1. Overview Analytical Framework & Transformation Strategy
Policy Formulation in Developing Countries

2. About This Course
Design, implementation and assessment of growth-oriented development policies
Collection and comparison of international best and worst practice cases (not mathematical modeling or cross-country regressions)
Both positive and normative aspects (situation analysis and policy advice)
Interactive, evolving and open-ended discussion

3. Ideas & Concepts for the Course
Politics and economics
Relationship among key players
Policy learning
Institutional dynamics
Middle income traps

4. Creation of a Developmental State: An Operational Question
Predatory/patrimonial state—power and state machinery for perpetuating private benefits of leader, his family and friends
Developmental state—policies and institutions for value creation & competitiveness for all people and enterprises
How can we promote DS instead of PS?
Political approach—encourage emergence of developmental agenda, actors and coalitions
Technical approach—provision of pragmatic & concrete cases of international best policy practices for willing governments to learn & adopt

5. Development Policy: Desirability vs. Feasibility
Development is both a political process and an economic process.
What should be done HRD & technology
Infrastructure
Integration & competition
Industrial transformation, etc
What can be done
Leaders, elites & interests
Coalition formation Popular mindset
Administrative capacity
(mainly economics)
(mainly politics)
Each country is unique in what needs to be done (economics) as well as what can actually be done (politics & administrative capacity).
Any policy maker must work with economic and political space simultaneously.

6. Key Relations and Coalitions
Leadership style
Horizontal coordination within central government
Vertical coordination between central and local governments
Relation with non-government stakeholders
Relation with foreign players
We assume that these five relations are critical in determining policy effectiveness.
We do not pre-impose an ideal form on each relation. Each country must create its own.

7. Key Relations and Coalitions

8. Policy Learning
Latecomer countries must learn three kinds of policy making:
Growth policies
Social policies to cope with growth-generated problems (income & wealth gaps, migration, traffic, housing, corruption, environment…)
Macroeconomic management under integration
 Unless all these policies are learned, development effort will stall. They can be efficiently learned from comparative study of international best (and worst) practices.

9. Growth & Social Policy: An East Asian Pattern
Economic growth
START
Emergence of new problems
Growth policy by developmental state
Income & wealth gaps, environmental damage, congestion, cultural change, land & stock bubbles, macro instability, corruption…
Social stability & popular support
20-30 years later
Maturity of middle class and political aspiration
Social policy
Democratic, high-income society
FINISH

10. What Must Be Learned? Policy measures
Policy procedure and organization
Policy structure—vision, strategy, action plans, monitoring
National movement for mindset change
The purpose is to acquire capability to create policy package suitable for each country using foreign models as building blocks.
Government can learn by self-study or with help from advanced countries (policy dialogue).

11. Learning from Other Countries
DO NOT copy policies adopted in some other country without local context. Ad hoc or random copying should be avoided.
The claim that “our country is unique” should not be used as an excuse for not learning from others.
Learn mindset and methodology for conducting industrial strategies effectively. Learn how to make policies.
Early achievers (Japan, Korea, Singapore…) improvised through self-effort and trial-and-error. For today’s latecomers, more systematic learning is desirable.

12. Institutional Dynamics
After knowing current status and desired system, how can we move from the one to the other?
Common obstacles:
--Political resistance: corruption, vested interests, neo-patrimonialism, predatory state
--Incompetence: leaders and officials do not know or care
--Lack of knowledge or a mistake in designing transition steps
--Bureaucratic sectionalism: no ministry or department has full authority or responsibility to execute reform

13. Comparative Institutional Analysis
Prof. Masahiko Aoki ( ) and others at Stanford Univ. and Tokyo Univ. initiated CIA.
Based on evolutionary game theory
Some questions
--Why do multiple systems emerge and coexist, without any system dominating all others?
--What is the dynamic mechanism of moving from one system to another?

14. Key Concepts Institutional complementarity Strategic complementarity
E.g., OJT, life-time employment, keiretsu system, main banks were mutually consistent in Postwar Japan
Strategic complementarity
E.g., people in competitive society study professional skills; people in connection society give parties & gifts.
Path dependence
E.g., because of these complementarities, a system, once started, will have little incentive to deviate.

15. Forces of Systemic Change
Collective mutation
Foreign pressure (contact with another system)
Policy as deus ex machina
--Strong leader
--Political parties, interest groups, people’s movement
--Researchers, advisors, intellectuals
Those who are inside the country but do not follow the rules of the existing system initiate change against resistance
Combining policy and foreign pressure

16. Policy and foreign pressure
Collective mutation
Foreign pressure
Policy
Policy and foreign pressure

17. Lazy Workers in Japan (Early 20th Century)
Survey of Industrial Workers, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 1901
Japanese workers are only half as productive as American workers.
They stop working when supervisors are not watching.
Skilled workers are few, and they are often too proud and lazy.
Job hopping is rampant in comparison with US.
Japanese workers never save.
 Even today’s high performers started with low capacity in private and public sectors.

18. South Korea: Unpromising Place with Inept Institution
The Lessons of East Asia – Korea, K. Kim & D.M. Leipziger (1993)
Heavily dependent on US foreign aid for food, fuel and other raw materials, Korea was not seen as a promising place for major investments.
During the period from 1940 to 1960, the Korean bureaucracy was a kind of spoils system.
The East Asian Miracle, The World Bank (1993)
At late as 1960, the Korean civil service was widely viewed as a corrupt and inept institution.
In less than two decades, this view has been dramatically altered. By the late 1970s, the bureaucracy had become one of the most reputable in developing world. How did this come about?