1. Preventing Runway Excursions Technical solutions
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
Preventing Runway Excursions
Technical solutions
From the Design and Manufacturing Sector
By Claude Lelaie
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

2. Main factors of Runway Overrun at landing
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
Today, main cause of accidents is Runway Excursion
Main factors of Runway Overrun at landing
No approved in-flight realistic operational landing distance
Stabilization not achieved at 1000/500 ft
Wind shift at low altitude
Approach becoming unstable at low altitude
Long flare
Long derotation
Late selection of engine thrust reversers
Runway friction coefficient lower than expected
Late/weak manual braking (w/o or after AB disc)
Failure affecting the landing distances
A vast majority of overruns at landing is avoidable
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

3. As it was for CFIT and Mid-Air collisions
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
ATC/Crews Operational Procedures
Proactive On-Board Technology
Airport Infrastructures
FSF/IATA Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Toolkit
Recommended ICAO Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
Honeywell
SmartLandingTM
Arresting System (EMAS)
Airbus
ROPS
FAA Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
Runway Condition Reporting
For Runway Excursion Risk, only a combined prevention approach should be effective
As it was for CFIT and Mid-Air collisions
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

4. But clear different design intents exist
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
ATC/Crews Operational Procedures
Proactive On-Board Technology
Airport Infrastructures
FSF/IATA Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Toolkit
Recommended ICAO Runway End Safety Area (RESA)
Monitoring of some measured ALA aircraft parameters
Honeywell
SmartLandingTM
Arresting System (EMAS)
FAA Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
Monitoring of realistic aircraft landing performance
Runway Condition Reporting
Proactive On-Board Technologies are now available with different design philosophy
Honeywell SmartLandingTM
In addition to existing “Stable Approach” SOP, a software upgrade of existing E-GPWS designed to warn the crew when some ALA parameters (approach speed, slope and touchdown point) reach abnormal airline preset thresholds
 Approved by FAA as a non interfering E-GPWS sub-function
Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
A software upgrade of TAWS / Airport Navigation, Flight Control, Displays and Flight Warning Systems designed to warn and guide the crew when a runway overrun risk is detected during short final and landing roll
 Approved by EASA, based on FAA TALPA ARC outcomes, as a major aircraft modification under a specific EASA regulation set up for all aircraft functions intending to prevent runway excursions
Airbus
ROPS
Like E-GPWS & TCAS, on-board technology will be key to mitigate Runway Excursion Risk
But clear different design intents exist
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

5. ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
SmartlandingTM is a Honeywell function of the E-GPWS:
Monitoring A/C speed and position vs. runway threshold
Providing visual/aural annunciations to enhance crew awareness of unstabilized approach
Based on tuning defined by Honeywell (speed, glideslope) or set by airlines (long landing distance)
SmartlandingTM main monitorings:
« TOO FAST » alert,
« TOO HIGH » alert,
« UNSTABLE » alert,
« LONG LANDING » alert, ...
TSO approval granted in 2009
As considered as a “non interferent” function, no demonstration is requested by FAA on SmartlandingTM tuning relevance
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

6. A bit more on Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
A bit more on Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
PFD (and HUD)
(Below 500 ft)
Audio
(Below 200 ft)
Crew Actions
AMM ND line symbols
ROW
(WET)
IF WET: RWY TOO SHORT (amber)
None
Go-Around if runway is wet / damp or more slippery
WET (amber)
DRY (magenta)
(DRY)
RWY TOO SHORT
(red)
"RWY TOO SHORT !"
Go-Around
WET (red)
DRY (red)
ROP
MAX BRAKING
MAX REVERSE
“BRAKE… MAX BRAKING MAX BRAKING”
"MAX REVERSE"
"KEEP MAX REVERSE"
MAX braking (Auto/Pilot)
MAX REV
(Pilots)
Red STOP bar
Red path
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

7. ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
A bit more on Airbus Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
EASA consideration for ROPS certification
Request to demonstrate the relevance of ROPS alerts and protections (no unprotected area, no undue conservatism)
Principle: “If no ROW alert before decision point
Then, thanks to ROP, no runway excursion
While no significant increase of go-around rate”
Translation into ROPS design objectives
Continuous real time performance computation of predicted and remaining realistic operational landing distance
Compare in real time with runway end
Trigger, only when necessary, simple and clear alerts with simple SOP
Guarantee both reliability and not excessive margins
Ensure consistency with FAA TALPA rule and computation philosophy
Avoid any additional tuning by airline
In obvious complement of the necessary need to fly stable approach
For other contaminated runway conditions, “SET MAX REV” callout will be triggered, the rest within the limit of physics, offering a partial but efficient crew assistance.
1st EASA Approval granted in 2009 (DRY and WET in a 1st step)
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit

8. ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
Conclusion
Despite clear different design intent, easy-to-install flight deck solutions exist
A significant fleet coverage is needed to achieve widespread safety benefit
ICAO Global Runway Safety Summit