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Keynes’ Beauty Contest: Speculative Price Bubbles in the Absence of Common Knowledge in Experimental Stock Markets Shin’ichi Hirota and Shyam Sunder 2002.

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Presentation on theme: "Keynes’ Beauty Contest: Speculative Price Bubbles in the Absence of Common Knowledge in Experimental Stock Markets Shin’ichi Hirota and Shyam Sunder 2002."— Presentation transcript:

1 Keynes’ Beauty Contest: Speculative Price Bubbles in the Absence of Common Knowledge in Experimental Stock Markets Shin’ichi Hirota and Shyam Sunder 2002 PC and ESA Meetings, March 23, 2002 Speculative Bubbles

2 The Purpose of Our Study
Test the validity of Keynes’ beauty contest story in experimental markets Speculative Bubbles

3 John Maynard Keynes (1936) Stock Market is like a newspaper beauty contest Stock Price is determined not by investors' own beliefs,but by their beliefs about others’ beliefs Speculative Bubbles

4 Beauty Contests I believe that I buy shares if P < 200, P=200
others believe that V = 200 I buy shares if P < 200, expecting that I can resell them to others at 200. P=200 even if every investor believes F=100 Speculative Bubbles

5 Bubbles are generated by
the gap between the first order beliefs (F) investors’ own beliefs and the second (higher) order beliefs (S) investors’ beliefs about others’ beliefs Speculative Bubbles

6 How to verify? Plausible story?
Well-known to practitioners and economists Difficult to verify in the actual stock markets The gap between F and S is not observable Speculative Bubbles

7 In Laboratory Possible to open a gap between F and S
F: controllable Give dividend value to subjects S: controllable (in some extent) By experimental design Observe the consequences Speculative Bubbles

8 2 Types of Keynes’ Bubble
S= 200 (even if F =100), because investors believe that others believe that … F = [Type I] A gap between 1st and 2nd order beliefs about fundamentals others believe that V = [Type II] Infinite sequence of higher order beliefs This bubble occurs in infinite maturity securities Speculative Bubbles

9 Experimental Markets Double auction market for multiple units of a single security 15 trading periods (3 minutes each) Each investor endowed with 10 shares, 10,000 points in “cash” Only terminal dividends Dividends is private information The range of dividends is announced publicly Speculative Bubbles

10 Experimental Design (1) Gap between F and S
A gap between F and S about fundamentals Dividend Value (F)  Announced Dividend Range F<S Type I bubble may be observed Speculative Bubbles

11 Experimental Design (2) Gap between F and S
Infinite maturity sessions The number of periods is uncertain Terminal payoff is determined by the price prediction for the next period (made by predictor). Type II bubble may be observed Speculative Bubbles

12 Gap between first (F) and second (S) order beliefs about fundamentals
4 Sessions Maturity of the stock Finite Infinite Gap between first (F) and second (S) order beliefs about fundamentals F=S Session 2 (Type II) FS Session 3 (Type I) Session 1 (Type I & II) Session 4 (No Bubble) Speculative Bubbles

13 Trading Screen Speculative Bubbles

14 Tentative Results Result 1: Result 2: Keynes is right!
Bubbles can form when there is a gap between 1st and 2nd order beliefs about fundamentals (Type I bubble). Result 2: Bubbles can form and persist through the end of a session when the security has infinite maturity. The price is totally dependent on market expectations (Type II bubble). Keynes is right! Speculative Bubbles

15 More Sessions Session 5-7 (F  S about fundamentals)
No bubble observed Doubt on Result 1 Session 8 (Infinite maturity session) Bubble observed Confirm Results 2 Speculative Bubbles


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