1. Weapons Procurement and Insurgency: Different Methods, Different Dynamics?
Nils Duquet

2. SALW and armed conflict
Crucial importance of weapons for insurgency groups
“Arms matter more than anything else … Their acquisition, storage, their care and protection are vital priorities” (Bowyer Bell, 1998)
However, academic attention for weapons procurement by insurgency groups is relatively new
Research on the causal mechanisms between weapons procurement by insurgency groups and the dynamics of intra-state armed conflict is still underdeveloped
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

3. SALW and armed conflict
Availability of weapons
Conflict-igniting effect in weak states (facilitates initiation, sustentation and intensification)
Symbiotic relationship:
availability of weapons  proliferation of armed conflict  rising demand  rising availability  more conflict
“The proliferation of small arms is the fuel of the conflict, not the starter” (Renner, 1997)
 Availability is only the final stage of a much broader arms acquisition process!
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

4. SALW and armed conflict
Leadership control (Marsh)
Correlation between degree of leadership control over acquisition networks and the type of armed conflict
Control enables leadership to impose discipline and better organise insurgency  more unified resistance
Methods of arms acquisition
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages
Access to different methods has impact on conflict dynamics: non-state armed groups with access to better methods are stronger than other groups
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

5. Goal of presentation
 Examine how specific weapons procurement methods influence the dynamics of armed conflict
 Case: Niger Delta
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

6. Evolution of the Niger Delta conflict
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

7. Evolution of Niger Delta conflict
From non-violent to armed resistance in 1990s
Early demands of resource control and environmental protection
spark off anti-oil movements in other parts of Delta
Heavy repression of Ogoni resistance
violence as means to achieve goals
Transition to democracy and the proliferation of violence
Oil company payments, disillusionment & weak state
 proliferation of arms and armed groups
 proliferation of violence
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

8. Evolution of Niger Delta conflict
Political violence running out of control
Politicians arming groups
New tools of political violence (SALW)
Failure to recover these SALW
Two main rival armed groups: NDPVF and NDV
Oil bunkering:
Patrons  Self-reliant
Escalation of violence (bunkering routes)
“Cults” as proxies
Necessity of weapons  boost to illegal arms acquisition
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

9. Evolution of Niger Delta conflict
Rise of MEND: return to political resistance?
Insurgency vacuum
Huge impact on oil production
Organisation:
Co-optation of existing (Ijaw) networks
Flexible, decentralised structure
Disciplined fighters
Real political motivations?
Aim: becoming an umbrella-organisation for political armed resistance in the Delta?
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

10. Arms acquisition methods
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

11. Arms acquisition methods
Domestic procurement
Indigenous production
Importation
State sponsored arms transfers
Cross-border trafficking
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

12. Domestic procurement Government arms stockpiles are attractive target
Individual loss, small-scale theft, seizing stockpiles, …
: 289 firearms and 488 rounds of ammunition officially reported ‘lost’ by Nigerian police
Corruption and complicity
Downsides:
Dependent on success of seizures or corruption efforts
No guarantee on obtaining the needed material
Mainly groups that lack financial resources and international networks
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

13. Indigenous production
Craft production is important source of weapons in W-Africa
Existence of an underground weapons crafting industry in the Niger Delta (Aba & Awka):
Local blacksmiths and welders
Mainly, but not solely, revolvers and shot-guns
“Independent” businesses and secrecy!
Usually less important source of weapons:
Often unreliable weapons
Time-consuming and small-scale character of production
 Tangible, but all-in-all secondary source of weapons in ND
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

14.  In the early stages of an insurgency local arms supplies may be adequate for insurgency groups, but at some point almost all successful groups realise that local arms supplies no longer suffice and that they need vast amounts of sophisticated weapons in order to achieve their goals.
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

15. Importation State-sponsored arms transfers
Not an uncommon practice in Africa, but no indication of this method in Nigeria
2) Cross-border trafficking
W-African market: recycling of weapons
Long and porous borders with an adequate resources and expertise to control them + proximity to international waters
With or without middlemen
Most important source of weapons in Niger Delta
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

16. The problem of financing
Large-scale cross-border trafficking requires significant financial resources
Niger Delta: all funds directly or indirectly from oil industry
Early stages: oil company payments crucial
Oil bunkering!
Strong increase since 2000
Better organisation & weapons
Lack of determination and inability of security forces
Annually m barrels  1,5-4 billion $
“Bunkering-arms nexus” (direct manner)
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

17. Arms acquisition methods & the structure of violence
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

18. Methods and the structure of violence
Armed groups are opportunistic actors:
use all acquisition methods possible taking into consideration the potential benefits and perceived risks and costs of each method
Early stages of the conflict:
Different kind of methods used
Strong dependency on patrons!
The demand for more weapons was increasingly met by the potential and means to acquire them:
Regional black market reaches Nigeria (potential)
Oil bunkering revenues (means)
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

19. Methods and the structure of violence
Result:
Cross-border arms trafficking = most important method
Oil bunkering groups have more methods at their disposal  more powerful than patrons and rival groups (affiliation)
Battle NDPVF-NDV at forefront of conflict
MEND: co-optation networks  superior acquisition skills?
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

20. Conclusion
Arms acquisition method is strongly connected to the power balance between and within insurgency groups in the Niger Delta, therefore influencing the structure and dynamics of the armed violence
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008

21. For more questions: nils.duquet@vlaamsparlement.be
Cost Action A25 Final Conference on Armed Violence, 17 March 2008