Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

THE ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, & THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS Amy E. Smithson, PhD Senior Fellow.

Published byRalf Harrison Modified over 6 years ago

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "THE ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, & THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS Amy E. Smithson, PhD Senior Fellow."— Presentation transcript:

1 THE ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, & THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS Amy E. Smithson, PhD Senior Fellow

2 OVERVIEW THE BASICs CHEMICAL TERRORISM PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
WEAPONS HISTORICAL ROLE CHEMICAL TERRORISM CASE STUDIES PROLIFERATION CONCERNS THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS AUSTRALIA GROUP CWC

3 CHEMICAL WARFARE IN A NUTSHELL
SUSCEPTIBLE TO WIND, TEMPERATURE, PRECIPITATION MOST WIDELY PROLIFERATED TACTICAL WEAPON ROLE IN CONFLICTS: WWI = SIGNIFICANT WWII = MARGINAL IRAN-IRAQ WAR = SPORADIC, BUT IMPORTANT

4 THE ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TWO APPROACHES: UNITARY BINARY KEY PROPERTIES: MODE OF ACTION: (e.g., INHALATION) LETHALITY/TOXICITY CAVEAT: THEORETICAL v. ACTUAL STATE: (e.g., AEROSOL, LIQUID) PERSISTENCE

5 ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TYPES OF AGENTS: CHOKING BLISTER BLOOD NERVE INCAPACITANTS TWO TYPES OF DELIVERY: POINT SOURCE LINE SOURCE

6 DELIVERY SYSTEMS

7 TIME TO INITIAL SYMPTOMS
CHEMICAL AGENTS TYPE/ AGENT EXPOSURE ROUTE TIME TO INITIAL SYMPTOMS PERSISTENT? BLOOD/ CYANIDE INHALATION 15 SECONDS NO CHOKING/ PHOSGENE SKIN/ INSTANT BLISTER/ MUSTARD 1-10 MINUTES YES NERVE/ SARIN VX INCAPACITATING/ CN RAPID

8 STEPS TO ACQUISITION RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PRECURSOR PROCUREMENT
PRODUCTION: PILOT LARGE SCALE (BULK AGENT) TESTING WEAPONIZATION STORAGE INCORPORATION INTO DOCTRINE & EXERCISES Alcohol, promoter DF

9 CHEMICAL DEFENSE DETECTION INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION MEDICAL THERAPY:
EARLY = KEY MODEL HAZARD => AVOID CONTAMINATION INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CUMBERSOME EFFECTS FIGHTING CAPABILITY MEDICAL THERAPY: AUTOINJECTORS DECONTAMINATION

10 STATUS AT THE STATE LEVEL
CWC MEMBERS ALBANIA CHINA IRAN INDIA LIBYA PAKISTAN RUSSIA SOUTH KOREA UNITED STATES CWC = 188 MEMBERS CWC HOLDOUTS EGYPT ISRAEL NORTH KOREA SYRIA

11 ACTIVE CHEMICAL PROGRAM WITH STOCKS
SYRIA ACTIVE CHEMICAL PROGRAM WITH STOCKS CHEMICAL PROGRAM DATING TO 1970s RELIANT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RECEIVED CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PRECURSORS FROM RUSSIA, EGYPT 1980s: POSSIBLY DEVELOPED DOMESTIC NERVE AGENT CAPACITY MULTIPLE PRODUCTION SITES SUSPECTED STOCKPILE OF MUSTARD, SARIN, VX, POSSIBLY WEAPONIZED DEGRADED SCUD, AERIAL DELIVERY CAPACITY Al-Safir

12 APPEAL TO TERRORISTS KNOW-HOW SUPPLIES ON THE OPEN MARKET
COOKBOOKS PATENT LITERATURE MA LEVEL EDUCATION SUPPLIES ON THE OPEN MARKET CHEMICALS PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT DISPERSAL SYSTEMS AS “EASY” AS RADIOLOGICAL DEVICES MASS CASUALTY OR MASS TERROR WASHINGTON, DC: 1,000 KG OF SARIN, LINE SOURCE ON CLEAR, CALM NIGHT 3,000 TO 8,000 DEAD (OTA, 1993) QUICK IMPACT

13 AUM SHINRIKYO’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
: $30 MILLION 100 INVOLVED AGENTS SYNTHESIZED VX ─ SOMAN TABUN ─ MUSTARD SARIN ─ HYDROGEN CYANIDE SARIN PRODUCTION GOALS 70 TONS IN 40 DAYS 2 TONS DAILY, 17.6 PINTS/BATCH 2 SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS

14 AUM’S INEPTNESS PROBLEMS AT SATYAN 7 BACKWARDS SPRAYER NOVICE MASKS
WORKER EXPOSURES 3 OFF-PREMISES LEAKS NOVEMBER 1994 SAMPLES BACKWARDS SPRAYER NOVICE MASKS SUBWAY ATTACK 30% STRENGTH DISPERSAL METHOD NOT THE WESTERN SAFETY MODEL

15 AL QAEDA & CO. BIN LADEN’S HOLY DUTY MANDATE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JIHAD
PLOTS: ROME, LONDON, AMMAN AFGHANISTAN CHEMICAL COOKBOOKS + LABS CNN DOG TAPE TAKIFIRI CHLORINE ATTACKS (2007) OTHER ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE OTHER MATERIALS CROPDUSTER INQUIRIES

16 TERRORIST EVENTS WORLDWIDE: 1997-2006
TOTAL EVENTS: ,135 BOMBS: ,806 ARMED ATTACKS: ,798 ASSASSINATIONS: ,689 KIDNAPPINGS: ,393 ARSON: HOSTAGE HIJACKING OTHER/UNKNOWN: BIOLOGICAL: CHEMICAL: FOOD/WATER SUPPLY: RADIOLOGICAL: Source: RAND/MIPT Terrorism Incident Database

17 TECHNICAL PLUS-UPS: I AID VIA FORMER WEAPONEERS ABOUT 6,500 EXPERTS
OVER 12 FACILITIES NEXT GENERATION AGENTS: R&D BEGAN IN 1970s NOVICHOK #5: 5-8 TIMES AS EFFECTIVE AS VX RED ARMY APPROVED TONS PRODUCED NOVICHOK #7: 10 TIMES AS EFFECTIVE AS SOMAN 10s OF TONS PRODUCED CONCEPT: BURY IN AGROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY CZECH AGENTS APPEALS TO “LONE WOLF” ACTOR(S)

18 TECHNICAL PLUS-UPS: II
NEW DISCIPLINES, TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION, SPEED OF ADVANCES CROSSING OF CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL AGENTS NOVEL NONLETHALS PATHOGEN DATE SYNTHESIZED # OF BASE PAIRS POLIO 2003 7.741 1918 INFLUENZA 2005 13,500 MYCOPLASMA GENITALIUM GENOME 2010 1,080,000 SMALLPOX ?????? 186,102 Polio virus took 2 years 1918 influenza took a few weeks

19 TECHNICAL PLUS UPS: III
MICRO-REACTORS HIGH SURFACE AREA TO REACTANT RATIO ENERGY, COST EFFICIENT MORE PRECISE CONTROL = SAFER FASTER GREENER PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNOLOGY: ON DEMAND PRODUCTION REDUCE DEVELOPMENT TIME HIGHLY, EXOTHERMIC REACTIONS MAKE UNSTABLE PRODUCTS DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE PRODUCTS NUMBERING UP = MULTI-TON PRODUCTION

20                                      POISONOUS SHORT CUTS                       

21 INDUSTRIAL + TRANSPORT SECURITY
COMMERCIAL PLANTS GATES + FENCES + GUARD(S)  NO GUN(S) EMPLOYEE SCREENING? SAFETY LABELS; OTHERWISE, VARIABLE PORTS: ADVANCE NOTIFICATION RAILWAYS: TANKERS = SAFETY LABELS TARGETS: EASILY SCOUTED GO TO LOCAL BAR TACTICS: EXPLOSIVES, REACTANTS (H20)

22 INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE CONSEQUENCES
855 3,973 1,430 4,713 2,306 586 123

23 THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS
1899 HAGUE CONVENTION 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AUSTRALIA GROUP 1997 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM SOUND DEFENSES INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

24 AUSTRALIA GROUP ORIGINS: HINDER USE IN 198Os IRAN-IRAQ WAR
HARMONIZATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS: 63 CHEMICALS DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT ACTIVITIES: END-USER CERTIFICATES NOTIFICATION OF REFUSALS NO UNDERCUT POLICY INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE 40 COUNTRIES + EC

25 CWC PROVISIONS BANS DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING & USE
ALLOWS DEFENSE ALL MEMBERS DESTROY: NONDISCRIMINATORY DECLARATIONS INSPECTIONS: ROUTINE MILITARY INDUSTRY CHALLENGE AUTOMATIC EXPORT CONTROLS SCHEDULE II CHEMICALS RIOT CONTROL AGENTS: NOT IN WARFARE YES FOR DOMESTIC RIOT CONTROL

26 CWC BENCHMARKS 188 MEMBERS INSPECTIONS: 4,167 IN OVER 81 STATES
AGENT DESTROYED: 62% WEAPONS/CONTAINERS DESTROYED: 45% 70 PRODUCTION FACILITIES: CLOSED 43 DESTROYED 21 CONVERTED

27 CWC DIFFICULTIES 10-YEAR DESTRUCTION DEADLINE MISSED:
U.S. & RUSSIA WILL NOT MEET 2012 (OR 2021) DISTRIBUTION OF INSPECTIONS DECLARATIONS & DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION PROMPT FROM UN RES. 1540

28 CWC SHORTCOMINGS U.S. EXEMPTIONS: NO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS
NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORY ANALYSIS NO CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS EXPANSION OF EXPORT CONTROLS TO SCHEDULE III CHEMICALS RIOT CONTROL LOOPHOLE? NOT KEEPING UP WITH TECHNICAL ADVANCES: NOVICHOKS MICROREACTORS APPLICABILITY TO SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS ENFORCEMENT

Download ppt "THE ABCs OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, & THREAT REDUCTION MECHANISMS Amy E. Smithson, PhD Senior Fellow."

Similar presentations

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) EXPORT LICENSING EXPERTS MEETING, 17 – 18 NOVEMBER 2005, SINGAPORE.

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) EXPORT LICENSING EXPERTS MEETING, 17 – 18 NOVEMBER 2005, SINGAPORE.
In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, establishing for the first time binding obligations on.

In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, establishing for the first time binding obligations on.
Challenge of Nuclear Weapons

Challenge of Nuclear Weapons
Terrorism and CERT CERT Basic Training Unit 8. CERT Basic Training Unit 8: Terrorism and CERT 8-1 Unit Objectives ●Define terrorism ●Identify potential.

Terrorism and CERT CERT Basic Training Unit 8. CERT Basic Training Unit 8: Terrorism and CERT 8-1 Unit Objectives ●Define terrorism ●Identify potential.
Visual 8.1 Terrorism and CERT  Define terrorism.  Identify potential targets in the community.  Identify CERT operating procedures for a terrorist incident.

Visual 8.1 Terrorism and CERT  Define terrorism.  Identify potential targets in the community.  Identify CERT operating procedures for a terrorist incident.
Chemical Weapons How are they “unconventional?”. I. History of CW: See Readings Note the process of “agent escalation” – tear gas  chlorine  phosgene.

Chemical Weapons How are they “unconventional?”. I. History of CW: See Readings Note the process of “agent escalation” – tear gas  chlorine  phosgene.
1 From Ypres to Damascus: Lessons of Chemical Weapons Abolition Paul F. Walker, Ph.D. Director, Environmental Security & Sustainability Green Cross International.

1 From Ypres to Damascus: Lessons of Chemical Weapons Abolition Paul F. Walker, Ph.D. Director, Environmental Security & Sustainability Green Cross International.
Dangers Big and Small Unconventional Threats to American Security.

Dangers Big and Small Unconventional Threats to American Security.
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders The Trench Geneva Centre for Security Policy ELECTIVE Term 2 – Arms Proliferation 24 February 2015.

Dr Jean Pascal Zanders The Trench Geneva Centre for Security Policy ELECTIVE Term 2 – Arms Proliferation 24 February 2015.
Charles Feer WMD Instructor Center for Domestic Preparedness Instructor of Criminal Justice Bakersfield College.

Charles Feer WMD Instructor Center for Domestic Preparedness Instructor of Criminal Justice Bakersfield College.
Overview of Terrorism Research at the CDC Dixie E. Snider, M.D., MPH. Associate Director for Science Presented at 2003 Medical Research Summit March 6,

Overview of Terrorism Research at the CDC Dixie E. Snider, M.D., MPH. Associate Director for Science Presented at 2003 Medical Research Summit March 6,
Department of Chemical and Biological Engineering

Department of Chemical and Biological Engineering
Threats to World Security Chapter 33 Section 3.

Threats to World Security Chapter 33 Section 3.
Nuclear Terrorism Threats Nuclear Security Global Nuclear Governance Nuclear Security Summit; background, significance, achievements 2012 Nuclear Security.

Nuclear Terrorism Threats Nuclear Security Global Nuclear Governance Nuclear Security Summit; background, significance, achievements 2012 Nuclear Security.
INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE. Today’s Goals Understand exercise concept and process Discuss exercise structure and participation Initiate planning now.

INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE. Today’s Goals Understand exercise concept and process Discuss exercise structure and participation Initiate planning now.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, Stockpiling, and use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction Emmy Bonagofski.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, Stockpiling, and use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction Emmy Bonagofski.
DF-200: Sandia Decontamination Formulation for Neutralization of CBW Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals Mark D. Tucker (505)844-7264

DF-200: Sandia Decontamination Formulation for Neutralization of CBW Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals Mark D. Tucker (505)
Radiological Terrorism: Introduction. Nuclear WMD Modern time weapons First used in WWII.

Radiological Terrorism: Introduction. Nuclear WMD Modern time weapons First used in WWII.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Overview Building a safer, more secure, more resilient America The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released.

Critical Infrastructure Protection Overview Building a safer, more secure, more resilient America The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released.
WMD Operations Unit 5 slide 1 MODULE 2 UNIT 5 Chemical Agents.

WMD Operations Unit 5 slide 1 MODULE 2 UNIT 5 Chemical Agents.

Similar presentations

Ads by Google