1. Emerging Concepts to Address SP21 Threats
Colonel Robert “Rooster” Schmidle
Director, Expeditionary Force Development Center (EFDC)

2. Agenda
Assured Access
Operational Reach
Fires
Sustaining STOM

3. Assured Access
Sea Power 21 identified the threat of anti-access strategies
OIF showed that we cannot assume availability of forward staging bases for a variety of reasons
Turkey
Kuwait
Reinforces the value of Sea Basing
Leverages our asymmetric naval advantage
Depth of operations
Kuwait to Tikrit
I was asked to present the concepts by which the Marine Corps seeks to deal with the threats identified in Seapower 21 and to discuss them in relationship to the lessons learned in OIF and OEF.  Of course, one of the first lessons learned from OIF was absorbed before the fight even started.  The inability of American diplomacy to get the 4th ID to the fight through the territory of one of our longest standing allies spoke volumes for the current and enduring need to "Assure Access."  The problem will be exacerbated in the future by the fact that nations now know our price. There were several huge sums of money that were floated as the price in loans and grants that the US was offering to get this one division into one fight one time.  26 Billion Dollars was a frequently cited price tag.  Now for much less than that amount of money we could purchase three squadrons of MPF(F) ships that will enable us to preposition the supplies for three division equivalents (A Marine MEB) in three dark corners of the world for the next thirty years--or the life expectancy of a MPF(F) platform.  The naval concept of Enhanced Networked Seabasing, upon which current joint seabasing concepts are now being built, will provide for the assured access, speed of response and economy of action so desperately lacking in OIF. 

4. Operational Reach Persistence, sustainment, and depth
Riverine operations from the sea base
Rivers traditionally seen as obstacles
Rivers can be seen as opportunities, as alternate avenues of approach
For operational maneuver and logistics
Over-the-Horizon (OTH), On-the-Move (OTM) communications – Irridium?
ISR to support maneuver commanders / decision makers
During the American Civil War, rivers were used as logistical and operational arteries.  In OIF most of the key objectives were astride the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, yet we were not able to exploit these rivers as logistical arteries.  Clearly the advantages of using rivers as means of logistical sustainment, operational fires, and operational maneuver has waned.  We need to reclaim the ability to exploit this portion of the battlespace to our ends.  EFDC Marines are  working on a concept by which we will extend the operational reach of the seaspace through the brown and green water environments--not just to deny the riverine environment to the enemy, but to exploit it to operational advantage. 
The concepts of OMFTS, STOM and Seabasing are a powerful combination in theory.  Of course, these operational concepts must have functional equivalents that are capable of delivering the support required --at STOM distances from at sea platforms.  There are many challenges associated with ensuring the execution is as cogent as the concept.  Some of these challenges are still at the R&D stage--OTH comm being a principal example, with the potential use of the Irridium network as part of the solution set. 

5. Fires Depth of OIF operation is relevant to envisioned STOM operations
STOM envisions persistent indirect fires throughout the battlespace
At extreme depth of both OIF and STOM capability gaps exist – particularly counter-battery fire
Capability gap partially bridged by EFSS and future NSFS
Remaining gap at extreme operational distances may be bridged by development of loitering munitions
As we look at the future Joint fight in a STOM environment of “noncontiguous battlespace" the ability to rely upon fires from the sea will greatly lighten the load of maneuvering forces ashore and enable STOM.  Freed of the need to move heavy artillery and the associated ammunition, Marines will rely upon future Naval Gunfire and the Expeditionary Fire Support System--in essence a beefed up 120mm mortar or perhaps a variation on the 105mm howitzer.  Yes the projected range and response time of the NGS solutions do not meet the STOM requirements for 2015 and the EFSS will be too short ranged to suppress enemy long-range artillery with counter-battery fire. There appears to be a need for some type of interim round to cover out to STOM distances beyond the range of NGFS.  We are exploring the potential of  tube or aviation delivered loitering rounds to close this gap. 

6. Sustaining STOM STOM “Quick Fuels” Concept OIF use of FARPs/FOBs
OEF use of heavy-lift, rotary aircraft specially configured with fuel handling systems that can download fuel from fixed-wing tanker, then return to the ground and refuel ground vehicles and other rotary-wing aircraft
OIF use of FARPs/FOBs
Ground forces advanced and secured areas for C-130s and tanker trucks for the refuel of both ground and aviation assets
Use of VSTOL
We are also challenged to push the necessary fuel forward.  One example of an in extremis solution from OEF that we are looking to harden into a STOM functional concept for logistics involves the use of CH-53 helos to supply fuel to forward operating vehicles and smaller helicopters after tanking from KC-130's.  Our initial estimates indicate we can keep a STOM BN maneuver force on the move with 6 CH-53s tanking 4 times a day.. . .