1. Dropping the (Uranium) Ball:
A Critical Reevaluation of the Nuclear Security Summit Process
Leah Matchett
University of Oxford
Department of Politics and International Relations

2. Overview The Topography of a Summit Methodology Findings:
Positive and Negative Issue Linkage
The Tension between Universality and Consensus
Policy Recommendations

3. This is where the public conception of the NSS had its start
This is where the public conception of the NSS had its start. (although similar statements were made during a campaign speech)
“Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year. “ ~President Obama, 2009

4. The Topography of a Summit
“There was just no appetite... for some kind of new treaty regime or some inspection mechanism to ensure the counties were complying with their various commitments” ~Gary Samore
‘Minilateral’ or Multilateral?
This creates a tension between universality and consensus that runs through the entirety of the NSS process and its aftermath
Informal: IR scholars (Snidal) have suggested that informal summits reduce the contracting costs. Gary Samore acknowledges this specifically
Moises Naim (2009 in FP): ‘We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem.”
GS: “we still struggled to keep it as small as possible so there could be a genuine discussion among the leaders.”
The problem with this is that “any selection of leaders based on the criterion of importance would invariably offend those left out” (Armstrong)

5. Methods and Findings
Data from 17 Interviews from 10 countries, cables and released documents
Key Findings:
Positive and Negative Issue Linkage: Elevating nuclear security to a summit level pushed the issue forwards but also led to linkages with other nuclear issues
Tension between Universality and Consensus: How the limited invitation list has impacted progress on nuclear security as an issue both during and after the Summits

6. Positive and Negative Issue-Linkages
Positive Issue- Linkages
Strong Bilateral Ties with the US lead to strong engagement with the Summits
Negative Issue-Linkages
Weak Bilateral Ties with the US lead to to poor engagement with the Summits
Links to other Nuclear Issues: Disarmament, Nuclear Safety, etc. become the most contentious part of the negotiation of the Summit Communiques
Korea, The Netherlands both host summits, many states join because of the great personal popularity of President Obama

7. Tension between Universality and Consensus
The US stresses that it seeks a ‘representative’ group of states, without clarifying why one state is included or excluded.
The resentment among those states not included comes at a real cost to the later attempts to expand the achievements of the summit.
Expansion of the IAEA INFCRIC/869 is limited; December 2016 IAEA Ministerial Statement is weak
Germany made specific notes of early problems of not including other countries. For example Bulgaria is included but Romania is not
The group balloons from an originally intended 25 countries to more than 50 due to allies requests and political necessity, but many countries are still excluded (NAM).
Weakness of the IAEA Ministerial Statement is attributed in news reports to greater diversity of views in the

8. Policy Recommendations
The tension between universality and consensus should be tackled explicitly: getting caught in the middle sacrifices both universality and consensus.
Increased diversity of summit leadership would encourage a broader and more sustainable agenda
This includes both non-US allies (Russia) and countries traditionally sidelined in nuclear debates (NAM)
Point 1: In the case of the NSS 50 was already too large for concrete decisions by consensus, leading to reliance in many cases on the gift basket mechanism. Allowing those states which wished to join to do would have done little except create a new suite of gift baskets
As Gary Samore, Will Tobey and others have indicated, a huge point of the summit was getting world leaders to take ownership of the issue, and the consequent push this had on their domestic bureaucracies. It is unlikely that the addition of more states would have stopped this.
Point 2: The strong association of the NSS with the US was a large factor in Russia’s withdrawal.
Continued lack of ownership among NNWS./ NAM countries in this and similar negotiations led them to seek another outlet in the Ban