1. Ten Myths of the War in Iraq James Madison University, 27 Apr 07
UNCLASSIFIED/For Official Use Only
James Madison University, 27 Apr 07
Ten Myths of
the War in Iraq
Brigadier General Steve Anderson Deputy Chief of Staff Resources and Sustainment Multi-National Force - Iraq
SUPPORT THE FORCE!
UNCLASSIFIED/For Official Use Only

2. Why Iraq is Vital to National Security Key Fact & Current Situation
Agenda
Purpose
Why Iraq is Vital to National Security
Key Fact & Current Situation
The Top Ten Myths of the War in Iraq
Ten Reasons to be Optimistic
Way Ahead
Questions & Discussion
Note: Views expressed are mine alone and are not to be misconstrued as official Army/DoD positions

3. Purpose
Present unvarnished viewpoint of soldier serving in Iraq in Baghdad for previous 8 months
Provide insights on Operation Iraqi Freedom that may run counter to how many presently view the war
Promote understanding of what many believe is “the defining political-military event of this generation”
Engage in candid discussion with students, faculty and other attendees regarding OIF
Stimulate critical thinking about the War in Iraq in a learning environment

4. Sunni Kurd Shi’a & Sunni Shi’a SAUDI ARABIA
TURKEY
Iraqi Ethnic/
Sectarian Groups
Why Iraq is so vital to regional stability
Shi’a
60%
Sunni
20%
Kurd
17%
Other 3%
Kurd
Mixed
Sunni Arab
Shi’a Arab
Dahuk
Tall Afar
Mosul
Irbil
Kirkuk
Tikrit
SYRIA
IRAN
Al Qa’im
Samarra
Baqubah
Ramadi
Fallujah
BAGHDAD
Ar Rutbah
JORDAN
Karbala
Hillah
Al Kut
60% Shia, 30% Sunni and 10% Kurd data. or
60% Shia, 20% Sunni, 17% Kurd and 3% Other - (Turkomen, Assyrian) Part of the difference is also related to the fact that Kurds and Turkomen are often also Sunni.
An Najaf
Al Amarah
SAUDI
ARABIA
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Iraq situated on sectarian fault lines…
Regional balance and world security at stake

5. Key Facts & Current Situation
Four years of War in Iraq (Mar 03 – Present)
War costs estimated at $9B/month
Iraqi civ casualties (most from Car Bombs) = 3K/month
Iraqi mil casualties = 26K (last 24 months)
Total OIF US casualties = 27K; 3400 US KIA
Evidence of strong foreign support – Iran, Syria, other Arab suicide bombers
Fighting 100K armed fighters (SCIRI, JAM, AQI, 1920’s Bde, etc.), a resilient and adaptive enemy able to regenerate (Ratio of Civ’s to Fighters = 290:1)
3M Iraqi’s are displaced or have fled to Jordan and Syria
US Daily KIA Rates: WWI = 199, WWII = 301; Korea = 32; Vietnam = 20; OIF = 2
Focus of
most media reporting
Coalition forces executing new strategy w/ 28K additional troops that peaks in June 07; living with population in order to secure it
Next 6-8 months critical; security situation must improve so that Gov’t of Iraq can develop POLITICAL solution (vs. military)

6. Myth #1: War in Iraq is “All about Oil”
Oil industry vital to regional & world stability -- and Iraqi prosperity
OIF not an effort to keep gas prices low; War in Iraq is all about freedom, democracy, self-determination and regional security in Middle East
OIF is combating religious extremists trying to terrorize the Iraqi populace and dictate political outcome thru terror and intimidation
Coalition efforts focused on providing security to a good and noble people/culture that has been subjected to 30 years of brutal repression
Leaving now would result in a huge human/Iraqi catastrophe:
Brookings Institute: Pullout would result in 750K civilians casualties (e.g., Rwanda: 800,000 Tutsis slaughtered by Hutus in ’94)
Impact of failed state -- AQI safe haven in the heart of Middle East
Is “escalating violence” a reason to leave?
Encourage similar efforts elsewhere in world?
“Within 24 months we will have an attack on US soil to dwarf 9-11” Tommy Franks
“Date for withdrawal = date for failure” SEN John McCain
War in Iraq is essentially a fight against religious extremists – an enemy dedicated to denying the people of Iraq freedom, democracy, and basic rights of self-determination

7. Myth #2: US is Fighting Alone
26 nations contributing soldiers (approx 12K)
Largest contributors: UK, Australia, Poland, Korea, Georgia (Jun 07)
Non-US KIA (13 nations): 186
40+ nations contributing contract labor (approx 80K)
United Nations Security Council Resolutions in support of OIF: 5
US Interagency: US State Dept, USAID, DIA, CIA, etc.
Increasingly capable Iraqi Security Forces:
Iraq casualties: 8123 KIA, over 18K WIA in last two years alone
Iraqi’s now have 329K security personnel (31 x IA Bdes, 9 x NP Bdes)
9 of 10 Iraqi Divisions are now LEADING combat ops in their areas
Iraqi’s established Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) and assumed command & control of Baghdad and Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon
Iraqi training base now producing 24K soldiers/year and 26K police/year
Ramadi Recruits: Nov 06 = 4, Dec 06 = 40; Mar 07 = 1500 in 3 days
UNSCR 1483 (22 May 03)
UNSCR 1511 (16 Oct 03)
Recognized the realities on the ground and gave some international spt to occupation and rebuilding of Iraq; 1511 first mentioned CPA by name
UNSCR 1546 (8 Jun 04), UNSCR 1637 (8 Nov 05) and USSCR 1723 (28 Nov 06) provide support for MNF-I presence and opns contains what we all refer to as the “security and stability” MANDATE – 1637 and 1723 are renewals
All five under Chapter VII (peace maintenance or peace enforcement) of UN charter
KIA since 19 Mar 03
UK = 109
Italy = 24
Poland = 13
Ukraine = 7
Bulgaria = 7
Denmark = 4
El Salvador = 4
Slovakia = 4
Latvia = 3
Estonia = 2
Netherlands = 2
Romania = 1
Kazakhstan = 1
OIF is a robust COALITION of many nations, all committed to helping Iraqis build their security forces to counter violence and empower them to take control and secure their nation

8. Myth #3: Iraq engulfed in full-scale Civil War
War primarily a fight between religious extremists (Foreign fighters + suicide bombers + Al Qaeda) and coalition forces
Baghdad + Al Anbar Province = still unacceptably high violence; other provinces relatively safe and secure
Majority of Muslims do not want to rule the world; most are peace-loving, hard-working people that to wish to live and work in safety and peace
Car bombs, road-side bombs and sniper attacks cause most casualties
Religious extremists not unique to Iraq
Jim Jones, David Koresh, Eric Rudolph, Abortion Clinic bombers, etc.
Security improving with over 35 neighborhood police stations in Baghdad – markets, banks, restaurants, soccer games, amusement park
“No fanatic like a religious fanatic.” Andy Rooney
Force on Force violence/battles are rare
David Koresh was recent enough that they are likely to remember, and is the poster child for American religious extremists.
There are a host of pro-life abortion clinic bombers, but I would go with Eric Rudolph, who is probably the best known. He was convicted of a Birmingham, AL clinic bombing that killed a security guard and badly wounded a young nurse, and also bombed the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta (killing one woman and wounding over 100 people), and confessed to several other bombings (including another abortion clinic and a gay bar) after he was caught. After his arrest, he guided police to his stash of over 200 KG of explosives. He is a devout Christian (not sure what flavor) and his bombings were religiously motivated. He remains committed to the ideal that abortion is murder and must be met with deadly force. Jim Jones was probably too long ago for most college students to remember.
Violence levels are unacceptable and must be brought down; it is not a war waged between large factions of the general populace, but a fight involving religiously-motivated fringe extremists who promote their cause thru civilian bloodshed and brutal acts of terror

9. Myth #4: Iraqi’s Better Off Under Saddam (1 of 2)
Since ’03 and the fall of Saddam:
Democratically elected representative government
Free Speech and Free Press (TV, Radio, Internet, Papers)
Rule of Law Complex bringing justice to Sunni, Shia and Kurd extremists
Free-Market Economy vs. State Owned Industries
Health Services: 25% increase in immunizations; measles reduced 90%
Sewer, Water, Trash: 20 projects ($10M)
Providing water for 5.4M Iraqis
Electricity:
Before Mar 03, most of Iraq had 4-8 hrs (outside Baghdad); Baghdad had 16-24
Now equally distributed, most country has 8-10 hrs
75% of Iraqis now get TWICE the power they did before war
Demand for electricity since Mar 03 increased 70%
Energy Fusion Center being stood up (Joint Coalition/Iraqi)
Electrical demand increases when people buy more washing machines, air conditioners, TV’s, etc.

10. Myth #4: Iraqi’s Better Off Under Saddam (2 of 2)
US Army Corps of Engineers working to combat 25 years of infrastructure neglect
US Army Corps of Engineers have completed 3704 construction projects
Cost: $5.0B
Infrastructure = 80%
Community-based projects = 20%
4794 Planned Projects: $9.3B
Efforts ongoing to train Iraqi engineers, contractors, surveyors, etc.
A portion of the 3704 completed projects include:
35 post office projects
4 training academy projects
93 fire stations projects
155 border fort projects (278 Nationwide)
13 border points of entry projects
36 courthouse projects
32 hospital renovation projects
51 Primary Healthcare Center projects
981 schools (325K students) projects
97 railway station renovation projects
20 aviation projects
6 port projects
190 village road projects
342 police station projects
136 public building projects
Majority of Iraqis have a higher quality of life than under Saddam – and enjoy freedoms repressed under his rule

11. Myth #5: Iraqi Government Ineffective
New government – only one year old; Dec 05 Iraqi voters approved new permanent constitution; working Constitutional Review and next round of provincial elections
Iraq convened a regional conf of 13 nations (12 Mar 07) – neighbors, US, UN, Islamic Conf, Arab League; agreements on security, imports, refugees
Key legislative accomplishments:
Prime Minister’s Emergency Powers Renewal, Provincial Powers Law
Council of Ministers Passed Hydrocarbon Law (equitable distribution of oil revenues) Feb 07; awaiting approval by Council of Reps
Constitutional Referendum, Detainee Legislation
Passed 2007 Budget ($41B) -- Budget Execution improvement
Established Nat’l Ops Center, Energy Fusion Ctr, Rule of Law Complex
4 of 18 provinces under Provincial Governor control for security
PM Maliki – committed, competent, making progress; no political interference to security ops (e.g., ops now in formerly restricted Sadr City)
Contrast with US constitution development
SECURITY:
- Iraqis are feeling less secure in their neighborhoods than in March, yet we are still near six month highs. Decline in those who feel safe within their own neighborhoods (77.3% feel safe vice 82.1% in March 2007, compared to 68.5% in Oct 06).
- The overall effectiveness of the IP beginning to decline according to Iraqis, but we are still above pre-OFaQ levels (70.1% Apr 07% vice 73.1% in Feb 07, compared to 67.6% in Oct 06).
IRAQI GOVERNMENT:
- Improvement in Iraqis that believe that the GoI is addressing the current needs of the nation - highest level in five months (48.2%/ 39.7% in Apr 07/ Feb 07).
- Support for using the peaceful political process is nearing levels seen in January 2007 (80.1%/80.7% in Apr 07/Jan 07).
BASIC NEEDS:
- Satisfaction with life is at a 6 month high recovering from January low (4.68 avg out of 10 in Apr 07/ 4.23 in Jan 07).
In June 2005, Iraq’s Prime Minister announced a joint decision between the GoI and Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) to systematically hand over security responsibility in Iraq’s 18 provinces to the Provincial Civil Authorities under the control of the province’s governor. The responsibility for security in each province will become the responsibility of the Provincial Governor, his Provincial Council and local Iraqi Police Service (IPS) led by the Provincial Director of Police.
The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR), comprised of Iraqi, MNF-I and Embassy representatives, was commissioned in July 2005 to develop a set of conditions assessing the readiness of each province for PIC. The committee considers four criteria: threat assessment, readiness of Iraqi Security Forces, governance capabilities, and MNF-I Force posture.
Iraq’s new democracy: natural growth pains but increasingly functional and credible; services, budgeting, legislative and diplomatic capability improving

12. Myth #6: Economic Development Nonexistent
IMF projects 9% growth in economy for 2007; inflation cut in half to 34%
Saudi Arabia forgives 80% of $15B of Iraqi debt
USAID helping to develop and reopen many closed banks; many banks now turning profits; Japanese providing loan guarantees
Reducing corruption by stabilizing oil prices
Oil exports revenues = $33.4B; oil provides great opportunity to jumpstart economy
Most private and public mgmt processes: manual systems from ’40’s
DoD’s Brinkley Group working agriculture, contracting, financial and industrial revitalization w/ key CEO’s (IBM, ITT, Caterpillar, UA, etc.)
“Art of the Possible” = Irbil; high employment & flourishing economy
Developing transportation infrastructure to support economic growth
State has dominated Private Sector for 30 years; working to change
“Business is NON-SECTARIAN” Amb Carney
Many positive signs that Iraqi economic recovery starting to get legs; improving security will stimulate additional investment interest

13. Myth #7: Contractors Cost Gov’t Too Much
129K contractors: 21K US + 43K Third Country Nationals + 65K Iraqi (47K KBR)
Contractor casualties (KBR): 101 KIA, 586 WIA
General Trend: Services up, Costs down (experience, efficiencies, economies of scale)
KBR augments at least 50% of sustainment mission--invaluable service for down-sized military; provide continuity (many here 3-4 yrs); organic support would require 3X troops
KBR has received $19B since beginning of war (approx 5% total OIF costs)
KBR works on 1% fixed fee guarantee, 2% award fee possible (earned 88% of available award); max return on investment = 3%
121 KBR employees have received the prestigious Defense of Freedom OF medal
Total Audits of KBR = 25
17 – Army Audit Agency (AAA)
5 – Special Investigator General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR)
2 – Government Accountability Office (GAO)
1 – DoD Inspector General (IG)
KBR Award Fee Trend
Companies: how many would make such an investment for such little profit margin?
Contractors are providing tremendous support at reasonable cost to taxpayer; they are patriots equally committed to the cause of Iraqi freedom that share risks and suffer losses side-by-side with troops

14. Myth #8: Troops Aren’t Properly Equipped (1 of 2)
Coalition Forces are superbly outfitted
Body Armor for all deployed troops (stops small arms and shrapnel) & chemical protection
Over 25K Armored Vehicles in Theater; no troops off base w/out one
Hummer – now on 6th major iteration of improved protection
Route Clearance Equipment Cougar, Buffalo, MRAP, Frag Kit #6
Steady stream of technology insertions and new developments
Tactical advantage thru Own-The-Night technology
High Quality-of-Life in operating bases
Iraq Security Forces (Army + Police) are well equipped as well
ISF forces equipment improving constantly -- $7.3B in 2007
Vehicles & key weapons: 3500 x UAH’s, 500 x Cougar & BTR-80 light wheeled armor vehs, 900+ mortars
Aircraft: 80+ helicopters, 3 x C-130 multi-purpose aircraft

15. Myth #8: Troops Aren’t Properly Equipped (2 of 2)
1200 cargo trucks delivering supplies daily (800 from Kuwait, 200 from Jordan, 200 from Turkey)
400,000 meals served at DFAC a day. Feed Alexandria, VA
1.3M gallons of fuel consumed daily – enough fuel to fill the tanks of 87K typical mid-sized cars (over 50,000 vehicles in theater)
Produce 2 million bottles of drinking water daily.
Produce 9M gallons of bulk water every day – enough to fill 450 residential swimming pools (approx 40 gals/person/day)
465 tons of ice per day – that’s 1.4 pounds of ice per soldier
2.8 million pieces of laundry daily – enough clothing to outfit every person in the city of San Francisco
400,000 lbs of mail each day in December. Dec = 50 lbs/person
Typical
Day In
Iraq:
Forces are well equipped and supported; an adaptive enemy continues to develop more sophisticated and lethal weaponry;
DoD and industry responding to give troops best available protection

16. Myth #9: Morale is Low
The NEW Greatest Generation (18-30 years old): Tough, committed, adaptive and professional fighting force – representing you well
Disciplined and compassionate; don’t pull trigger indiscriminately, go overboard to protect citizens and respect Islamic culture
Sign of soldier morale = high retention rates
Re-up rate continues to far exceed objectives
Retention “simply astonishing” (GEN (Ret) McCaffrey)
Troops have seen the polls and realize most Americans evidently don’t support the war – but appreciate the strong support Americans continue to show to those fighting it
Amazing outpouring of mail, packages and messages from CONUS
Reaction to troops in uniform transiting airports returning from Iraq
Anti-war messages usually not projected against troops
Please view all media reports with objectivity: A dozen x disgruntled soldiers on 60 Mins – an accurate representation of soldier attitudes?
“We love you troops” Comedian/Commentator Al Franken, Dec 06
Comparison to Vietnam
Morale is high and not adversely impacted by war debate; 180k coalition soldiers getting a tough job done in Iraq; all Services serving honorably and courageously

17. Myth #10 -- The Biggest Myth: We Have Lost
New Operational Scheme getting more troops into Baghdad (US + Iraq = 87.5K): Operation “Fardh Al-Qanoon” (FAQ)
First time, enough troops to Clear – Control – Retain – Build
Ensuring security by increasing permanent presence in key Baghdad neighborhoods
Establishing over 75 Neighborhood Police Stations (Iraqi Army + Iraqi Police + Coalition)
Securing markets – life returning to city (parks, shops, restaurants, etc)
National Tips Hotline – all-time high
Iraqi gov't supporting significant military actions in Sadr City for first time
Decline in ethno-sectarian incidents (26%) since FAQ initiation
Iraqis have committed sizeable numbers to the fight (Police + Army) = 329K
Tribal resistance to Al Qaeda in Iraq, especially in West; Sunni tribes supplying young men to IA for the first time; AQI, “A War Against All Iraqis”
Extremist Shiite militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr in hiding and we are working with Shiite Mayor of Sadr City, his old stronghold
According Krauthammer, the preliminary results from the surge are visible. In Anbar province, one of the two fronts of the two surge, the results are the most promising. “…14 of the 18 tribal leaders in Anbar have turned against Al Qaeda. As a result, thousands of Sunni recruits are turning up at police stations where none could be seen before. For the first time, former insurgent strongholds such as Ramadi have a Sunni police force fighting essentially on our side.”
Military cannot “win” this war – can only help set conditions for a POLITICAL solution; security is paramount and there are some early signs new strategy working -- expect assessments at end of summer

18. Summary: Ten Reasons to be Optimistic
We are fighting for a worthy cause: freedom & democracy
US has many great teammates in this effort
Level of violence unsatisfactory, but not a full scale civil war
Iraqi quality of life and infrastructure improving
Increasing effectiveness and ministerial capability of Iraq gov’t
Private sector investment climate getting better
Contractors continue to serve ably & provide tremendous service
Forces are best equipped and best protected in history
Troop morale, professionalism and competence high
Brutal, high-profile acts of violence too frequent, but we are making steady progress towards enabling a political solution

19. We MUST win this struggle.
Way Ahead
Engaged in a tough fight with brutal, adaptive extremists
Apply appropriate coalition political, military, diplomatic, economic and informational power to:
Protect population, reduce sectarian violence and allow nation to establish consensus among Shia, Sunni, Kurd
Ensure regional stability and a secure Iraq, at peace w/ neighbors
Empower Iraqi democracy and commitment to law-based gov’t
Contain Islamic extremists to Middle East
Enable passing security responsibility to Govt of Iraq
“So far the military action in Iraq has produced a modest improvement in American and global economic conditions; an intensified dialogue within the Arab world about political reform; a withdrawal of American forces from Saudi Arabia; and an increasing nervousness on the part of the Syrian and Iranian governments as they contemplated the consequences of being surrounded by American clients or surrogates. The United States has emerged as a more powerful and purposeful actor within the international system than it had been on September 11, 2001."
From Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Harvard Press) released in March 07 by John Lewis Gaddis, the Robert A. Lovett professor of military and naval history at Yale University
This is the defining international event of our time… We can win this struggle.
We MUST win this struggle.