1. Co-operate or cheat: beyond individual choice
Prisoners’ dilemma
Co-operate or cheat: beyond individual choice

2. In a game of imperfect information, players do not know game dimension, players are simply unaware of the actions chosen by other players. However if they know the other players type information is complete.
In incomplete information games, players may or may not know some information about the other players - their type, their strategies, payoffs or their preferences but they have beliefs.

3. Binary Preference
Co-operate
Reward
Compete
Not
Punished
No Reward

4. Binary Preference
Co-operate
1st
preference
Compete ?
4th

5. Payoffs reflect preference order
Payoffs reflect preference order. Guaranteed a 2 but there is an elusive 3 What if? Strategy I: cooperate What if? Strategy II: compete. Then if Strategy I is the consensus……..?
Strategy I
Strategy II
2,2
0,3
3,0
1,1
Nash Equilibrium

6. Winning in terms of number of moves
CHEAT 8 Moves Σ = ⓫
THIEF OF NATURE
TRUST 8 Moves Σ = ⓰
Move 1 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 2 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②…
After 2 moves ❹
Move 3 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②……
After 3 moves ❻
Move 4 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 5 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 6 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 7 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 8 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 1 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②
Move 2 = ❸ Rival Move 2 = ⓿…
After 2 moves ❺
Move 3 = ① Rival Move 3 = ①…
After 3 moves…❻
Move 4 = ① Rival Move 4 = ①
Move 5 = ① Rival Move 4 = ①
Move 6 = ① Rival Move 4 = ①
Move 7 = ① Rival Move 4 = ①
Move 8 = ① Rival Move 4 = ①
Cheating on 2nd move after signalling trust on 1st move delivers ❺
2 moves ❺
Short-term gain
2 moves ❺ > 2 moves ❹
Indifference with thief of nature….
Opponent likewise with ‘I-think-You think-I-think’ and punishes the cheater for breaking trust.
If knowledge of 8 moves then Short- term gain < Long Term Benefit

7. All bets are off the table
(A,B) B
Reciprocal Altruism
Prisoners’ Dilemma A
1st Preference
Pro-active
No Regrets
Tough commitment
& Trust  ?
Descartes’ Game Change
A lags behind, Costly Altruism for B
unsustainable
unilateral
 B lags behind, Costly Altruism for A
4th Preference
Reactive
Conflict
All bets are off the table

8. Trust & Commitment Co-operate cheat 2,2 Kantian equilibrium 0,3 3,0
1,1
Nash equilibrium
alliance
No alliance
2,2
Payoff-dominant
0,1
1,0
1,1

9. Play Games of Strategic Interaction
Play Games of Strategic Interaction
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Conflict
Trust & Commitment
nflict &
Truhttp://ncase.me/trust/