an EU seat in the UN?).

16. Conclusions: 2
But arguably more has been achieved than is sometimes recognised:
in respect of trade the EU is an international actor of the first rank
in respect of development policy it is a very important actor
in respect of the CFSP, it has developed goals and has pursued these in various ways – including through the use of conditionality clauses in many agreements with third countries
arguably its use of ‘soft’ policy instruments have been more effective in advancing liberty and democracy than have the ‘hard’ policy instruments of the US