1. Passions within Reason
Frank 1988
Christina Weng
November 14, 2008

2. REPUTATION

3. Not Saints
Guilt
Evolution
Natural Selection
Fine tuning the reward mechanism by making it more sensitive to future rewards and penalties.
Establish favorable reputations to further personal interests

4. The Reputation Argument
By not cheating, we acquire good reputations, which provide more benefits than cheating.
Sounds good.
So what’s the problem?

5. The Bad-Outcome-Implies-Bad-Decision Fallacy
The reputation argument assumes that it is not rational to cheat simply because there is always SOME possibility of being caught.
What if the odds of getting caught were low? Whether we actually do get caught or not implies nothing about the quality of our decision.

6. Reputation and Character Is there a link?
Not having a bad reputation ≠ Having an honest reputation
Observed actions are not good tests of honesty.
Why do we judge so much based on reputation, then?
Cheat 50% of time

7. When we judge honesty based on reputation, we judge not so much on actions as an individual’s self-control and motives.
This is based on several important assumptions

8. Assumptions
Dishonest persons tend to cheat even when the odds are against them.
The Matching Law and speciousness
Those who are merely prudent in their decisions to cheat will eventually be caught.

9. The Matching Law

10. Implications of the Matching Law
Deterrence from taking the immediate reward
Guilt Impulse Control
Reputation

11. The Heart of the Matter
We value reputation as a judgment of character because it gives insight to the degree of which people are able to resist immediate rewards.
A purely self-interested person will not have enough impulse-control to resist every temptation, and eventually he will be caught. Thus, someone who has not been caught (ie. clean reputation) likely has non-materialistic motives.
Impulse control; nonmaterial motivations
Assumes that if person never caught cheating, other motivations, keep rationality

12. Signaling

13. Properties of Signals between Adversaries
Costly to fake
Originate for reasons unrelated to signaling
Individuals are forced to reveal unfavorable information when others reveal favorable information.

14. Costly to fake
….or else the signal will lose its credibility

15. The Derivation Principle
“…can there be any edge in looking 5% like a turd?”
---Stephen Jay Gould

16. The Full Disclosure Principle
Lack of evidence that an individual possesses a favorable characteristic suggests it possesses a less favorable one.

17. Telltale Clues

18. Darwin’s Take on Emotional Expression
Principle of Serviceable Associated Habits
Principle of Antithesis
Principle of Direct Action of the Nervous System

19. Your Face An exercise in facial muscle control.
Pull the corners of your lips downward without moving your chin
Elevate your eyebrows at the center of your brow
Raise your eyebrows and pull them together
Reliable muscles
10%

20. Watch out for Microexpressions
Eyes
Blinking
Brightness
Blushing
Perspiration
Voice
Emblems

21. But if you REALLY want to fool someone: Self-Deception
Don’t do it too often
Hope that others have less than perfect ability to self-deceive
Guilt

22. Will you Cooperate?
The Prisoner’s Dilemma

23. Results

24. Conclusions Discerning Emotional Predisposition:
Reputation (DOES matter because the human reward mechanism is biased toward immediate rewards)
Physical and behavioral cues