1. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts C.Corradetti, Oslo

2. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
Research questions: what are - if any - the ”transitional” determinants of cosmopolitanism? And how International Courts advance the process?
First Pillar: Transitional Elements in Cosmopolitan Law (as Constitutionalization of International Law)
Second Pillar: Transitional Interpretation of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism
Third Pillar: Constitutionalization of International Law through International Courts

3. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
First Pillar: «Transitional Elements» in Cosmopolitan Law
R.Teitel’s assumptions in Transitional Justice, OUP, 2000
Transitional Justice (TJ) rejection of the necessity of «a universal or ideal norm» in liberal transitions (TJ, 2000, p.4) vis-à-vis non-ideal approach to Transitional Cosmopolitanism (TC)
Exended interpretation of TJ problems as «spanning two regimes» (TJ, 2000, p.5) vis-à-vis states’ disaggregation and construction of a post-national constellation

4. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
3. Paradoxality of law in transitions: maintenance of order and fostering of transformation vis-à-vis i.e. transitional jurisprudence of the ECtHR and use of the principle of «self-defending democracy»
4. Gradual constructivist process of TJ constitutionalism vis-à-vis cosmopolitan constitutionalizations

5. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
5. No sharp distinction in TJ constitutionalism between «higher and lower lawmaking» as in Ackerman’s «dualist democracy» vis-à-vis cosmopolitan constitutionalism as formulating rights without democratic legitimation by «We the People(s)»
6. As in TJ contexts, the constitutionalization of international law includes «backward-looking» and retributive measures in a transitional fashion as with the application of a «selectivity principle» by the ICC (prosecution of the heads of states)

6. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
Second Pillar: Transitional Interpretation of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism
Objective: to argue for a «transitional asymmetry» between cosmopolitan law and its institutional instantiation vis-à-vis Slaughter’s dilemma of «global rules without centralized power»
The normative transitional drive: cosmopolitan right as a component of public right and as grounded on a priori reason:
a. Ethical relations as legally regulated relations based on public rights and duties in accordance to a «universal law of freedom»

7. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
b. Public right (and cosmopolitan right) generates a constitution (constitutio) as a «rightful condition»
c. Cosmopolitan right constructed in conformity to the moral constraint on freedom and an original (legitimate) common possession on earth, that is, a legitimate location on earth
d. Cosmopolitan right to be realized «through gradual reform, according to fixed principles» and not as a revolution (Kant, Rechtslehre, 6:355)

8. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
3. Preliminary textual evidences of Kant’s transitional view
I. Use of «zu» as a movement «toward» Perpetual Peace.
II. «transitional» traces in Kant: «duty to a continual approach toward perpetual peace» (even if «perpetual peace…cannot be realized»)
4.The institutional progression:
I.Congress of states (Kongreß)
No constitution ii. Based on mere voluntarily affiliations iii. «it can be dissolved at any time» ref. to the States General at the Hague - disappeared after (Kant Rechtslehre 6:351)

9. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
II. Federation/League of states (Föderation/Völkerbund)
i. Constitution ii. Voluntary entrance but no exit iii.some enforcement of decisions
Ideally desirable but…
III. State of peoples/Commonwealth of states (Völkerstaat)
i.Republican Constitution ii. Stricter enforcement iii. It is contradictory since nations forming one state result in a single nation (Perpetual Peace 8:354)

10. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
IV. World state/Monarchy (Weltrepublik) i.Despotic ii. «the graveyard of freedom» (Perpetual Peace 8:357) Interpretive Thesis: The State of Peoples (Völkerstaat) remains a valid option if adopted as a regulatory criterion within a transitional and non-ideal progression: «as if» standard

11. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
Third Pillar: Constitutionalization of International Law and Role of International Courts
a. Today International customary law (art.38 ICJ) is recognized on the bases of opinio juris of international judges not only as a de facto acceptance by states
Ergo: International judiciaries more than states’ acceptance of covenants define the contour of international law
Vertical Disaggregation of States
and Constitutionalization through ICs, i.e. role of ECJ as a starting ”consitutional moment” for Europe

12. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
Constitutional Functions of the ECJ:
Direct effects
Extensions:
i.From vertical (indiv. vs state) to also horizontal (indiv.vs indiv.)
ii. From negative (oblig. «not to act») to also positive obligations
Supremacy over domestic courts
Extension:
i. Supremacy principle constructed on the premise of respect of fundamental rights as «general principles»
c) From Treaty Law to Community Legislation
i. From regulations to also «directives» as «direclty applicable»

13. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
Constitutional Functions of the ECJ:
Conclusion: reformulation of the multifunctional thesis for ICs (Venzke and Bogdandy, 2012)
Multifunctionality of ICs (lawmaking, control and legitimation of public authorities) as embedded within a constitutionalization function of ICs

14. Transitional Cosmopolitanism through Courts
How can we think of other processes of constitutionalization through Courts ?
i.e. The ECtHR adoption of the margin of appreciation principle, subsidiarity, the proportionality principle etc. Or
i.e the reference by the U.S. Supreme Court to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the «Western tradition» in Lawrence v.Texas (2003)