1. Norman Malcolm American philosopher. 11 June 1911 – 4 August 1990.
Student of Wittgenstein.
Defender of a modal version of the ontological argument.

2. Norman Malcolm
Argued that meaningful propositions are not restricted to the analytic or synthetic.
Meaning is derived from use of language.
In a religious form of life the concept of necessary existence has real meaning.
Comparison between de re (of things) existence, in reality/factually necessary, and de dicto (of speech) existence, a priori, analytic/logically necessary.
It makes sense to talk of God within a religious community, does not have to be verified empirically.

3. Recap on Anselm’s statement:
Which is greater?
A being which can be thought of not to exist?
A being which cannot be thought of not to exist?

4. Malcolm’s key point
Argued that God’s existence is either impossible or necessary. [Keep in mind the concept of God as ‘perfect being’ or TTWNGCBC.]
Impossible only if it is logically absurd or contradictory.
It is neither of these, therefore it is necessary.
Necessary existence, not existence, is a perfection and part of the concept of God.

5. Malcolm’s key point [Lacewing p190-191]
God cannot simply exist as a matter of contingency but rather must exist in necessity if at all.
He argued that if God exists in contingency then his existence is subject to a series of conditions that would then be greater than God and this would be a contradiction (referring to Anselm's definition of God as TTWNGCBC).

6. Malcolm’s formulation[cf. Lacewing p191]
God, as the greatest conceivable being, cannot be a limited being.
Therefore, if God does not exist he cannot come into existence.
Similarly, if God does exist he cannot cease to exist.
If 2, then if God does not exist his existence is impossible, and if 3, then if God does exist his existence is necessary.
Either God does exist or he does not exist.
Therefore God’s existence is either impossible or necessary.
God’s existence is not impossible.
Therefore God necessarily exists.

7. Criticisms [Lacewing p192-193]