1. Collective Action Theory & Networks
Fall 2007
Sociology 626

2. Main theme today
“Logic” of collective action and the problem of mobilization
Quick overview of collective behavior vs. collective action & rationality/irrationality arguments
Looking to next week: Importance of networks and social relations in the mobilization process (cycles back to the initial readings + Klandermans, McAdam & Wood/Hughes)

3. Collective Action Theory
From lecture notes

4. "Olson's problem." The free rider.
Public/collective good: Group benefits are inherently shared, cannot privatize your benefit. Thus incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of others
Why "public goods" need to be provided coercively through the political system. Also problem of pollution.
Problematizes mobilization. Collective action cannot be assumed automatically to flow from common interests.
Highlights efficacy: the probability of "making a difference.“
NOTE: Olson did NOT argue that people participate in social movements out of rational self-interest. Do you see why?

5. Olson's Size argument & his critics
Olson argues (says he proves) that larger groups are more likely to have free rider problems. This is widely cited.
His equations are actually independent of group size (see Oliver’s proof on web site if you care)
He points to a real problem, but REAL issues are
efficacy problem = can you by yourself (or you and the social group you are connected to) make a noticeable difference in the collective good?
externality problem = is the collective good too much controlled by the actions of others and your own actions are not enough to make a difference?

6. Selective incentives
Private private goods given to people on the basis of whether they have contributed.
Olson argues they are necessary. Later theory says not necessary, but helpful.
Types of selective incentives. James Q. Wilson.
Material: payments, incentives for participating or coercion for not participating
Solidary: benefits or costs of participating (or not) arising from relationships with other people, either their respect & honor, or the communal pleasures of doing things together
Purposive or moral: the internal feeling of doing the right thing

7. Critical Mass Theory (Oliver & Marwell)
Argue the key to collective action is the small group who play a crucial role
Contrast production functions (see pictures)
Accelerating: high start up costs, first actors raise the value of later contributions
Decelerating: initial contributions most valuable, declining marginal returns to later contributions
What matters is not the size of the whole group, but the presence of a critical mass who are socially connected to each other and willing & able to act.

8. The problem of start-up costs
The problem of start-up costs. Critical Mass creates conditions to motivate later contributions

9. The problem of “free riding
The problem of “free riding.” Early contributions make people less motivated to contribute later. The critical mass provides the good for everyone

10. Early and later phases of movements have different dynamics
Early and later phases of movements have different dynamics. Start-up problems early, loss of enthusiasm & reliance on committed or professional activists later

11. Critical Mass Theory, more
Production functions are chosen for feasibility:
Instead of trying to get millions of individuals to drive less or choose gas-efficient cars, you lobby Congress for a law to require fewer emissions from cars.
You can choose HOW to try to gain a law. Informational campaigns, large demonstrations, disruptive protests, etc.
The "size" problem pertains to whether there is a critical mass and what its structure is, and this in turn is linked to the production function.
We also developed some theory of organizing: the costs and benefits of mobilizing other people to contribute to collective goods.

12. Research on Individuals in Collective Action
Predictors of participation fit the theory pretty well:
concern about the collective good,
influence of people around them (networks, solidary incentives),
likelihood of others' participating,
personal sense of capacity,
probability of making a difference
approval/disapproval of the statements or tactics of leaders,

13. Discrepant Evidence
HOWEVER, empirical data does NOT fit a rational-action framework entirely
Movement participants often REJECT the free-rider dilemma, attribute to themselves personally as individuals the efficacy they think the group would have if everyone acted like them. It is perceived collective efficacy that seems most important.
Contrary to theory, participants in movements often report that they bear high costs, while non-participants say participants are not bearing costs (are just having fun).

14. Collective action (rational action) theory overall
People do not necessarily or automatically act out of their common interests
Interests matter: what people will gain or lose from various proposals, or what they think they will gain or lose.
Checklist of factors that affect decisions, ESPECIALLY
efficacy (probability of making a difference)
concern about the collective good
moral or social incentives.
Rational action theory has little (nothing) to say about WHICH goals people will care about or how they define their interests.

15. Networks are crucial in social movements
Communication, coordination, socialization, motivation

16. How was the research designed?
Klandermans & Oegema
What was the main point?
How was the research designed?

17. Reading article tables
Klandermans, Wood & Hughes, McAdam “High Risk” model

18. Klandermans & Oegema 1987
Conditional probabilities
.74
.79 .4
.17

19. Klandermans & Oegema: Network Effects
Links
None
Formal
Informal
Both
% Participate 0% 7%
24%
19%
Table suggests that informal links are most important!!
Tilt of movement to educated, leftist, men came through networks, NOT opinions for/against movement

20. Klandermans & Oegema: Deciding to Go
Left parties, educated are key. Overlap with expect friends to go
Additional effect of believing Dutch government has effect
Majority who said they would go did not (6/10): cited specific “reasons”

21. Reading regression tables
Look for symbols about “significance”, usually *’s. (Check footnotes, occasionally non-significant results are *’d.) Significant = effect too large to be due to change. MORE SIGNIFICANT IS SMALLER P, p<.05 is significant, p<.001 is more significant.
Look at sign of coefficient: + or -, and meaning of variables. [In a few cases, the coefficients are odds ratios instead, which are above 1.0 if effect is positive and below 1.0 if effect is negative.]
Unstandardized “b” or “B” coefficients can be compared across equations for the same variables
Standardized $ (beta) coefficients tell you how “strong” each variable is compared to others in the same equation.

22. Interpreting Klandermans & Oegema regression: DV=intend to go
Equivalent to saying:
LogOdds(Intend) = .04Age - .32Gender + .37Educ Voting –7.53
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Coefficients are significant when they are substantially larger than their standard error.
Here, only education and voting for left parties are significant.
Table SHOULD have labeled direction for gender, voting

23. Klandermans & Oegema: Deciding to Go
Left parties, educated are key. Overlap with expect friends to go
Additional effect of believing Dutch government has effect
Majority who said they would go did not (6/10): cited specific “reasons”

24. Reading Wood & Hughes Table
B is undstandardized regression coefficient; gives equation for attitude toward pornography.
The beta ($)column gives standardized coefficients. You can use it to find which independent variables are strongest. Here, age, then sex, then education.
The t column is for a t-test, ratio of B to its standard error (not shown). The symbols show that all independent variables are significant.

25. Wood & Hughes Table
Significant predictors are older, female (-male), -education, rural now & rural at 16, Southern manual or lower white collar occupation, came from low income family, not Black, Catholic & Conservative Protestant.

26. McAdam High Risk Activism

27. Networks in the readings
Discuss the kinds of networks & their role in the movement articles Morris (Black civil rights), Freeman (women’s) and Esterberg (lesbian/gay)
Discuss networks in Klandermans mobilization process
Discuss networks/socialization in McAdam & Wood/Hughes.