1. Armed Group Organization in Socially Fragmented Environments (i. e
Armed Group Organization in Socially Fragmented Environments (i.e., Collapsed States)
Will Reno
Northwestern University

2. Armed group cohesion in general terms:
How do different armed group—community relationships emerge, historically & now?
What are specific consequences of these relationships for armed group organizational cohesion (as expressed through recruitment, discipline)?
Known #1: Armed groups use coercion & information to establish control over people and territory (Kalyvas).
Example: Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Iraq), Al Shabaab (Somalia) sought territorial control (discriminate violence – assassinations); popular response was complicity, if not outright support.

3. Known #2: Prewar community institutions matter, shaping different forms of rebel governance (Arjona)
Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; the people obey the strongest force
Strong local institutions -> keep rebels (or state) at bay. Institutions mediate resources & rebel goals.
Known #2.1: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape armed group organization at the outset (Staniland).
Networks, re-purposed for war, shape organizational options for armed groups to recruit, discipline and motivate members.

4. A Puzzle: Why would armed groups that face weak state institutions and dominate local communities fail to utilize these advantages to increase internal cohesion?
This is like asking why some terrorist groups have a hard time getting traction in “ungoverned spaces”

5. No holiday from history: State context matters
Early nation-states  guerrilla rebels
Industrializing states  urban insurgency
Periphery state-builders  Maoist “liberated zones”
Periphery Patronage states  fragmented rebels
A related question: If armed group fragmentation is the dominant mode, why do cohesive armed groups appear in similar conditions?

6. State collapse produces a distinct context for conflict, blurring rebel-government distinctions
*Field vacation. Not field research.

7. Pre-conflict states of reciprocal infiltration & violence
Patronage state networks infiltrate other social networks as a strategy to exercise authority Patronage politics uses violence (“creative tension”) to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime; it works if the original hierarchy is maintained Disruption, often externally induced, fragments the state patronage and other social networks  civil war

8. The Desert of the Real

9. Two Kinds of Armed Groups
Town Rebels: Vice President Riek Machar, political network insider, at his “rebel” HQ, April 2014
Bush Rebels: I don’t know who he is, but he is appears to be on the margins of the establishment
* Look left: R.M reads Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Kevin Mauer, No Easy Day, and the Holy Bible
* Sheikh Munajjid ruled that creating a snowman is a sin!

10. Data & Measurement
Counting conflicts: If the character of warfare changes, what should we count? There is no consensus on how to count, many ignore non-state dimensions of organized violence.
Collecting Data: Where should data come from?
Conceptualization: Are state-centric data collection / approaches less helpful over time? A “non-state realm” and its interactions provides useful insights for understanding contemporary patterns of conflict.
I’m on board with GIS and the Armed Conflict Event Location Data Project (ACLED),

11. Armed Group Cohesion
Measured in terms of the degree of autonomous capacity to manage social relationships outside groups, and manage obligations of group members.
Low cohesion: Symmetrical irregular warfare of clan-based militias in the South Sudan slide
High cohesion: Rebels sustaining “liberated zones” (Al-Shabaab, ISIS, etc.)

12. A model of armed group control in collapsed states
Neighborhood 
Leadership ↓
Social Fragmented
Social Embedded
Town Rebels
Criminal Pluralism: Leaders able to capitalize on local tensions to fulfill political goals; but community provides concealment for low-level violent operators.
Bush Rebels
Dominant strongman: Potential translation of leader interests into concrete action.
Nasty insurgents unable to fulfill insurgent potential, nasty rebels.
Mobilizing insurgents: Community enables bush rebels to fulfill an insurgent potential.

13. The other two-by-two Fragment Embed Town Rebels Jajab & Hodon
Kamaliyah
Dominated from within: hardened strongmen competing for position
Shebelle enclaves
Beladiyat & Mashtal
Warlords: Territorial control, Ethnic & sectarian fiefdoms
Bush Rebels
Shiibiis, Amin
Poisoned from within: Criminal mosques, self-appointed morality police
Khatumo, Shebelle Shabaab
Liberated zones: Alternative governance

14. The importance of ground checking concepts (and GIS)
For the fate of these coordinates, visit R.I.P.

15. Somali Rabbit Hole Matrix

16. Mesopotamian R.H.M.