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2 Today’s slides available at: www.duke.edu/~gettes/CAMP

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4 Seminar 02 Introduction to Identity Management: The Big Picture Michael R. Gettes Duke University CAMP: Building a Distributed Access Management Infrastructure Greetings Panel focus is on the importance of creating policy and process in pursuit of an enterprise directory service. There’s information of interest for those already managing a directory service, as well as those just thinking about one. Description of panel format: Context – centralization focus in building an enterprise service Headers on slides are broad areas that will require policy Questions on slides are examples of likely issues, that will spur conversation, and are not all inclusive Panelists will speak to some of these questions, audience is encouraged to ask other questions, add comments, challenge group

5 Observations on: Identity Management, Middleware & Security in U. S
Observations on: Identity Management, Middleware & Security in U.S. Higher Education Michael R Gettes Duke University

6 We recognize there exists a larger world...
A GLOBAL PROBLEM! We recognize there exists a larger world... 9/18/2018

7 Identity Management? #1 Issue in Higher Education /2006 EDUCAUSE IT Survey. Less than 10 years old - some HE schools doing it much longer. IdM is defined by many components as follows ...

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9 IdM Components a.k.a. “middleware” (1)
Systems of Record (HR, SIS, Alumni, Telecom) Information Switch (Vendor/build) entity registry (Vendor/build) identity business rule handling (Vendor/build)

10 IdM Components a.k.a. “middleware” (2)
Authentication (Password, PKI, Kerberos (ECAR Survey - K5 everywhere), ...) Authority Mgmt (Signet, HR system, ...) Group Mgmt (Vendor, Grouper, Build) Directories - fast repositories (Vendor, Open Source) EVERYONE should be implementing Kerberos!

11 IdM Components a.k.a. “middleware” (3)
Service Provisioning Vendor, Built, Nexus Message Mgmt - real-time and queuing Vendor, Built or Jabber/XMPP

12 IdM Components a.k.a. “middleware” (4)
Attribute Delivery PKI, SAML/Shibboleth, Directory, Vendor, (Various) Authorization, Act of (by Application) Policy Decision Point (PDP) Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)

13 Age of this Technology Technology is young.
Lots of options - much more than just 5 years ago. If you buy - you will still need to build your own Identity Business Rules. Buy *and* Build decision. NSF/Internet2 Middleware - these “solutions” are simply options. If you believe in Open Source - they are good. If not, then use these solutions to drive vendors for what you want. Remain aware of trends.

14 Institutional Issues STAY OFF THE FRONT PAGE OF NATIONAL NEWS!!!
IdM is part of any “good” security program. Each institution having IdM leads to better National Security - or at least the perception of it. IdM leads to Access Control via Authority Management, Authorization and timeliness

15 Institutional Issues (2)
Nobody cares about implementing IdM. Need to define it in terms of Infrastructure to deliver a set of Services/Goals. Duke - Goal is 1 hour to get ID Card and NetID services for new employee and 1 hour for status changes to take effect (job changes). Buy-in from VPs, EVP, Provost, etc...

16 Institutional Issues (3)
Consider rolling affiliates (non-student/fac- staff/alumni) into HR system - many contracts based on FTE (=paid person). You might get affiliate management for free. How do ID Proofing processes (identity registration) need to change for students and staff to enhance Business services?

17 Institutional Issues (4)
How do we validate our processes? Is my institution doing a good job on IdM? CAF - Credential Assessment Framework How do we know if other institutions are doing a good job? Federations! Like-minded organizations seeking like-minded services.

18 Institutional Identity
BRANDING of the institution via E-Identity my.harvard, stanford.you, CNetID (chicago) How easy is institutional initiation? How easy to change function at institution? Uniting the institution electronically - overcoming typical political boundaries

19 Levels of Assurance (LoA)?
Classify the requirements of an application Assign confidence levels for the ID Proofing and Electronic Authentication Processes Define mapping between Reqs and Confidence As simple as a number (Levels 1,2,3,4). Define confidence in terms of application requirements and you can use the same value for both.

20 Federation? A collection of organizations, having implemented some form of Identity Management, where Credential Service Providers (CSP, Universities) and Service Providers (SP, Content Providers) agree to “rules of engagement” (policy and attributes) using federating software (SAML/Shibboleth, PKI, InfoCard ...)

21 Higher Ed Activity... InCommon - SAML based Federation
USHER - US Higher Education Root - PKI HEBCA - Bridged PKI similar to USGov Federal eAuth involvement (see Alterman) Research community seeking Id Mgmt NSF CyberInfrastructure Shy away from Biometrics - What if you lose your E-thumb? National ID vs. Federated ID - NOT RFID!

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23 So, what is Identity Management, practically-speaking?

24 9/18/2018

25 “IAM” is… “Hi! I’m Lisa.” (Identity)
“…and here’s my NetID / password to prove it.” (Authentication) “I want to do some E-Reserves reading.” (Authorization : Allowing Lisa to use the services for which she’s authorized) “And I want to change my grade in last semester’s Physics course.” (Authorization : Preventing her from doing things she’s not supposed to do) Jim 9/18/2018

26 What questions are common to these scenarios?
Are the people using these services who they claim to be? Are they a member of our campus community? Have they been given permission? Is their privacy being protected? Policy/process issues lurk nearby Jim 9/18/2018

27 Vision of a better way to do IAM
IAM as a middleware layer at the service of any number of applications Requires an expanded set of basic functions Reflect Join Credential Manage Affil/Groups Manage Privileges Provision Relay Authenticate Authorize Log Jim 9/18/2018

28 Basic IAM functions Identity Mgmt System Reflect Join Credential
Systems of Record Stdnt HR Other Identity Mgmt System Registry LDAP Reflect Join Credential Jim 9/18/2018

29 Role- and Privilege-based AuthZ
Privileges are what you can do Roles are who you are, can be used for policy-based privileges Both are viable, complementary for authorization Jim 9/18/2018

30 Privilege Management Feature Summary
By authority of the Dean grantor principal investigators role (group) who have completed training prerequisite can approve purchases function in the School of Medicine scope for research projects up to $100,000 limits until January 1, 2006 condition Jim 9/18/2018

31 Basic IAM functions mapped to the NMI / MACE components
Systems of Record Identity Mgmt System Reflect Join Credential Mng. Affil. Priv. AuthN MACE contributions - this actually reflects the evolution time flow and data flow. Lifecycle issues. Jim 9/18/2018

32 The Environment AuthN Log Reflect Provision Join Credential AuthZ Pass
Systems of Record Identity Mgmt System Reflect Join Credential Mng. Affil. AuthN Provision Apps / Resources Log AuthZ Pass Attributes Priv. Jim Always a dialog - policy and procedure 9/18/2018

33 How full IdM layer helps
Improves scalability: IdM process automation Improves agility: Keeping up with demands Reduces complexity of IT ecosystem Complexity as friction (wasted resources) Improved user experience Functional specialization: App developer can concentrate on app-specific functionality Jim 9/18/2018

34 The Environment AuthN AuthN Log Reflect Provision Join Credential
Apps / Resources Identity Mgmt System AuthN Systems of Record AuthN Log Reflect Provision Join Credential Michael AuthZ Pass Attributes Mng. Affil. Mng. Priv. Log Grouper Signet Shibboleth 9/18/2018

35 Grouper Grouper project of Internet2 MACE
Infrastructure at University of Chicago User interface at Bristol University in UK $upport from NSF Middleware Initiative (NMI) Michael 9/18/2018

36 Signet Project Signet of Internet2 MACE
Development based at Stanford $upport from NSF Middleware Initiative Michael 9/18/2018

37 IAM functions Reflect Data of interest Join Identity across SoR
Credential NetID, other Manage Affil/Groups AuthZ info Manage Privileges More AuthZ info Provision Gen. AuthNZ info into app space Relay AuthZ info to app on request Authenticate Identity claim Authorize access decision (allow/deny) Log usage for audit, accounting,… Jim 9/18/2018

38 Terminology CSP - Credential Service Provider - A trusted entity issuing electronic credentials to subscribers (aka Identity Provider) RA - Registration Authority - Vouches for the identity of a subscriber to a CSP Identity Proofing - Process by which CSP and RA uniquely identify a person/entity RP - Relying Party - an entity relying upon the credentials issued by a CSP (aka Service Provider) LoA - Level of Assurance - Classification of ID proofing suitable for electronic use to control access to information M 9/18/2018

39 What is a Federation? A collection of organizations, having implemented some form of Identity Management, where Credential Service Providers (CSP, Universities) and Service Providers (SP, Content Providers) agree to “rules of engagement” (policy and attributes) using federating software (Shibboleth, SAML, PKI) M 9/18/2018

40 What is a Federation? Continued
Sounds simple? It can be. It can be made really complex, really fast. for more info CSPs and SPs retain control over their environments (identity data and access ctrl) Approx 37 participants (9/06), Launched 4/2005 Inqueue.internet2.edu Testing/Playground for InCommon >225 participants (9/06) and GOING AWAY! M 9/18/2018

41 Shibboleth and Federation
It’s real, uses SAML Open source, freely available Takes between 3 hours and 3 years to install -- depending on IdM infra In production at various schools (Duke!) For internal apps & external Univ vendors shibboleth.internet2.edu M 9/18/2018

42 Inter-institutional integration
Virtual Organization (VOs) GridShib development to enhance VOs working with Institutional Identity Mgmt Systems Federations Federal E-Authentication Initiative League of Federations The Interfederation Interoperability Working Group (IIWG). yes, it’s real M 9/18/2018

43 One key resource to help you start building the IdM infrastructure
Enterprise Directory Implementation Roadmap directories.html Parallel project planning paths: Technology/Architecture Policy/Management Jim 9/18/2018

44 YOUR MILEAGE WILL VARY! 9/18/2018

45 The Environment AuthN AuthN Log Reflect Provision Join Credential
Apps / Resources Identity Mgmt System AuthN Systems of Record AuthN Log Reflect Provision Join Credential Jim AuthZ Pass Attributes Mng. Affil. Mng. Priv. Log Grouper Signet Shibboleth 9/18/2018

46 9/18/2018

47 JIm 9/18/2018

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49 A Different View of IdM Biz Process?
Michael R Gettes Duke University Denver

50 Prioritization… @ Duke
Cough ahem Cough, Cough Gag… Next slide please ………… 9/18/2018

51 The Problem (per Tom Barton @ U of Memphis)
Unclear process for lifecycle management of accounts & other IT resources Seat of pants policy determination Inconsistent operational practices Done differently by different people at different times Common business logic forced to reside in applications to determine eligibility Eg. Is this user “currently a member of community”? Inconsistent service levels for users results. 9/18/2018

52 Tom Barton’s Original U of Memphis States View of IdM …
Not shown: transitions to prospective state from grace, limbo, slide, IDonly. 9/18/2018

53 Adding to the Problem … Gaining common understanding among Id Mgmt functional types Communication between Id Mgmt Functional and Id Mgmt Technical types How do Service Providers fit in? Knitting together other Business Processes with IdM Biz Process (communication and understanding) Hence, A Duke View… 9/18/2018

54 ACTIVE or EXISTS Identity & Service/Provisioning Condition
States (functional view) Condition ACTIVE or EXISTS Action Creation Result Become Student Each flower is an identity state. An object can be in more than one state at any time. Each petal on the flower implies some form of provisioning -- adding/deleting attributes to inform services what to do -- send a message to a service to provision this object and so on. DISABLED allows for the disabling of services without modifying too much in the object. GRACE is for the de-provisioning of services as it may take some time to run through the GRACE period -- like removing an account may take 6 months of leaving the in place. Become Faculty Remove Student Services 9/18/2018

55 Service/Provisioning States (functional view)
Condition Identity & Service/Provisioning States (functional view) Action ACTIVE or EXISTS Creation Result Become Student Each flower is an identity state. An object can be in more than one state at any time. Each petal on the flower implies some form of provisioning -- adding/deleting attributes to inform services what to do -- send a message to a service to provision this object and so on. DISABLED allows for the disabling of services without modifying too much in the object. GRACE is for the de-provisioning of services as it may take some time to run through the GRACE period -- like removing an account may take 6 months of leaving the in place. Become Faculty GRACE DISABLED Remove Student Services Terminated Staff 9/18/2018

56 For each ID Object … Condition Action Result Loop Over All Conditions
DENT TY OB J ECT Action Result Loop Over All Conditions Until No Actions Stable State The previous state diagram takes the Condition/Action/Results tuples and turns that into code -- the functional types can speak with the technical (implementers) speaking the same language. The Conditions operate on attributes in the identity object. If condition TRUE then perform ACTIONS and return RESULTS. Keep running thru all the conditions (loop) until no conditions are satisified and now the identity object is in a stable (and predictable) state. For good biz logic Order must not matter 9/18/2018

57 Testing and Validation Now Possible
ID Object #1 Old ID Object #1 New Identity Management Business Logic ID Object #2 Old ID Object #2 New ID Object #3 Old ID Object #3 New With all the previous -- you can now design testing/validation scenarios with input objects producing output objects expected. If you don’t get what you expect - there is a bug in the biz logic. ID Object #4 Old ID Object #4 New 9/18/2018

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59 Borrowed from Mark S. Bruhn Indiana University
Policy Points… Borrowed from Mark S. Bruhn Indiana University

60 Scope of “Identity Management”
Identification, authentication, authorization services Directory services Extract/load processes Potential Out-feeds Maintenance services (support and self-service) Application interfaces Logs Inter-institution sharing Other stuff… 9/18/2018

61 Business Goals of IdM Identity can be used to
Protect the interests and rights of the organization Satisfy the obligations of the organization Protect the interests of the individual Security can exist without privacy; privacy cannot exist without security 9/18/2018

62 So, why are you doing IdM? Because you have to…
…implement a directory? …identify users? ...authenticate users? …authorize users? …track users? …track usage? No…these are not reasons! 9/18/2018

63 IdM based on policies Implementation of IdM must be as a reaction to organizational philosophies and attitudes (which should be represented by policies) Or at least as a result of stated business and functional needs (which should be represented by requirements documents) Nothing in IdM should be done without fully understanding the business requirements; it can get complicated, and sensitive information is involved – risks may not be worth exposing data and systems 9/18/2018

64 Why then? Having said that…there are pressures that institutions SHOULD be feeling: Obligations to revenue sources Legal requirements Ethical considerations “Prudent stewardship” Deter/prevent nefarious deeds Support/security issues in maintaining disparate services Systems interoperability Depending on local decisions in response to these, and (hopefully) resulting policy statements, you will implement IdM and supporting infrastructure 9/18/2018

65 Security and Privacy: CIA
Essentially, these are basic security goals: Confidentiality Integrity Availability 9/18/2018

66 Defining Confidentiality
Ensuring that data is not disclosed to unauthorized viewers Protection against disclosure is required by Law Organizational policy Prudent stewardship 9/18/2018

67 Confidentiality: Some Laws
4th Amendment FERPA HIPAA GLBA ECPA Federal Wiretap Law Open Records Laws 9/18/2018

68 4th Amendment Applies to public/government entities
Prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures Based on “reasonable expectation of privacy” Organizational policy defines reasonable expectation of privacy User accounts versus department folders; user accounts versus scratch space Physical or logical IdM mechanisms may be deployed to facilitate 4th Amendment protections 9/18/2018

69 FERPA Limits disclosure of student educational records to
Individuals with “Legitimate Educational Interest” Third parties with student’s prior written consent Third parties in response to federal grand jury subpoena, and any other valid subpoena or judicial order Appropriate persons where necessary to protect health and safety Prior notice to student required except as otherwise expressly prohibited in law Generally records of each request and disclosure of data must be kept While there aren’t civil or criminal penalties for FERPA violations, they may result in loss of Federal monies Clearly, IdM mechanisms are required to ensure compliance 9/18/2018

70 HIPAA Governs use and disclosure of “protected health information” by “covered entities” PHI is defined as “individually identifiable information regarding health care or payment (other than student health data) that is transmitted or maintained in electronic or other media” Covered entities include: health plan/benefits, units who provide health care services and engage in electronic transactions involving PHI 9/18/2018

71 HIPAA (con’t) Privacy Rule: Effective April 1, 2003
Need to identify who within system handles PHI or may be “business associate” of third parties handling PHI Need to draft accurate notice to patients about uses of PHI Security Rule: Effective April 21, 2005 Requires rigorous access controls to limit internal and external access to health care data Physical and electronic controls, oversight, education Requires significant and ongoing communication and partnering among IT, legal, relevant personnel within affected units As opposed to FERPA, there are civil and criminal penalties violations of HIPAA Clearly, IdM mechanisms are required to ensure compliance 9/18/2018

72 Federal Wiretap Law Generally prohibits intentional interception, use, or disclosure of wire and electronic communications Allows senior DOJ officials to apply for court order authorizing capture of real-time wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to federal felonies (There are some exceptions) (Question: are we providing service “to the public”?) Service providers can authorize law enforcement to intercept communications of trespassers on our “protected computers” (used in interstate commerce) IdM will help us distinguish between authorized users and trespassers 9/18/2018

73 ECPA Governs disclosure of stored voice and electronic communications and related user data Need warrant for contents, need subpoenas for related user data: name, address, session logs, user ids, type/length of service, payment means Service providers “to public” can disclose contents or user data: with consent of one party as necessary to render service to protect rights/property to law enforcement if inadvertently obtained and appears to pertain to crime (Question: are we providing service “to the public”?) If at some point the administration wants to pursue action against an individual related to protecting campus rights/property, individual users’ activities must be identifiable 9/18/2018

74 Open Records Laws Generally requires disclosure upon request of records maintained by state agencies There are often exemptions mandatory (FERPA) Security and other data that would jeopardize systems Discretionary information (personnel files) Applies to , other electronic records In Indiana, the requestor does NOT have to indicate a reason, and there is no exception for information related to personal activities stored on University systems Being able to distinguish between users will make it easier for an organization to respond to requests pertaining to only one individual’s activities 9/18/2018

75 Organizational Operations and Policies
Safety of individuals – bomb threats, harassment, expectation of privacy Data classifications Self-service applications Course management Fiscal policies Academic code Any institutional policy or procedure that assigned responsibility to an individual or group… 9/18/2018

76 Prudent Stewardship Gray area…
No real legal requirement for assigning and ensuring identity…but perhaps reasons related to Business operation (Deans comparing funding notes…) Ethical (accusing the wrong person…) Personal privacy (fodder for stalkers…whois, finger) Helping people do the right thing (customization based on category…limiting configuration capabilities) 9/18/2018

77 Prudent Stewardship (con’t)
We limit access to building plans. We limit access to information that locates a person physically, in real-time. We limit access to labor distribution information (non-salary compensation information) We discourage people from making personal information publicly accessible (We restricted access to normally-public information associated with the daughter of a highly-placed Indiana public official) 9/18/2018

78 Integrity Ensuring that specific programs do what the programs are supposed to do The old 10th-of-a-cent problem Ensuring that data are accurate E.g., medicines are developed based on research data: even if the data can be publicly DISCLOSED; even a suspicion of tampering must render the entire dataset useless and even dangerous E.g., grades on transcripts have much to say about a student’s future 9/18/2018

79 Integrity (con’t) Must ensure accountability is maintained for all change-level access (modify, insert, delete) to programs, systems and databases: Functional office staff System administrators Database administrators Applications developers 9/18/2018

80 Integrity (con’t) Must implement separation of duties in order to reduce opportunities for fraud/complicity Functional office staff (esp. money handlers) System administrators Database administrators Applications developers Maintaining accountability and separation of function isn’t possible without Identity Mgt. 9/18/2018

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