1. THE US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES AND THE POLITICS OF NONPROLIFERATION
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

2. Key Points and Arguments
US-India Nuclear Deal: Rationales and Negotiation
The Politics, Diplomacy, and the Nuclear Agreement
The Broader Context of US-India Relations post tests
Chinese Perspectives and Concerns
Beijing’s Responses and Policy Adjustments
The Emerging US-India-China Triangle?
Geopolitics and the Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation
Concluding Remarks

3. US Sanctions after Indian/Pak Tests
Suspend foreign aid (except for humanitarian assistance or food and other agricultural commodities);
Terminate sales of any military items;
Terminate other military assistance;
Stop credits or guarantees to the country by US government agencies;
Vote against credits or assistance by international financial institutions;
Prohibit US banks from making loans to the foreign government concerned; and
Prohibit exports of specific goods and technology [as specified in the Export Administration Act of 1979] with civilian and military nuclear applications.
Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

4. US Sanctions:Ｏｂｊｅｃｔｉｖｅｓ
The United States imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as a result of their nuclear tests in May　 Imposing these sanctions, the United States sought:
• To send a strong message to would-be nuclear testers;
• To have maximum influence on Indian and Pakistani behavior;
• To target the governments, rather than the people; and
• To minimize the damage to other US interests.
Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

5. US Sanctions:Ｏｂｊｅｃｔｉｖｅｓ
The goals of the United States are that India and Pakistan:
• Halt further nuclear testing
• Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without conditions;
• Not deploy or test missiles or nuclear weapons;
• Cut off fissile material production for nuclear weapons
• Cooperate in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva;
• Maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies with other countries; and
• Reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir.
Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

6. Restoring Bilateral Ties
The (Strobe) Talbott-(Jaswant) Singh strategic dialogue
Easing of US sanctions on India and required benchmarks:
stronger export controls
Separating civilian and military reactors
nuclear and missile test restraints
fissile material production restraints
President Clinton’s historical visit to India, March 2000; however, most post-1998 sanctions stayed
Lifting of post-Pokhran sanctions after 9.11
The Bush administration and efforts to strengthen US-India relations: lifting sanctions; high-tech sales/dialogue (HTCG); Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)

7. US-India Interactions after Test

8. NSSP: Getting to the Nuclear Deal
HTCG and expanding technology cooperation
New Delhi’s push for civilian nuclear cooperation and promise of minimum strategic nuclear program
Bush second term and NSSP (high-technology, civilian space, and civilian nuclear issues)
Obstacles to nuclear cooperation: US bureaucratic resistance and regional tensions ( , between India and Pakistan)
Bush second term: renewed efforts and strategic vision for stronger US-India ties to advance American interests in multiple ways

9. Negotiating the Nuclear Deal
The July 2005 US-India Joint Statement on civilian nuclear cooperation
US-India negotiation
separation of facilities/power plants
fuel supply assurances and safeguards
Congressional mandates/initiatives
congressional hearings
legislative measures
US domestic politics
bureaucracies: strategic vs. nonproliferation
India lobby; media; nonproliferation group

10. The Nuclear Deal: Milestones
March 1-3, 2006, President Bush visited India; joint statement emphasizes strategic partnership and nuclear cooperation
July 26, 2006: House passes “Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006”
Nov 16, 2006: Senate passes the “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act”
Dec 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy
Aug 1, 2008: IAEA adopts India-specific safeguards agreement
Sept 4-6, 2008: NSG meets to consider/grant exception for India
Sept 11, 2008: Pres Bush sends text of 123 Agreement to Congress
Sept 27, 2008: House approves the Indo-US nuclear deal
Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal 86-13
Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement

11. 123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation
“Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requires the conclusion of a specific agreement for significant transfers of nuclear material, equipment, or components from the United States to another nation. Section 123 Agreements are important tools in advancing U.S. nonproliferation principles. These Agreements act in conjunction with other nonproliferation tools, particularly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to establish the legal framework for significant nuclear cooperation with other countries. Moreover, the Agreements allow for cooperation in other areas, such as technical exchanges, scientific research, and safeguards discussions. In order for a country to enter into such an Agreement with the United States, that country must commit itself to adhering to U.S.- mandated nuclear nonproliferation norms.” Source: National Nuclear Security Administration

12. Growing US-India Ties

13. Rationales for Nuclear Deal
Removal of long-standing irritants in US-Indian relations
Civilian nuclear agreement would integrate India into the international nuclear nonproliferation regime
Lifting of tech embargoes could open US-India defense cooperation, including US arms sales
Nuclear energy critical for Indian economic development
India’s growing use of nuclear power would reduce pressure on global energy demands and global warming
Strategically, India’s rise a major power, an emerging market, and a democracy with shared values make it an important partner in counter-terrorism, WMD nonproliferation, regional security, China

14. India’s Rise at a Glance
Population: 1.24 billion
GDP in 2014: US$2.048 trillion (est)
GDP in PPP (2014): US$7.277 trillion
GDP growth rate in 2014: 5.6%
Trade 2013/14: US$763 billion ($100bn with US)
Foreign exchange reserve in 2013: $295 billion
Foreign direct investment: US$310 billion
Defence budget: US$38 billion ($5bn US arms)
Armed forces: 1.3 million

15. International Reactions
Issues raised: precedent or exception and the implications for the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime
A dilemma for many NSG member states: nonproliferation principles; trade opportunities (uranium sales; reactors); US pressure; relationship with India
Russia, France, and UK supportive
Pakistan disgruntled and displeased
China cautiously critical but not seeking to publicly opposing the deal (NSG exception for Pakistan?)

16. India’s 1998 Nuclear Tests: Setback In Relations
Chinese responses to Indian nuclear tests
 Restrained response to first round of tests
 Strong reaction to second round of tests
 The Vajpayee letter and Chinese concerns over “China threats” as justification (George Fernandes’s early remarks)
 China, P-5 communiqué, UNSCR 1172 and Sino-US Joint Statement on South Asia
Setbacks in bilateral relations and Chinese pressure on India to “untie the knot”
 Cancellation of JWG meeting in Beijing
 hints of renewed supported of Pakistani positions on Kashmir
 Greater Sino-Pakistani military exchanges
 Encouragement of Indian domestic opposition

17. Rebuilding Bilateral Relationship
US policy shift, Kargil crisis, and Chinese policy adjustment
 Singh-Talbott talks and US policy shift from UNSCR 1172
 New Delhi retraction on “China threat”
 Growing crisis in Kargil and potential risk for China  The Singh visit and the untying of the knot
Initiatives to rebuild the tattered bilateral relationship
 Sino-Indian Track-II dialogue
 Singh-Tang agreement on security dialogue
 Resumption of JWG meetings and movement on LAC
 High-level visits
 Greater cooperation: trade, terrorism, economic ties
 Limited military exchanges: visits and port calls

18. Chinese Perspectives
While official statements muted and low-key, analysts and commentators expressing critical views of the deal, charging Washington of “double standards” in nuclear nonproliferation (cf. North Korea, Iran)
US-India nuclear cooperation would enable New Delhi in its weapons program
Assessment of Bush administration intention: enlisting India in efforts to constrain China (shared democratic values; counter China’s rise; Sino-Indian disputes/rivalry)
Broader US-India cooperation in space, high-tech, defense (Indian procurement of US weapons systems; mil-mil exchanges; regional implications)

19. Sino-indian Relations: The International Factors
Sino-US relations since 1989: instability, competing interests, cooperation, and hedging
 Divergent strategic visions and interests
 Cooperation: North Korea; GWOT;
 US policy toward Taiwan
 Trade dispute and human rights issues
 Managing China’s rise
 US-Indian relations: looking for common interests
 US reassessment of India’s role
 De-linking nuclear proliferation
 Consolidating US-India security ties
 US-India nuclear deal and defense cooperation
 India in the Indo-Pacific Region

20. Developing Strategic & Cooperative Partnership
High-level visits by leaders of two countries
 Vajpayee (2003); Wen Jiabao (2005); Hu Jintao (2006); Singh (2008); Wen (2010); Li Keqiang (2013); Singh (2013); Xi (2014)
Growing bilateral trade
 $117 m (1987); $25 bn (2006); $38 bn (2007); $65.47 bn (2013)
Special political representatives to resolve border issues and 2005 joint declaration
 17 rounds of meetings held,
Regular consultation and dialogues on bilateral, regional, and global issues (e.g., BRICS)
Military exchanges and defense MOU
 High-ranking visits; Port calls; joint search & rescue exercises

21. Developing Strategic & Cooperative Partnership

22. The Politics of Nonproliferation
NPT and its key pillars: balance of implementation
NPT RevCon and PrepCom: progress and setback
CTBT: negotiation, adoption, and ratification: issues and challenges
FMCT: production, accounting, stockpile, and obstacles
Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones
Supplier Regime: NSG and the US-India exception
The politics of nonproliferation: national interests and domestic politics; international norms and geopolitical realities; best practices and trade-offs