1. VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements
Postulated Russian Strategic Nuclear Force Production and Deployment: 2024
James R. Howe
VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements
Vision Centric, Inc.
Presented to SMDWG 25 Jan 2018
100 MT WH
PAK-DA?
UNCLASSIFIED

2. Study Objective
Objective– Using open sources estimate Russian 2024 Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) force structure based on: 1) Existing deployed force levels (including modernized/life extension systems) and planned retirements 2) Planned IOC’s for RS-26, RS-28, RS-X-29, Tu-160M3, PAK-DA and Borei SSBN build rates 3) Planned production: Pres Putin 2012—”Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022” NOTE- The public decision on producing RS-28 & RS-29’s was made ~ 1 year later, so not included in the 400. Also 400 IC/SLBM’s is within Votinsk’s production capability. 4) Demonstrated missile production capabilities – Russia could have three missile production plants: -- Votinsk built 38 IC/SLBM’s in 2014, 50 in 2015, >40 in 2016 – can produce 400+ by Krasnoyarsk built >4,000 liquid SLBM’s and is building RS-28 Sarmat – could build 10-30/yr -- Khrunichev built ~400 liquid fueled ICBM’s (SS-19), and currently is producing the Proton and Angara SLV’s, and may build the RS-X-29. Could build 10-30/yr 5) Given the planned SNF force levels and capabilities of conventional missiles w/advanced technology WH, it is believed a significant portion of the force will have a conventional mission. Given the number of variables that exist, the baseline estimates used are what is believed to be a conservative estimate of what Russia could deploy by 2024 (baseline study) While both Krasnoyarsk (RS-28) and Khrunichev (RS-X-29) could produce missiles/year, the rate of 10 missiles/year for each was used. --- During the Cold War, USSR built over 200 IC/SLBM’s/year
UNCLASSIFIED

3. Integrated Cyber-Radio Electronic Combat
Russian Integrated Strategic Offense/Defense System –
Will be completely Modernized by 2022—Why the URGENCY?
Focus of this brief is on Russian Strategic
Offense (Nuclear and Non-nuclear),
-- Relationship w/Aerospace Defense Forces
-- Space, cyber warfare and strategic indirect warfare
issues will also have to be addressed.
-- President Putin 22 Dec 2016—Strategic
non-nuclear forces are a high force
development priority; 2nd priority in
State Armament Program
Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO) (2015)
Space Command
Air & Space Defense Command (PRO/PKO)
-- Moscow ABM
-- S-400/500 units
-- Civil/passive Defense
Russian Air Force
Counter force operations?
Strategic Offense
Nuclear
-- ICBM
-- SLBM
-- Bomber
-- SSN/SSGN LACM?
Non-Nuclear
-- Kinetic
-- Cyber
The combination of a declining state creating need
-- strategic/theater nuclear superiority providing
means ,
-- together with effective air/missile defenses
and extensive civil defenses reducing vulnerabilities
-- means Russia will be willing to accept far more risk
--US/NATO risk adverse
BM/C4ISR
Integrated Cyber-Radio Electronic Combat
UNCLASSIFIED

4. Nuclear Weapons and Warfare are not Immune to the March of Technology
V. Mikhaylov, Minister of Atomic Energy, and First Deputy Minister, proposed creating a force of 10,000, Low yield, “clean”, highly accurate nuclear weapons – confirmed by CIA 22 June 2000 (1) Yeltsin reportedly signed presidential decree authorizing development 29 Apr 99
Goal is to “…make the threat realistic”…“make nuclear weapons an instrument of policy” …” provide usable military force”
“Evidence of Russian operational testing of new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads”– CIA 30 Aug 2000 (1)
-- Large number of low-yield nuclear tests against equipment and biological targets
Russia reportedly has deployed precision nuclear WH w/ ton yields on SLBM’s.
Col-Gen Muravyev, Dep CINC of the RVSN -- [Strategic missile systems should be capable of conducting ‘surgical’ strikes… using both highly accurate, super-low yield nuclear weapons, as well as conventional ones…” “…groupings of non-nuclear MBR (ICBM’s) and BRPL (SLBM’s) may appear…” ] Moscow Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 Dec 1999.
President Putin –”Russia is creating a new generation nuclear weapons …these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers.”
-- e.g. Drone torpedo w/100 MT WH; Sea bottom based SLBM’s; Precision, low-yield, “clean” nuclear weapons? “discrete” EMP weapons? Neutron? Other tailored nuclear weapon effects?
– Russia is developing a spectrum of nuclear weapons which can maintain escalation dominance all along the conflict spectrum – from “de-escalate” conflicts to conducting major nuclear warfare.
1) Declassified CIA documents
Russia Has a Very Different View of Nuclear War Than The US and is developing the policy/doctrine/forces to implement
The most cost-effective way to deter the US is with nuclear weapons
UNCLASSIFIED

5. What Are Russia’s SNF Implementing Activities?
Putin – 2012 “ Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022”—(Note: all w/4-10+ WH capability)
-- A simple calculation illustrates how many IC/SLBM nuclear warheads Russia could have deployed by 2022 due to SNF modernization, new production and MIRVing:
400 IC/SL X 4 RV’s = 1600 WH
400 IC/SL X 7RV’s = 2800 WH
400 IC/SL X 10 RV’s = 4000 WH
Plus ~ 50 SS-18/Sarmat X 10/15 = 500/750 WH
Plus refurbished Delta IV’s = WH
Plus 30 “like new” SS-19 = 180 WH
Plus 78 SS-27 Mod 1 MIRV =
Plus RS-X-29 new liquid (6-12 RV’s?) = TBD
Life extension and MIRV’ing could allow a much slower rate of new SNF production—but it isn’t
By 2024 Russia’s Votinsk could produce an additional IC/SLBM’s: Krasnoyarsk 20 more 10/yr. and Khrunichev an additional or 20/yr.
Potentially
IC/SL WH
( Plus > 800 bomber WH)
Great Uncertainty
-- Numbers
-- Types
-- WH loadings
-- Missions
Consequently, life extension & MIRV’ing to maximize near-term firepower and new production missile WH numbers/throw-weight will far exceed New START limits and raises questions about Russian intentions
UNCLASSIFIED