1. Radiological Terrorism
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson
President, Federation of American Scientists
Presentation to
Brookhaven National Laboratory
June 28, 2011

2. RDDs: A Rising Concern
RDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices such as “dirty bombs”
Heightened Concern:
Are radioactive materials secure?
Attacks of September 11, 2001
Al Qaeda has expressed interest in RDDs
Widespread news reporting

3. Chain of Causation for Radiological or Nuclear Terrorism
Terrorists must be motivated to launch an unconventional attack using radiological or nuclear means.
They must have or must acquire the requisite technical expertise.
They must acquire radioactive or fissile materials and build the weapon.
They must be able to plan the attack without being detected and caught.
They must finally be able to carry out the attack by delivering the weapon to the target.

4. Terrorist Motivations
Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclear terrorism] for most – but not all – terrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001
Psychological and political factors would constrain most groups

5. Recent Terrorist Interest in Radiological Terrorism
Al Qaeda-in-Iraq leader
José Padilla??
“Radicalized” Chechen rebels?
Jihadist groups in South Asia
Dhiren Barot a.k.a. Issa al-Hindi
But why no attacks?

6. Unexpected Radiological Attack
Litvinenko’s murder using Po-210
October 2006 in London
Lessons learned

7. Myth versus Reality: Characteristics of RDDs
RDDs are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction
Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD
RDDs can be
Weapons of Mass Disruption
Major effects:
Panic
Economic costs
(decontamination and
rebuilding)

8. Radiological Dispersal Devices – Myth versus Reality (continued)
“Dirty bombs” are only one type of RDD
Do not need conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material
Some radioactive materials are already in very dispersible form
RED: Radiation emission device – could think of as a “passive” RDD
RID: Radiological Incendiary Device

9. Components of Radiological Weapons
Radioactive materials:
Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, food irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oil-prospecting, etc.
Spent nuclear fuel
Other material: depleted uranium (DU)
Means of dispersal:
Conventional explosives
Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices
Aerosolized particles
Contamination of water supplies

10. commercial radioactive sources:
Scope of Center for Nonproliferation Studies report Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks
Focused on the security of
commercial radioactive sources:
a significant category of radioactive materials that are used widely throughout the world
until the late 1990s, these materials were usually not considered high security risks

11. High-Risk Materials? High Risk Low or No Risk
Good news: Most radioactive sources do not pose a high security risk.
Right: Smoke detectors contain a minuscule amount of Am-241, a radioisotope. To build an effective dirty bomb would require millions of smoke detectors. Even though individual smoke detectors would not present a security concern, smoke detector factories could contain enough americium to pose a security concern.
Left: The left photo depicts a radiation cancer treatment machine that contains cobalt-60. There could be enough cobalt-60 in such machines to present a security concern. [Mention 1987 Goiania, Brazil incident, which resulted in 4 deaths.]

12. High-Risk Materials (cont’d)
Finding: Only a small fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks
High-risk sources are:
Portable
Dispersible
Contain significant
amounts of radioactive materials
This study found that only a small fraction of the millions of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks. Still, at least tens of thousands of sources worldwide are in this high-risk category.
High-risk determination factors are:
Portability
Dispersibility
Amount of radioactivity
Photo shows two small (highly portable) radiography sources.

13. High-Risk Radioactive Sources Examples
Radiography Sources
Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs)
Here are some more examples of radioactive sources that present high security risks.
[Name them.]
Mobile Cesium Irradiators

14. Radiography Camera
Portable radioactive source

15. Radiography

16. Brachytherapy

17. Oil Well Logging

18. Teletherapy

19. Blood and Research Irradiators

20. Food irradiation: Example of a Very Potent but Not Very Portable Source

21. Interlude: Nuclear Physics 101
Atoms, protons, neutrons, nuclei
Radiation and ionizing radiation
Elements and isotopes

22. Neutrons, Protons, and Nuclei
Nucleus
Neutron
Proton

23. Elements

24. Isotopes

25. Production of some important isotopes

27. Ionizing Radiation Alpha (α): Helium nucleus: 2 neutrons and 2 protons
Beta (β): Highly energetic electron or positron (positively charged electron)
Gamma (γ): Highly energetic particles of light

28. Relative Harm from Ionizing Radiation
Quality Factor (Q)
Alpha: 20
Beta: 1
Gamma: 1
Thermal neutron: 5
Fast neutron: 20
Fast proton: 20

29. Half-life Time required for half the radioactive material to decay
Exponential decay
Less than 1% of original sample
after 7 half-lives

30. Natural Radiation Sources
Indoor Radon: 2.0 mSv/yr [About half of total exposure from both natural and artificial sources]
Food, drink, and body tissue: 0.4 mSv/yr
Cosmic rays (sea level), increases with altitude: 0.3 mSv/yr
Terrestrial radiation (e.g., rocks and soil): 0.3 mSv/yr
Total: 3.0 mSv/yr

31. What’s a Sievert and what are the other radiation units?
Activity: # disintegrations (decays) per unit time
Curie – original unit [amount of activity in 1 gram of radium]
Becquerel – modern unit [1 disintegration per second]
Curie (Ci) = 3.7 X 1010 Bq
But knowing activity alone does not tell you the whole story of the radiation emitted.

32. Energy of the Radiation and Human Exposure
Ionizing radiation varies in the energy it carries
Absorbed dose (D): energy deposited per unit mass of irradiated tissue [Grays or Rads]
D = Activity X Energy per particle X Time of Exposure X Fraction of Energy Absorbed
Need to know whether specific organs or whole body affected
Dose equivalent (H) [Sieverts or REM] = Q X D

33. America vs. the World? Unit Confusion: A Guide for the Perplexed
1 Curie = 3.7 X 1010 Becquerel
1 gray = 100 rad
1 sievert = 100 REM
[REM = Roentgen Equivalent Man]

34. Potassium-40: Major Radiation Source in Human Body
Half-life: ~ 1 billion years
Isotopic abundance: %
0.165 mSv/yr in “standard man”

35. Artificial Radiation Sources
Medical (x-rays): mSv/yr
Medical (other treatments):
0.14 mSv/yr
Consumer products: 0.1 mSv/yr
Nuclear weapons tests fallout:
0.003 mSv/yr
Nuclear fuel cycle: mSv/yr
Total Artificial Sources: mSv/yr

36. Behavioral Sources Skiing holiday: 0.008 mSv/week
Air travel in jet airliner:
to mSv/hour

37. Natural and Artificial Radiation Sources Combined
Natural: 3.0 mSv/yr
Artificial: 0.6 mSv/yr
Total: mSv/yr on average
But actual background amount depends on location and behavioral activities

38. Linear No Threshold versus Other Models
LNT Model
Threshold
Hormesis Effect

39. Excess Radiation Exposure
1 mSv/yr from manmade sources for general public
On average, a person absorbs about 250 mSv in a lifetime
Occupational exposure for nuclear industry: 50 mSv/yr

40. Radiation Health Effects
High dose  Deterministic effects
Low dose  Probabilistic (stochastic) effects

41. Stochastic Health risks
Linear no-threshold model
Low dose: 0.04 cancers/Sv
0.25 Sv in lifetime X 0.04 = 1.0%
But 20% or 2,000 out of 10,000 will die from all causes of cancer

42. Radiation Health Effects -- Deterministic
75 to 100 Rads – Radiation sickness threshold
>150 Rads: nausea & vomiting within a few hours; lasts 1 to 2 days
500 Rads: 50% survival rate; deaths occur over one month
600 Rads: 10% survival rate; < one month
>1,000 Rads: 0% survive

43. Basic Radiation Protection Principles
Time, Distance, and Shielding
ALARA = As Low As Reasonable Achievable

44. Useful Reference
Roger Eckhardt, “Ionizing Radiation – It’s Everywhere!” Los Alamos Science, Number 23, 1995

45. High-Risk Radioactive Materials
Only 7 reactor-produced + 1 naturally-occurring radioisotopes present high security concern:
Internal Health Hazards (Mainly):
americium-241 (433 years)
californium-252 (2.7 years)
plutonium-238 (88 years)
radium-226 (1600 years)
Internal and External Health Hazards:
cesium-137 (30 years)
cobalt-60 (5.3 years)
iridium-192 (74 days)
strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard) (29 years)
We also found that only seven reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concerns.
Three of them [name] pose only internal health hazards only. Internal hazards arise from inhalation or ingestion of the radioactive material.
The other four [name] are both internal and external health hazards. However, strontium-90 is mainly an internal hazard. It is especially pernicious because it can replace calcium and thus lodge in bones.
The IAEA also tracks these radioisotopes as high safety and security concerns. Moreover, the NRC unofficially recognizes the security risks posed by these isotopes.
Co years
Cs years
Ir days
Sr years
Am years
Cf years
Pu years

46. Category 1 High-Risk Source
Could cause permanent injury (few minutes) or death (few minutes to hour) if near unshielded source
Examples:
RTGs: ≈ 20,000 Ci of Sr-90; 300 Ci of Pu-238
Food irradiation: up to few million Curies (Ci) of Co-60 or Cs-137
Research and blood irradiators: few 1,000 to few 10,000 Ci of Co-60 or Cs-137
Radiation teletherapy machines: few 1,000 Ci of Co-60 or Cs-137

47. Category 2 High-Risk Source
Could cause permanent injury (minutes to hours) or death (few hours to days) if near unshielded source
Examples:
Industrial gamma radiography devices: tens to few hundreds of Curies of Co-60 or Ir-192
High dose rate brachytherapy sources: about 10 curies of Co-60, Ir-192, or Cs-137
Medium dose rate brachytherapy sources: few curies

48. Category 3 High-Risk Sources
Could cause permanent injury (days to weeks) but unlikely to be fatal, if near unshielded source
Examples:
Some level gauges: up to a couple of curies of Cs-137 or Co-60
Some well logging sources: about 2 curies of Cs-137 plus up to 20 curies of Am-241
Low dose rate brachytherapy sources

49. Categories 4 and 5 sources
Diagnostic medical use
Medical research use
Smoke detectors
Other detectors, such as aerosol and chemical agent detectors

50. Radioactive Source Industry
Finding: Only a few corporations in a handful of nations produce most of the high-risk commercial radioactive sources.
This small group then distributes radioactive sources to tens of thousands of users throughout the world
MDS Nordion, based in Canada, is the largest producer.
Amersham, a joint venture with Russia and the UK, IRE, based in Belgium, and NTP/NECSA, based in South Africa, are also major producers.

51. Radioactive Source Industry (cont’d)
Canada
France
U.S.
Russia
Reactors
Belgium
Netherlands
South Africa
Argentina
UK/Russia
Joint Venture
Processors
Canada
Belgium
U.S.
South Africa
Finding: Three major levels of production, processing, and distribution. The steps from on level to another represent “chokepoints” where only a handful of major corporations and nations could set high standards of security. The many thousands of smaller companies would likely follow these standards established by the leaders.
Industry has a great opportunity before it to establish stricter security controls over truly high-risk sources.
I know from talks with industry officials that there is concern that security costs keep ratcheting up and may never go back down. So, industry must work closely with regulatory officials to develop an effective security system that will not drive producers out of business.
Worldwide distribution
to thousands of companies
Global
Distribution

52. Radioactive Source Lifecycle
Illegitimate
Users
Orphan
Sources
Radioisotope
Production
Source
Manufacture
Legitimate
Users
Disused
Sources
Govt.
Disposal
Site
Recycling/
Manufacturer
Disposal
Ref: Greg van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory; CNS Occasional Paper No. 11

53. 1. Disused Sources Bad News:
Large numbers
Vulnerable to theft, diversion
Potential safety hazard
Could become orphaned
Inadequate disposal facilities
Good News: Disused sources are largely accounted for; very successful Off-Site Source Recovery Program
[Define disused source.]
More good news: Inadequate facilities can be fixed. For example, the DOE OSR program has already established an interim secure storage facility at LANL. This program is focused on an important class of high-risk sources – mainly transuranics.
Focused efforts over the next few years would secure many thousands of high-risk disused sources in the U.S.
Need to expand these efforts throughout the world – Lugar-Biden legislation would do that.

54. 2. Orphan Sources Result of:
Bad News: Many Thousands of High-Risk Sources
Result of:
High disposal costs
Lack of adequate depositories
Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit trafficking activities cause concern
Good News: Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA, U.S., and Russia efforts focused on FSU
[Define]
Do not really know how many there are. But no one really does.
We analyzed available NRC data and estimated that no more than 20% of the roughly 300 sources orphaned per year in the U.S. are in the high security risk category. Comparing these numbers to the numbers of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. (about 27,000), it appears that less than 1% (roughly 0.2%) of high-risk disused sources become orphaned per year.
However, the numbers of orphan sources are likely underreported because users are not inclined to report missing sources.
Based on a recent EU report, we believe that a similar situation holds there.
Could stem the flow of sources becoming orphaned by prioritizing securing high-risk disused sources.

55. 3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countries
Bad News: Regulatory controls have been weak or almost non-existent – in about half the world’s nations
Good News: But during the past ten years, significant improvements have been made:
First concentrated security efforts on FSU
U.S. cooperation program has expanded to include dozens of countries outside the FSU
The IAEA has had programs focused on this problem since the mid-1990s.
It needs more support to expand these programs.
Some 50 nations do not qualify from IAEA assistance – need to find a way to provide regulatory assistance to them.
However, change does not occur instantaneously. It can take several years for a nation to develop a safety and security culture. Therefore, concerted effort is required. Just enacting a law or regulation is not enough.
These nations should also be encouraged to pull themselves up.
Mention the 170 teletherapy units in 62 Indian cities that use Co-60 sources generally containing 5,000-9,000 curies. On a per capita basis, this is not many teletherapy sources. The relative magnitude of the number of high-risk sources in the developing world is small.

56. Weak Export Controls Worldwide Problem??
Fortunately, in the United States, we have a “second line of defense” – which I have illustrated on this slide with a heavy broken line -- because our Customs Service checks shipping documents for radioactive cargoes before they leave the country. If Customs agents have any questions about the end-user, they ask licensing officials for guidance. Obviously, however, relying on customs is not a complete answer to the problem. If it were we would not need licensing for other goods, but, in fact, we consider specific licensing to be an essential first step for all of the more dangerous goods on the international and domestic control lists.
This is an area that needs urgent attention, and it is now the subject of discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency where a Code of Conduct for the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is being drafted. That code will include language urging all states to regulate the export of the most dangerous sources more closely.
I have heard in the remarks made here yesterday, that a number of states represented here do have mechanisms for regulating exports of radioactive materials that may go beyond the normal international practice I have described. I would be most interested in learning more about your approaches to this challenge.

57. Export Controls (cont’d)
June 2004: G8 Summit – committed to improve export controls over high-risk sources by end of 2005
U.S. NRC has established improved export controls
While not perfect, major exporting countries have made significant improvements in regulations.

58. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System
Implement Better Source Controls
Establish Regulatory Measures
Manage Security Risks
Prepare for RDD Attack
[Name them]

59. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System
1. SOURCE CONTROLS
Safely and securely dispose of disused sources
Example: DOE Off-Site Source Recovery Program
Track down and secure orphan sources, in dozens of countries, that pose the highest security risk – risk-based approach
OSR: I would recommend moving responsibility of the OSR program from DOE’s Environmental Management division to the NNSA because this program is not just a radiation safety and environmental cleanup program. It is a national security program.
OSR has already secured some 3,000 high-risk disused sources.
I estimate that less than $70 million would be required to secure the 15,000 sources that the program has identified as remaining to be secured. This money could be directed to this program over the next few years to achieve a significant improvement in source security.
Set up a disposal fee system. Fee could be collected when a source is purchased. This could go into a fund to operate disposal facilities.
Need a confidential national tracking system.
HPS has written a policy paper last year that focused on the disused and orphan source problems in the U.S.

60. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System
2. REGULATORY MEASURES
Assist nations with weak or essentially nonexistent regulatory controls (buttress IAEA assistance programs)
Protect against illicit commerce in radioactive sources
Implement improved U.S. and global licensing rules – protect against “insider” threat
About 50 nations do not qualify for IAEA assistance.
IAEA Code of Conduct is being revised to focus more on security.
Illicit commerce: radiation detection equipment, Customs officials (hand held detectors), training of Customs officials in FSU and in developing countries.
Canadian and other developed countries have similar regulations and gaps.

61. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System
3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS
Decrease security risks from future radioactive sources by:
(a) Encouraging producers to make fewer high-risk radioactive sources and less dispersible sources
(b) Promoting use of non-radioactive alternatives – Principle of Justification
[Discuss what is meant by non-radioactive alternatives.]
[Mention beer can level checking.]
[Discuss photo]
Hospitals in the US are by and large switching to non-radioactive alternatives.

62. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System
4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK
Educate the public, the press, and political leadership
Equip and train first responders
Conduct planning exercises
Need transition: Residual risk; much we can do to reduce the risk over the next five years; prepare for the worst so we are not caught unprepared.
Need to be attentive to lessons learned from planning exercises.
[Mention Biden-Lugar-Domenici legislation – Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002]
Five regional shelters for disused and orphan sources.
Cooperate with the IAEA to establish worldwide OSR program.
3. Replace RTGs in lighthouses, weather stations, and other facilities throughout the FSU with non-radioactive power sources.
4. Train emergency responders abroad.
5. Require the State Dept. to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat
6. Establish special representative for negotiations of international agreements to ensure inspections of cargo – coordinate with Customs Service.
7. Encourage development of non-radioactive alternatives.
Mention complementary Clinton-Gregg legislation -- Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002
Plans to reintroduce; handles domestic side.

63. Decontamination
Rapidly restore area  drive down costs  minimize attack effects
Need for comprehensive national strategy for radiological decontamination
[Ref: Jaime Yassif, Nuclear Threat Initiative]

64. Urban Contamination Dust – micron size particulate matter
Non-homogeneous distribution – hot spots
Most radioactive contamination will be loose, e.g. dust settling on exterior surfaces and some sucked into interiors of buildings
Contamination becomes more fixed with time – radioactive materials absorbed and chemically combined with building materials, grass, soil, asphalt, etc.

65. Post-Attack Decision Process
Need to determine whether to demolish or decontaminate buildings: factor in monetary, cultural, and historic value
For decontamination, need to determine type of method:
Low impact mechanical
High impact mechanical
Chemical

66. Decontamination Technologies
Vibratory processing
Solution-grit blasting
Power brushing
Dry-blasting
Manual wiping
Foams
Acids
Chelants
Spalling
Etc.

67. Decontamination of People
Quick wash down vs. more thorough cleaning
New York, for example, has the ability to do a quick wash down of tens of thousands.
However, it is more limited in its ability to provide for more thorough, but slower, decontamination.

68. Providing Timely Information to the Public: Making People More Resilient
September 2004 New York Academy of Medicine study found:
Only 3/5 of the public would shelter in place for as long as told
2/5 of the public would be worried about what govt. officials would say or do
People face conflicting obligations – would want to know that family members are safe – 1/3 would try to leave shelters to take care of children
However, ¾ of these people would cooperate if they could communicate with loved ones.
If people knew about building safety procedures and how to minimize their exposure beforehand, they would be more than twice as likely to obey authorities.

69. Thank you for your attention
Any Questions?