2. How To Govern Shared Natural Resources?
Published 1990
Governance of common pool resources (CPRs)
Alternative to current approaches (government regulation, private property)

3. How To Govern Shared Natural Resources?
Traditional models:
Tragedy of the commons
Prisoners dilemma
Logic of collective action

4. 1. Tragedy of the Commons
1968 paper The Tragedy of the Commons by ecologist Garrett Hardin
Cited 15,707 times
Individuals, acting rationally and in their own self-interest, will eventually deplete a shared natural resource
Each user gets full benefit of use, but shares the cost of overuse
Garrett Hardin

5. Albert William Tucker 1905 - 1995
2. Prisoners Dilemma
Game theory approach
Puzzles with this structure discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher
Part of Rand Corporation’s research into nuclear strategy
Canadian-born mathematician Albert Tucker formalized the game in 1950
Albert William Tucker

6. 2. Prisoners Dilemma Two men arrested, placed in separate cells
No communication between them
Each can confess or remain silent
Dilemma: each one is better off confessing, no matter what other does
Outcome for both is worse than if each remained silent
Y confesses
Y remains silent
X confesses
X: 5 yrs
Y: 5 yrs
X: 2 yrs Y: 10 yrs
X remains silent
X: 10 yrs
Y: 2 yrs
X: 3 yrs
Y: 3 yrs

7. 3. Logic of Collective Action
American economist Mancur Olson
The Logic of Collective Action 1965
“unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”
Mancur Olson

8. Elinor Ostrom Born 1933 in Los Angeles CA
Professor of political science at Indiana University
Challenged view that common property is poorly managed, must be centrally regulated or privatized

9. Inland Fishery at Alanya, Turkey

10. About 100 fishers in small (2-3 person) boats
By early 1970s unrestrained use led to conflict, violence
Competition for best spots increased production costs, uncertainty
After decade of trial and error, came up with a system

11. Each September, list:
All eligible fishers
All usable fishing spots
All fishers draw lots to determine spots
Sep – Jan every day each fisher moves 1 spot east
After Jan fishers move west
Fishers themselves monitor and enforce rules

12. Fisheries

13. Irrigation systems

14. Forests and pasture land

15. Design Principles for enduring CPR institutions
Clearly defined boundaries
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Collective choice arrangements
Monitoring

16. Design Principles for enduring CPR institutions
Graduated sanctions
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
Nested enterprises (for CPRs that are parts of larger systems)

17. Sources
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Print
Ostrom, Elinor. Prize Lecture. Nobelprize.org. 17 Oct