1. HMI Mission Assurance Manager
Edward McFeaters
HMI Mission Assurance Manager

2. HMI Mission Assurance – Agenda
Mission Assurance Overview – Edward McFeaters
Hardware Quality Assurance
Software Quality Assurance
Materials & Processes
Safety
EEE Parts
Reliability – Dale Wolfe
Contamination Control – Syndie Meyer

3. HMI Mission Assurance Overview
HMI Product Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP) 2H00021 Rev. A submitted to GSFC on 15 Oct
HMI MA Team has been fully integrated into the HMI Program since the start.
Mission Assurance Manager; Edward McFeaters.
Quality Engineer; Edward McFeaters.
Software Quality Engineer; Karen Kao.
Reliability Engineer; Dale Wolfe.
Systems Safety Engineer; Zaki Kudiya.
Materials and Processes Engineer; Chuck Fischer.
Components Engineer; Ross Yamamoto.
Contamination Control Engineer; Syndie Meyer.
PDR Deliverable MA Data Items per PAIP.
Safety Package/System Safety Engineering Assessment.
FMEA/Critical Items List/Limited Life List.
EEE Parts Stress Analysis.
EEE Parts List.
Materials & Processes List.
Contamination Control Plan.

4. HMI Hardware Quality Assurance
Edward McFeaters
Quality Engineer

5. HMI Hardware Quality Assurance – Agenda
Hardware QA Requirements.
ISO 9000:2000 Certification.
Controls, Inspection and Test.
Quality Records.
Material Review Board.
Procurement.

6. Hardware Quality Assurance
Requirements for the HMI Quality Assurance Program flow down from the PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A
LMSSC and ATC are ISO 9000:2000 Registered, BSI Certificate No. FM 36556, 26 Mar. 97 Date of Original Registration..
LMSSC and ATC quality procedures and standards are in accordance with the requirements ISO 9000:2000
HMI specific quality procedures and standards are in accordance with the SDO mission and HMI contract requirements as well as 9000:2000 .
Controls, processes, verification equipment, fixtures, production resources and skills needed to achieve the desired level of HMI quality are in place.
Quality control, inspection, and testing techniques are available, and required new instrumentation is being developed.
Quality Records are being prepared and maintained.
Material Review Board (MRB) is in place to process any discrepancies.
HMI Purchase Requests and Subcontracts are reviewed on an individual basis to ensure Mission Assurance provisions are flowed down to our suppliers, vendors and subcontractors as appropriate.
The selection of HMI suppliers, vendors and subcontractors, from the LMSSC Directory of Approved Suppliers, is based on performance history, supplier ratings, etc., to assure the suitable selection of suppliers who produce reliable products.

7. HMI Software Quality Assurance
Karen Kao
Software Quality Engineer

8. HMI Software QA – Agenda
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Overview.
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Software Management Plan (SMP) Defined Activities.
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Standard Activities.
HMI Software Quality Assurance, Planned Activities.

9. HMI SQA – Overview
Software Quality Assurance (SQA) activities flow from the SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A , and the Software Management Plan (SMP), 2H00005.
SQA activities are adapted from the LMSSC SQA Practices and the LMSSC Standard Software process (SSP).
SQA activities related to the HMI Program are performed by the Software Quality Engineer (SQE) for the Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center (LMATC).
SQE support for HMI began at program inception and continues through program completion.
The primary goal of the ATC SQE is to ensure that ATC program software is reliable and verifiably exhibits the characteristics specified in program software requirements.

10. HMI SQA – SMP Defined Activities
SQE software process activities :
Software Development Planning – support SMP development, review and sign-off prior to release.
Project Tracking and Oversight – attend program status, software staff, and other meetings to monitor development progress.
Software Engineering Environment – audit to ensure adequacy of resource and support for software development.
Software Management Indicators – surveillance of definition and use of software progress and quality indicators.
Software Analysis and Design – monitor software analysis and design by auditing related processes and products.
Software Testing – review and sign off test related documents and witness formal testing of final integrated software items.
Corrective Action – CA completion verification throughout software life cycle.
Software Configuration Management – member of SCCB, review and monitor CM process for adequate product control.
Software Peer Review – attend peer reviews and ensure appropriate records are kept.

11. HMI SQA – Standard Activities
Compose ATC SQE Weekly Activity Report including all ATC SQE supported programs.
Attend Bi-Weekly HMI Software Status Meetings.
Attend HMI Program Team Meetings and other HMI software related meetings.
Perform Software Process Audits in accordance to LMSSC SSP and archive audit reports.
Assist in Developing the SMP and Updates.
Review and Approve Software Documents.
Support Customer Reviews.
Attend Software Peer Reviews.
Provide Software Process and Product Consultation.

12. HMI SQA – Planned Activities
Continue Current Regularly Scheduled Meetings.
Continue Monthly Software Process Audits.
Audit All Software Test Documentation.
Verify HMI S/W Test Programs Addresses All Software Requirements.
Support Customer Reviews.
Attend Software Peer Reviews.
Monitor CM Process and attend SCCB meetings.
Surveillance of software progress & quality indicators.
Participate in the Corrective Action Process.
Review all Software Anomaly Reports.
Developer Anomaly and Improvement (DAI).
Instrument Anomaly Report (IAR).
Witness Software Acceptance Testing.

13. HMI Materials and Processes
Chuck Fischer
Materials and Processes Engineer

14. HMI Materials & Processes – Agenda
Materials and Processes Requirements
Materials and Processes Control Board
Program M & P List
Electronics Fabrication Support

15. Materials and Processes Requirements
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A
Requires the control of materials and processes to various NASA and Lockheed Martin documents through the use of an M & P Control Board.
Requires M & P List as a deliverable item.
M & P Control Board to be established
Chaired by LMSSC M & P Engineer.
Membership: LMSSC HMI Program Office, Engineering, Reliability Engineering, Contamination Control Engineering, Quality Engineering, and NASA GSFC SDO M & P Engineering.
Program M & P List
Draft submitted 20 June 2003, updated for PDR, and updated as the HMI design matures.
Heritage M & P - prior usage on Program D hardware (plus Program C, MDI, TRACE).
Living document - will capture design changes for MPCB approval.
Electronics Fabrication Support
Printed Wiring Boards
Polyimide construction - LMSSC material specification, approved suppliers, coupons tested by GSFC.
Printed Wiring Assemblies fabbed by LMSSC
LMSSC assembly process specs: Plated Thru Hole, Surface Mount, Uralane conformal coating.

16. Zaki Kudiya Safety Engineer zaki.kudiya@lmco.com
HMI Safety
Zaki Kudiya
Safety Engineer

17. HMI Safety – Agenda
Safety Requirements.
Preliminary Hazards List.

18. Safety Requirements
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A.
System Safety Implementation Plan is included in the PAIP Meets the requirements of DID 3.1 “Safety Planning”.
The Safety Engineer is the single point of contact for program personnel, LMSSC ATC, and GSFC for safety-related matters.
A Hazard Analysis is Presented for Each Major Program Review.
Safety Concerns Are In Two Categories
Protection of HMI and its components from damage due to hazards during manufacturing, assembly, test, transport, and pre-launch integration with the SDO.
Protection of personnel who will be working with the HMI Instrument from potential hazards originating from the HMI and associated support equipment during the above operations.
Safety Package/System Safety Engineering Assessment has been issued for PDR
Safety Package/System Engineering Assessment meets the requirements of DID 3.1.
Safety Package describes the the different aspects of the system.
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis has been presented as the System Safety Engineering Assessment.
Seven Preliminary Hazards have been identified.

19. Preliminary Hazards List
The Preliminary Hazards List for HMI at PDR Contains:
HMI is dropped while encased in shipping container.
Exposure to hazardous materials.
HMI is dropped during fabrication/assembly.
Launch vibrational loads.
Electrostatic Discharge.
HMI components exposed to excessive temperatures.
Power Surge.
Controls for hazard risk mitigation to be completely identified by CDR.
Hazards will be closed by PSR.

20. Ross Yamamoto Components Engineer ross.yamamoto@lmco.com
HMI EEE Parts
Ross Yamamoto
Components Engineer

21. HMI EEE Parts – Agenda Parts Requirements EEE Parts Control Board
Parts Identification List (PIL)
As-Built Parts List (ABPL)
Electronics Support

22. EEE Parts Requirements
Requirements flow from Performance Assurance Implementation Plan, 2H00021
Requires the control of EEE Parts to various NASA, Military, and Lockheed Martin documents through the use of an Parts Control Board.
Requires a Parts Identification List (PIL) and an As-Built Parts List (ABPL) as deliverable items
Parts Control Board
Chaired by LMSSC Parts Engineer
Membership: LMSSC HMI Program Office, Engineering, Reliability Engineering, Quality Engineering, and NASA GSFC SDO Parts Engineering.
Program PIL
Draft submitted 11 June 2003
Updated 27 October 2003 (Revision A)
Program ABPL
Reflects as-built condition of hardware
Generated after flight hardware is built
Electronics Support
Assist designers in the selection of EEE parts
Coordinate part procurements
Oversee DPA and PIND testing
Ensure requirements defined in EEE-INST-002 are met
Review all GIDEP’s and NASA Advisories for impact

23. EEE Parts Screening
Parts screened to the requirements defined in EEE-INST Derating requirements also defined in this document.
Standard Parts
Microcircuits – when an SMD is available will be procured to Class Q requirements with the addition of PIND testing.
Hybrids – when an SMD is available will be procured to Class H requirements with the addition of PIND testing.
Semiconductors – procured to TXV level as a minimum
Passive Devices – procured to failure rate level R as a minimum
Non-Standard Parts
Microcircuits – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent Class Q or B level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. DPA will also be required.
Hybrids – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent Class K or S level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. Pre-cap and DPA will also be required.
Semiconductors - procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification to an equivalent JTXV or JANS level, as a minimum, with the addition of PIND testing. DPA will also be required.
Passive Devices – procured either to a LM SCD or vendor specification. Screening to the appropriate section of EEE-INST-002 will be required. DPA will also be required.

24. Radiation
Radiation environment specified in the Radiation Requirements for the Solar Dynamics Observatory (Michael A. Xapsos & Janet L. Barth dated June 2003)
LM designed electronics shielded with at least 160 mils of aluminum
Total Dose
All parts selected for 100Krads
Part parametric deratings after radiation supplied to designers
Low dose rate taken in account for bipolar linear IC’s
Protons
Degradation of optocouplers accommodated by derating CTR
SEU
After initial review of the preliminary parts list by Sunnyvale Survivability, single even transients defined to designers for assessment
Latch-Up
The plan is that no parts are to be procured that are susceptible to single event latch-up. However, should an SEL susceptible part have to be used, protective circuitry shall be added to eliminate the possibility of damage.

25. Dale Wolfe Reliability Engineer dale.wolfe@lmco.com
HMI Reliability
Dale Wolfe
Reliability Engineer

26. HMI Reliability – Agenda
Reliability Requirements
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List
EEE Parts Stress Analysis
Reliability Prediction
Reliability Block Diagram
Limited Life Items

27. Reliability Requirements
Requirements for HMI Reliability are derived from the SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A.
The following HMI reliability analyses are SDO MAR related deliverables covered by DID 4.2
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List (reference PAIP 4.3.1)
Utilizes procedures from MIL-STD-1629, “Procedures for Performing an FMEA”
EE Parts Stress Analysis (reference PAIP 4.3.2)
EEE-INST-002 derating guidelines are applied to calculated stresses
Reliability Prediction (reference PAIP 4.3.3)
Uses guidelines in MIL-STD-756, “Reliability Modeling and Prediction”
Failure rates are derived from MIL-HDBK 217 and life testing where applicable.
Limited-Life Items (reference PAIP 4.3.4)

28. FMEA and Critical Items List
An FMEA is a procedure by which the ways an item or function can fail (failure modes) are identified and the effects of the failures on performance (failure effects) and mission objectives (severity) are evaluated.
The following severity categories are used in the FMEA for each failure mode.
Category
Severity
Description 1
Catastrophic
Failure modes that could result in serious injury, loss of life, or total loss of mission. 1R
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that, if all failed, could result in category 1 effects. 1S
Failure in a safety or hazard monitoring system that could cause the system to fail to detect a hazardous condition or fail to operate during such condition and lead to Sev. Cat. 1 consequences. 2
Critical
Failure modes that could result in loss of one or more minimum mission objectives as defined by the GSFC project office. 2R
Failure modes of identical or equivalent redundant hardware items that could result in Category 2 effects if all failed. 3
Significant
Failure modes that could cause degradation to full mission objectives and still meet a minimum mission. 4
Minor
Failure modes that could result in insignificant or no loss to mission objectives.

29. FMEA and Critical Items List
Failure modes that affect the SDO or HMI mission adversely, category 1, 1R, 1S and 2 are identified on a Critical Items List.
The critical items list is maintained within the FMEA where a risk mitigation approach is listed for each item.
The FMEA and Critical Items list is documented in HMI document 2H00229.
The following is the only identified HMI critical item to-date.
Critical Item
Mitigation approach
Optics/Optics signal path
The optics are set up, aligned and tested on an optical bench prior to being installed in the optics package. Environmental testing will include vibration testing and thermal cycling at qualification temperatures. Testing, handling and operation to be contamination and environmentally controlled.

30. EEE Parts Stress Analysis
A stress analysis will be performed when design schematics become available.
The stress analysis will be performed at the most stressful part parameters that can result from the specified performance and environmental requirements.
Stress analysis results will be documented and compared to EEE-INST-002 derating guidelines.

31. Reliability Prediction
The reliability prediction calculates the probability of success for the HMI instrument over the 5-year mission.
The HMI reliability Prediction and Reliability Block Diagram are documented in HMI document 2H00032
Current failure rate calculations are based on heritage equipment and/or similar equipment from prior programs.
Reliability prediction updates using HMI parts lists will be performed as the design matures
Subsystem
Minimum Mission
Full Mission
Camera and Camera Electronics (Includes Camera I/F electronics)
0.9933
0.8430
HMI Electronics
0.9982
0.9428
Mechanisms & Mech. Controllers
0.9968
0.9825
Oven/Optics
0.9990
Total (5 years)
0.9773
0.7800

32. Reliability Prediction
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (full mission)

33. Reliability Prediction
HMI Reliability Block Diagram (minimum mission)
Not required

34. Limited Life Items
Limited Life items are defined as those items that are time or cycling sensitive
The limited life items are maintained in the HMI FMEA, document 2H00229
Mitigation actions are identified in the limited life items list to minimize potential risk in meeting mission requirements and provide confidence in their use for the duration of the HMI mission.

35. Limited Life Items Subsystem Limited Life Item Expected life
Required life
Failure Impact
Risk Mitigation
Mechanisms
Polarization Selector mechanism hollow core motor
160+ million operations
80 million operations
Modulator does not rotate resulting in a loss of instrument data due to inability to make spectro-polarimetric measurements and produce 3-dimensional vector magnetographs.
Redundancy (2 of 3 motors required) has been incorporated. Life test is planned Life test planned. Testing will include vibration and thermal cycling at qualification temperatures. No history of failure with similar mechanisms used in life tests and on orbit for prior programs.
Michelson Interferometer (Tunable Filter) mechanism hollow core motor
Filter does not rotate resulting in the loss of ability to orient filter and capture images at very specific wavelengths of light: degradation of instrument data
Redundancy (3 of 4 motors required) has been incorporated. Life test planned. Testing will include vibration and thermal cycling at qualification temperatures. No history of failure with similar mechanisms used in life tests and on orbit for prior programs.
Shutter Motor and Bearings
80+ million exposures
40 million exposures
Shutter fails: loss of instrument data.
Life test planned. Similar shutter mechanisms are qualified, including life testing. Similar shutters used on the MDI and TRACE with no problems after many millions of operations.

36. HMI Contamination Control
Syndie Meyer
Contamination Control Engineer

37. HMI Contamination Control – Agenda
HMI Contamination Control Plan
Contamination Control Requirements and Flow-down
Design Features for Contamination Control
Cleanliness Inspection and Verification
Facilities (Assembly and Test)
Shipping and Handling
Integration and Test (Spacecraft)
Launch and On Orbit Operations

38. Contamination Control Plan
Requirements flow from SDO HMI PAIP, 2H00021 Rev. A.
PAIP requirements for Contamination Control Plan (Section 11 of PAIP)
Instrument shall meet performance requirements without unacceptable degradation due to contamination
Contamination Control Plan shall maintain instrument cleanliness through end of life on orbit
Materials selection and outgassing requirements are per Section 10 of the PAIP
Cleanliness verification required prior to delivery to GSFC
Caps, covers, protective measures and red-tag cover lists shall be in the HMI CCP
Ascent vent (ascent depressurization) and on-orbit molecular venting shall meet instrument safety and performance requirements
Bakeouts and outgassing verification shall be performed to meet the instrument performance requirements
Shall meet requirements of SDO CCP 464-SYS-PLAN-0002 for non-cross contamination of SDO instruments
Science and Other Performance requirements (degradation allocations: HMI CCP Section 3.1.2)
Pixel Outage: <0.01% (300 pixels) pixel outage allowance for contamination (about 37 particles <100mm). HMI is relatively insensitive to pixel outage due to the relatively large number of pixels in the array (4096 x 4096).
Throughput Loss due to hydrocarbon film and particle obscuration: Allow 20%loss (TBC) at 6000Å wavelength. Visible-light throughput relatively insensitive to moderate levels of hydrocarbon film and particle contamination.
Scatter and stray light. HMI is not sensitive to scatter and stray-light before the shutter, and is relatively insensitive to moderate levels of particle contamination between the shutters and the CCD detectors.
Thermal control all thermal control surfaces on HMI are relatively insensitive to visible levels of contamination, except the aperture door area which is insensitive to moderate levels of contamination
Where required, quantified contamination allowances are being derived
HMI Contamination Control Plan, 2H00045, Status
Draft submitted to GSFC for comment as apart of CSR (July 03)
Draft CCP accepted in GSFC review and comments received
Preliminary CCP provided at PDR

39. Contamination Control Requirements
Preliminary Contamination Budget (Section and Surface Cleanliness Requirements -- Derived from Performance Requirements (all requirements per Mil-Std 1246C or JSC-SN-C 0005) HMI CCP Section and Tables and
Hardware components: Interior 300A; Exterior 500A
CCD and interior of CCD housing at assembly: 100A
Instrument at delivery to spacecraft: Exterior VC-HS / 500A
Radiators and MLI at delivery to spacecraft; VC-HS / 500A
At delivery to orbit:Thermal control surfaces VC-HS / 750A
End of Life on Orbit: Thermal control surfaces 750C / VC1
Outgassing Requirements (PAIP Section 10, HMI CCP Section 3.2.2)
Materials Screening to meet JSC-SN-C 0022/ 1.00%TML 0.10% CVCM per ASTM E595
Bakeout of major sub-assemblies and Integrated Instrument
Cleanroom Requirements (HMI CCP Section and 4.4.1)
Class 100 for CCD detector assembly
Class 10,000, or better, for Structure, Optics, Telescope, Instrument Exterior, and Thermal Control Surfaces through Assembly, test and environmental test.
Nitrogen Purge Requirements (HMI CCP Section 3.7 and 4.3.3)
No purge required for HMI Optics if environment is Class 1000 or better and humidity is <50%, but purge may be use as an additional protective measure.

40. Design Features for Contamination Control
Materials and configuration (PAIP Section 10, HMI CCP Sections 3.1.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2)
to reduce sources where possible, cleanable materials and configuration, materials screening
Enclosed areas, Compartments, Covers, and Housings (HMI CCP Sections 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.4)
Aperture door to cover telescope window
Telescope optics isolated from environment
Enclosed Optical Package with other interior spaces
Enclosed, Isolated, and separately assembled CCD housing and assembly
Michelsons and Lyot Filter enclosed in oven
Temperature control (HMI CCP Section 1, 3.4.2, and 4.3.4)
Warm optics, especially Michelsons and Lyot Filter warmed in temperature controlled oven.
Warmable CCD detector recessed within a cold-tube isolator that acts as a collecting surface for molecular material
Red-Tag Covers (HMI CCP Sections 3.4.3, 3.4.4)
Sections of Optical Structure with separate covers for protection during assembly and test
Baffles, labyrinths, and filters at vents (HMI CCP Section 1 and,4.3.3)
GN2 purge port (HMI CCP Sections 3.7, 4.3.3)

41. Cleaning and Verification
Cleaning and verification plan (HMI CCP Section 3.9, 4.6.1)
Piece part precision cleaning and verification of hardware (Section 4.6.1, methods & 4.6)
Periodic cleaning and re-verification of Optic Package during assembly and test
Final cleaning and inspection of Optic Package at delivery (Section per req'ts)
Bakeout of selected sub-assemblies (HMI CCP Section 3.2.2, and 4.9)
Mechanisms, cable harnesses, MLI, electronics boxes, etc.
Certified vacuum chamber for thermal vacuum testing
Certifications, Witness Samples, and Monitoring (HMI CCP Section 3.9 summarizes)
Cleanroom monitoring and Certification (section 4.4)
Vacuum chamber certification (section 4.9)
Witness sampling (Section 3.9 plan, 4.9 vacuum chamber, hardware)
Performance testing during instrument and s/c I&T for verification
Actual instrument performance used to verify cleanliness when possible
Through-put, image quality and distortion measurable.

42. Facilities, Shipping and Handling
Facilities (HMI CCP Section 4.4)
Parts cleaning facility in Vertical Flow Class 100 cleanroom. B/202 2B28
CCD assembly in Class 100 Laminar Flow Bench in Clean area(Room 140)
Bakeout chambers B/252 Rm 107 dedicated to LMSAL Bakeout and thermal cycling operations
Class 1000 Laminar Flow Bench in clean enclosure in Rm 107 for chamber loading and unloading operations
Class 10,000 Vertical Laminar Flow Tent (Program D tent) for instrument assembly and test (removable panel to allow testing with heliostat) B/252 Rm 110
Clean Tent with HEPA filtration, capable of Class 10,000 particle counts enclosing Thermal Vacuum chamber. Rocket Chamber (Programs C and D) B/252 Rm 116 high bay
Packaging and covering between activities (HMI CCP Section 3.9, 4.10)
Shipping and Transportation (HMI CCP Sections 3.4.5, 3.8, 3.9, 4.10, 4.11)
Cleaned and verified shipping and storage containers, cleanroom compatible
GN2 Backfill
Cleaned and verified prior to use

43. Purge, GSE, Interface Control
GN2 Purge (HMI CCP Section 3.9)
Active for Optical Structure interior and vacuum chamber
Backfill for storage containers and shipping (Section 4.10, 4.11)
GSE
GSE cleanroom compatible
Cleaned and verified (VC-HS, or better, as required) prior to use with clean flight hardware
Flow-down of Cleanliness Requirements to Sub-contractors
Specifications and Statement of Work
Sub-contract contamination control plans
Spacecraft Integration, Test, and Launch operations
HMI CCP input to Spacecraft interface control document contam section
Comments and input to SDO CCP

44. Spacecraft I&T, Launch, On-orbit
ICD contains HMI requirements and CCP elements
SDO CCP contains HMI requirements and implementation plans
Instrument enclosed, covered, and with GN2 purge during s/c I&T and prior to final faring closeout
Aperture door closed during launch
Instrument ascent vents baffled or labyrinth path for depressurization venting
Protective covers and witness samples removed prior to final faring closeout
Instrument venting during on-orbit outgassing period
CCD warm during on-orbit outgassing period
Maintain optical bench warm during operation
Capability for periodic warming of CCD to decontaminate is available if required