1. The Putin Puzzle: The West, the Rest & What Russia Wants
David Dusseault, PhD
Affiliate Researcher
Aleksanteri Institute
University of Helsinki

2. Introduction Overall Assessment Deciphering the Putin Calculus
The Putin Doctrine Applied
Ukraine: Whose Bridge too Far?
Syria: A Win-Win Proposition?
Moving forward without Looking Back?

3. Dystopia: An Emerging Paradigm?
Economics: End of exponential growth and conspicuous consumption (for some)
Political Institutions: challenges to the legitimacy of the liberal state model (bureaucratic verticals, authoritarian regimes, & theocracies)
Demographics: older & wealthier versus poorer & younger.
Environment: breaking bad or going green?
Information: “absurdus ad nauseum”

4. Putin’s Calculus: Stripping away the Sentiment
Putin’s FP differs from previous post-soviet models in that it is a hard- boiled calculation of observed structural conditions versus value added policy propositions within a set of hard capacity constraints.
FP (leverage) = (prevailing international circumstances) in relation to (available domestic assets) +/- (ability to deploy said assets abroad)
Russia’s FP is opportunistic in that it is geared to gain political & economic advantage where it can be found & exploited.

5. In a nutshell: “Hey, what about us?”
Europe & US: continuing the cold war hangover.
Asia: as an economic opportunity.
Middle East: a chance to play the spoiler or facilitator.

6. Ukraine: Whose bridge too far?
Spheres of Influence: a legacy of promises made & promises broken
Ad-hockery gone amuck: no policies then, no problems… until now
Liquidity for loyalty: IMF debt financing or BoR loans?
The battle for remaining institutions: which group of faceless, post-soviet nomenklatura would you chose?
A failed post-soviet state: an unintended, yet avoidable consequence.

7. Syria: What’s it all about ISIS?
Regime Franchise: Similarly constructed institutional model compared to other regional states; oligarchic elite, one party system, with a disciplined hierarchy, backed by considerable military resources.
Assad is dead, long live …: Lack of cohesive opposition upon which to build a viable successor regime.
See the forest for the trees: Syria is part & parcel of a wider regional conflict which is grounded in socio-economic disaffection & political exclusion while being painted in religious tones.

8. So, what’s Russia got to do with it?
Ukraine
Syria
Battle for Russian hearts & minds
Creeping Europe / Nato
Failed state on Russia’s western Border
Maintain the cohesiveness of post- soviet space
Former friends in need
Opportunity knocks
Swap shop
Raise the global profile

9. Analysis: FP a la Putinesca
Putin’s calculus allows Russian FP interest to occupy the structural space that is allowed.
There is a simple cost benefit analysis that underlines any policy decision defined by tangible limits.
Hard constraints include but are not limited to budgetary considerations, availability and capacity of assets to carry out operations, & the presence of alternative / competing interests on the ground.

10. Wrapping Up
Putin’s latest venture on the international stage is unlikely to be the start of a new round of Russian grand expansionism.
Instead, opportunities to forward the specific FP goals including improving Russia’s image at home and abroad at the expense of competing interest is more plausible.
This “take the shape of the container” approach indicates a significant evolution in Russian FP thinking as opposed to the late Soviet and early RF period.
To wit, the right tool for the job (proxy fighters in E. Ukraine) is better than mission over-streach (full invasion of Afghanistan) in order to fulfill the country’s perceived global interests.