1. Pluralism and Particularism
This unit introduces two moral theories that offer a way of moderating the views of Kantianism and Utilitarianism.

2. Moral Pluralism
W. D. Ross ( ) proposed a moral theory that is commonly referred to as moral pluralism.
He suggested that there is an objective set of prima facie duties that are non-absolute obligations to act ethically.
This view is deontological – it holds that these duties are intrinsically valuable.
It is a view based on intuitionism.

3. Intuitionism
Intuitionism is draws its basis from the common sense views of G. E. Moore ( ).
This view holds that moral values are basic (they cannot be defined or derived from other concepts), they are non-natural (against naturalism), and they are available to intuitive awareness.
This does not mean that moral values are obvious. In fact, sometimes we need thought experiments and arguments to make moral intuitions apparent.

4. Prima Facie duties
Ross outlines a list (that he claims is incomplete) of duties he thinks are intuitively obvious and ought to be accepted as an objective basis for ethics:
Fidelity
Reparation
Gratitude
Non-maleficence
Justice
Beneficence
Self-improvement
Ross claims that it is impossible to rank-order these duties and that non is absolute.

5. Non-absolute duties
Ross argues that no moral duties compel absolutely.
Every moral decision requires the use of a framework of prima facie duties, together with judgment, to apply to a particular case.
However, in order to override any particular duty (e.g., to claim that the morally best thing requires lying or not repaying one’s debts), one has to provide an adequate justification.
This does not mean “anything goes”; there are good and bad, right and wrong moral actions, and all moral decisions require rational justification.

6. Moral Particularism
Moral particularism claims that there are no moral principles at all.
On this view, moral actions are not the result of applying moral rules to particular situations.
For the particularist, moral actions require a sensitivity to the circumstance of the situation. This emphasizes the importance of human judgment.
What the particularist resists is that there are some general principles or rules that good judgment uses to determine moral actions.

7. Non-principled actions
Particularism does NOT mean that there are no reasons for particular moral judgments.
Instead, it holds that these reasons are variable: what counts as a reason in one circumstance is no reason at all in another.
Particularism is not relativism: there are right and wrong actions, and there are objective answers to the question of right and wrong. But these answers are not generally applicable.
For instance, just because taking property that does not belong to you constitutes stealing (and is therefore wrong) in one case, it may not constitute stealing in another case (and, therefore, may not be wrong).