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Major Communications Cables - Points of Convergence -
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile New York New York New York New York Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Denver Denver Denver Phoenix Phoenix Phoenix Kansas City Kansas City Kansas City Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Miami Miami Miami Washington DC Washington DC Washington DC Seattle Seattle Seattle San Francisco San Francisco San Francisco Dallas Dallas Dallas
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Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile San Jose San Jose San Diego San Diego St Louis St Louis Orlando Orlando Boston Boston Newark Newark Houston Houston Philadelphia Philadelphia Nashville Cleveland Portland San Diego Las Vegas Detroit Charlotte NC Richmond Sunnyvale Burbank Tucson Tampa Eckington
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Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Frankfurt Frankfurt Frankfurt Paris Paris Paris London London London London Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore Singapore Singapore Stockholm Stockholm Sydney Sydney Toronto Redditch Sophia Antipolis Bangolor Shanghai Buenos Aires Copenhagen Rio De Janeiro Marseille Santiago Hamburg Lima Hanover Mexico City Nuremberg Bogota Zurich Mumbai Vienna
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FISA Amendments Act Section 702 Operations
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FAIRVIEW Sites
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Global Public Service Telephone Network Switching System
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The Phone System Knows What It’s Doing – Why Don’t U.S. Officials?
FOREIGN TO FOREIGN FOREIGN TO UNITED STATES 00 UNITED STATES TO FOREIGN or 011 UNITED STATES TO UNITED STATES 1 PHONE CALL (LANDLINE OR CELL) REQUIRED PREFIX STELLAR WIND
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Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are generally assigned in a hierarchical manner. Users are assigned IP addresses by Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses from a local Internet Registry (LIR) or national Internet Registry (NIR), or from their appropriate Regional Internet Registry (RIR): Registry Area Covered AfriNIC Africa Region APNIC Asia/Pacific Region ARIN North America Region LACNIC Latin America and some RIPE NCC Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia
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Target Development and Discovery
Suspect Developing postulated rules to enable change detection and alerting Zone of “Suspects” 2º of separation from “Knowns” Unknown Known
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Focus of Analysis: One Degree and Two Degrees of Separation
Known Bad Guy Suspected Bad Guys
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Encryption – The key to Protecting the Privacy of U.S. Citizens
Using encrypted identifiers of US individuals Relationships can still be mapped Communities can still be determined Connections with known US or foreign targets can be traced IC and/or LE analysts can look at any relationships without identifying protected persons IC analysts cannot purposefully or accidentally access and analyze protected citizen data without probable cause Identifying data can be decrypted for targeting, once criteria constituting probable cause are met Civil liberties are protected while preserving the ability to detect terrorists and/or other activities
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Discovering and Protecting
- Guarding Privacy While Finding the Threat - Mullah Omar Kandahar, Afghanistan Mustafa Alhawsawi Dubai, UAE Mustafa Alhawsawi Dubai, UAE Nawaf Alhazmi San Diego, CA Ramzi Binalshibh Hamburg, Germany Ramzi Binalshibh Hamburg, Germany <#(!}| ?%#*&”:> Hollywood, FL Marwan Alshehhi Hollywood, FL E Khalid Almihdhar San Diego, CA Mohamed Atta Hollywood, FL ?<|{ Hollywood, FL Make 6 Points: 1) Employs classic (but lost) traffic analysis techniques; 2) Forms basis for precise content selection and management; 3) Forms basis for pattern analysis – can discern meaning without continuous dependence on reading of content; 4) Multi-source integration of data provides basis for “hiding” sensitive sources and thereby enabling source-based “declassification”; 5) Encryption of personal data for U.S.-based entities protects privacy rights, while preserving the context of entity relationships. 6) This is the “BAG” +^#* Hollywood, FL Hani Hanjour Hollywood, FL Majed Moqed Daytona Beach, FL ){;?] %)/’| Daytona Beach, FL WANTED U.S. WANTED UNKNOWN U.S. PROTECTED
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Community Transaction Timeline
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Illegal Use of Private Information U. S
Illegal Use of Private Information U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency/Special Ops Division
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Illegal Use of Private Information - Masking the (Illegal) Source -
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