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Philosophy of Language Seminar 2: Definite Descriptions (1)

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1 Philosophy of Language Seminar 2: Definite Descriptions (1)
Henry Taylor

2 Reminder! You will need to know a few things for this course, to do with essay submissions etc. All the info you need is in the module guide (available on Canvas and my website) Be sure to read it.

3 Recap Last week we came across Frege’s theory of sense and reference.
Senses explain: 1) The cognitive significance of a name 2) How reference is fixed 3) The public nature of meanings 4) How words combine to create thoughts.

4 This week Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.
Bertrand Russell ( ) The theory of definite descriptions is ’That paragon of philosophy’ (Frank Ramsey)

5 The theory of definite descriptions
‘A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science’ (1905; ).

6 The theory of definite descriptions
A definite description is a description of something that uses the word ‘the’. Like ‘The X is Y’ ‘The’ is called the definite article by linguists, because it refers to one thing. ‘The current Prime Minister is a Tory’ ‘The person who murdered Abraham Lincoln is John Wilkes Booth’ Etc.

7 The theory of definite descriptions
Sometimes we make reference to things that do not exist. For example: ‘The current prime minister is Tory’ ’The person who murdered Abraham Lincoln is John Wilkes Booth’ ‘The current King of France is bald’ ‘The person who murdered Dumbledore is Snape’

8 The theory of definite descriptions
Reference to non-existent things (Snape, the current King of France) seems just as easy and natural as reference to existent things (Theresa May, John Wilkes Booth). How does all this work?

9 The theory of definite descriptions
Taking this problem deeper: Russell believes in the law of excluded middle. That is a law of logic that states (roughly) that any well formed claim must be either true or false (it can’t be ‘in between’ or be neither). So what do we do with claims like ‘the current King of France is bald’ and ‘The person who murdered Dumbledore is Snape’ Are they true, or false, or what????

10 The theory of definite descriptions
“By the law of the excluded middle, either ‘A is B’ or ‘A is not B’ must be true. Hence either ‘The present King of France is bald’ or ‘The present King of France is not bald’ must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not find the present King of France in either list.” (‘On Denoting,’ 485)

11 The theory of definite descriptions
The second puzzle: negative existential claims Just a fancy term for saying certain things don’t exist. Like ‘The current King of France doesn’t exist’ Is that true or false? And what makes it true or false?

12 The theory of definite descriptions
When we say ‘The Queen of the UK is called Elizabeth’ we can see what makes that true or false. It’s true just in case the woman who really is the Queen is, in fact, called Elizabeth. It’s false if she’s not really called Elizabeth. But when it comes to a claim like ‘The present King of France doesn’t exist’ that doesn’t work. It can’t be true just in case the man who actually is the King of France doesn’t exist, because the whole point is that there is no man who actually is the present King of France!

13 The theory of definite descriptions
Alexius Meining ( ): Polish philosopher. The problem of non-existents led Meinong to say that things that we normally think don’t exist (James Bond, Sherlock Holmes, Harry Potter, Aphrodite, Juliet Capulet etc.) actually do have some kind of being, they do exist in some sense. But that looks crazy. And it also means that claims like ‘Harry Potter doesn’t exist’ always turn out to be false. But that can’t be right.

14 The theory of definite descriptions
Questions? Comments?

15 The theory of definite descriptions
Russell’s approach: sentences containing the word ‘the’ have a kind of ‘hidden structure’. ‘The author of Waverley is Scotch’ is far more complex than it at first looks. In fact, it has three claims ‘packed into it’.

16 The theory of definite descriptions
’The author of Waverley was Scotch’ in fact means: 1) There is at least one person who is the author of Waverley. 2) There is at most one person who is the author of Waverley. 3) That person was Scotch. Or: there was one and only one person who wrote Waverley, and s/he was Scotch.

17 The theory of definite descriptions
Important: all three claims need to be true in order for the overall sentence to be true. If just one of them is false, then the sentence itself is false. This seems correct: ’The author of Waverley was Scotch’ 1) There is at least one person who is the author of Waverley. 2) There is at most one person who is the author of Waverley. 3) That person was Scotch.

18 The theory of definite descriptions
This gives us a general formula. Take an claim ‘The X is Y’ That means: 1) There is at least one thing that is X. 2) There is at most one thing that is X. 3) The thing that is X is Y.

19 The theory of definite descriptions
Logical notation: ‘The F is G’ means: ∃x (F x & ∀y (F y → y = x) & Gx) There exists at least one thing (call it ‘x’) that is F. If anything is F then it is the same thing as x. and x is G Informal example: ‘The author of Waverley is Scotch’ There exists at least one thing that is the author of Waverley. If anything is the author of Waverley, then it is the same thing as the first thing. That thing is Scotch

20 The theory of definite descriptions
Notice how far away from the ‘surface’ of language we have come. ‘The author of Waverley is Scotch’ and ‘Theresa May is a Tory’ look like they have very straightforward meanings. But really they don’t: the real meanings of them are very different from how they look on the surface. This is a philosophical point about language: it often hides its ‘true’ nature. We’ll find a similar idea in Chomsky (seminar 10): different languages look very very different on the surface, but really they have a hidden core that they all share.

21 The theory of definite descriptions
Questions/comments?

22 The theory of definite descriptions
Back to the problems. ‘The present King of France is bald’: 1) There is at least one thing that is presently the King of France. 2) There is at most one thing that is presently the King of France. 3) That thing is bald. (1) is false. And all three of them need to be true for the overall claim to be true. So the overall claim ‘The present King of France is bald’ is also false.

23 The theory of definite descriptions
Questions/comments?

24 The theory of definite descriptions
Question: does this work for fiction? ‘The murderer of Dumbledore is Snape’ means: 1) There is at least one person who is the murderer of Dumbledore. 2) There is at most one person who is the murderer of Dumbledore. 3) That person is Snape. Notice that (1) is false (there isn’t anyone who murdered Dumbledore, Snape doesn’t really exist). So the whole sentence must be false (by Russell’s theory). So it’s false that the murderer of Dumbledore is Snape. Is that right?!?!

25 The theory of definite descriptions
Remember the negative existential claim ‘The present King of France does not exist’. We were worried whether that’s true or false, and if so, how? Russell’s answer: that can be read in at least two ways

26 The theory of definite descriptions
1) On the first reading, it is just like a normal definite description: There is at least one thing that is the present King of France. There is at most one thing that is the present King of France. That thing does not exist. So, on that reading is ‘The present King of France does not exist’ true or false? It’s false because (1) is false Note: you don’t need to worry about how weird (3) sounds, because we already know (1) is false, so the whole thing must be false, no matter what we think of (3).

27 The theory of definite descriptions
2) On the second reading, ‘the present King of France does not exist’ means ‘it is not the case that the present King of France exists’. So what you do then is take the claim ‘the present King of France exists’ and then analyse that like a normal definite description, and then stick ‘it is not the case that’ in front of it. ‘IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT [there is at least one present King of France, and there is at most one present King of France, and that person exists]’ Is that true or false? It’s true

28 The theory of definite descriptions
Notice that we’ve slid again away from the ‘surface’ of language. Not only do definite descriptions have a hidden meaning, but negative existentials have two hidden meanings! Notice the deep influence of Frege on Russell: Using logic to discover the hidden nature of language. Putting forward views to solve puzzles about language.

29 The theory of definite descriptions
Questions/comments?

30 The theory of definite descriptions
It can deal with the problems of non-existents. It can also deal with negative existentials. It gives us nice clear explanations of when definite descriptions are true and false. It gives you the same account of sentences like ‘The current Prime Minister is Tory’ as ‘The current King of France is bald’. It’s not clear how it deals with fiction.

31 The theory of definite descriptions
Discussion: Bertrand Russell ‘Descriptions’.


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