1. The UK Housing Market: will it ever be the same again
The UK Housing Market: will it ever be the same again? Christine Whitehead, LSE and CCHPR University of Cambridge ICEA Tuesday 14th February 2012 London

2. Basic Attributes of Housing
Necessity and luxury good;
Consumption good and asset;
Difficult to adjust and long lasting;
Requires access to finance market;
Takes large proportion of income;
Requires land and is locationally specific;
Value related to infrastructure, neighbourhood etc;
Big regional variations;
Heavy government intervention.

3. Stylised ‘facts’ Income elasticity around 1;
Price elasticity measure less robust – issues of quality etc – but certainly negative and less than income elasticity; But issues re impact of change and rate of change in price;
Credit constrained pre-1980s and post 2008;
Supply adjusts very slowly – annual adjustment less than 2% of stock – through net new building and additions to existing stock;
Long run supply elasticity very low by international standards;
So prices inherently volatile and possible assymetry in supply responsiveness.

4. Basic 1st year diagram

5. Historic development of prices in the UK
Early 1970s – incomes/demographics/tax changes – very rapid real house price rises and rapidly increasing inflation. Then stagnation; house prices down 40% in real terms; no nominal reductions;
Late 1970s; early 1980s;
Late 1980s/early 1990s – income and expectations growth/tax changes/ demographics – very rapid real house price rises and inflation. Then stagnation; property market crash; inflation down and house price falls in real and money terms; slow adjustment to some sort of equilibrium; mid 1990s – mid 2000s decade of growth;
Supply growth poor even when rapid increases in demand

6. Trends in new building since 1950

7. Changes in tenure structure
1971
1981
1991
2000
2007
2010
Owner-occupied 51 56 66 69 67
Private rented 19 11 9 10 12 14
Housing Associations -- 2 3 6
Local Authorities 31 30 21 15
Total (m) 23 25 26 27

8. Owner-occupation rates by age - UK Rates among younger households falling since the 80s – before the last crisis

9. Increasing house prices in the UK

10. The latest crisis
Post 2000, across the world rapid increases in house prices (except Germany);
Also rapid increases in credit but mainly among existing owner-occupiers – so debt/asset ratio improving as prices rose faster;
Affordability worsening;
New mortgage products;
In UK and some other countries growth in private renting
Supply adjustment variable – Ireland/Spain v UK/Netherlands?;
Adjustment to ‘soft landing’ 2006/7?; then financial crisis and a cliff?

11. Most recent period of sustained increase in real house prices in 12 OECD countries, and total real house-price increases over the period (highest-lowest last column)
Most recent period with increasing real house prices
Total increase in real house prices in the period (%)
Ireland
2Q1987-3Q2006
404
The Netherlands
3Q1985-1Q2008
234
Norway
1Q1993-3Q2007
198
Denmark
2Q1993-1Q2007
174 UK
4Q1995-4Q2007
173
Spain
3Q1996-3Q2007
127
Sweden
2Q1996-4Q2007
France
1Q1997-4Q2007
113
Australia
1Q1996-1Q2008
109
Finland
2Q1993-4Q2007
New Zealand
4Q2000-3Q2007 90
United States
1Q1995-4Q2006 56
Source: OECD data
Source: OECD data

12. Fall in nominal house prices from peak to late 2008 (lowest-highest column 3)
Table 2: Fall in nominal house prices from peak to late 2008 (lowest-highest column 3)
Peak (quarter)
Fall from peak to 4Q2008
Ireland
2006:Q3
-18.1 %
Denmark
2007:Q3
-10.5 %
New Zealand
-9.1 % UK
2008:Q1
-9.0 %
Norway
2007:Q4
-6.8 %
Finland
2008:Q2
-6.0 %
Australia
-5.7 %
USA
2007:Q2
-4.7 %
Spain
-3.9 %
France
-3.7 %
Sweden
-2.4 %
Netherlands
2008:Q3
-0.2 %
Source: OECD data

13. Change in residential building permits in Europe 2007 to 2011 – % change between 2007 and 2011 Q2
Spain -89
Ireland -86
Greece -75
Portugal -71
Hungary -68
Cyprus -60
Denmark -43
United Kingdom -42
Netherlands -35
Norway -33
Poland -28
Sweden -18
France -13
Germany -7
Switzerland 36
Source: Eurostat

14. The Crisis in the UK
One of the most volatile – but not as extreme as many thought
Problems of arrears and possessions far less than expected
Investment much reduced - but government stimulus package
Regional/area variations in impact
Some continuing fundamental changes especially in tenure

17. Impact on Consumers
Initial effect worsening expectations and little access to credit for consumers or developers
More general recession – lower levels of activity; increased unemployment; but mainly short time/wage reductions
Impact on existing owner-occupiers much less than expected – lower interest rates allowed repayments to remain affordable; refinancing market worked relatively well; no incentive to take homes into possession
Potential owners far higher deposit and far more stringent credit histories required; uncertainty about future house prices – and future jobs; – so question as to the relative impact of demand and supply of funds
Currently thought to be at least one million ‘missing’ owner-occupiers but increasing importance of private rented accommodation

18. Continuing problems of affordability in the market place
House prices rising faster than earnings and incomes at least until 2008 and probably since 2010
Affordability ratios have improved for those who have managed to access home ownership – but many excluded by deposit requirements as well as by uncertainties
Rents have been rising faster than inflation and indeed incomes especially in London
So continuing affordability and access problems
Increased sharing, living at home etc.

19. Increasing pressures on private renting
One million plus missing home owners
Migration
Investment demand – including international
Rents have been increasing rapidly, especially in London but beginning to stabilise?
And reductions in demand at bottom end of market from from Local housing Allowance cutbacks?
Lack of Buy to Let funding – but improving
No signs of significant institutional investment
Quality of management in particular still an issue

20. Why no worse? Lack of supply overhang;
Expectations of continued inelasticity of supply;
Variable rate mortgages;
Relatively few first time buyers;
Devaluation of £ and political stability;
So the fundamentals that economists hate – inelasticity of supply; mortgage risks with consumer; intergenerational inequalities; lack of international competitiveness have all helped stabilise the system – but not to improve fundamentals of either demand, access or supply.

21. Looking to the future
Household projections suggest maybe 230,000 additional households per annum in England
Big increases in elderly and lone parent households
The vacancy rate in the existing stock is low by international standards, especially in London – though more could be done to match households to dwellings and so reduce overcrowding
Estimates of housing demand and need suggest around 250,00 dwellings are required, if standards are to be maintained
But no evidence that, even were the market to improve, anything like this number of dwellings can be produced.

22. 2008-Based Projections of Households in England to 2026
2006
2016
2026
(thousands)
Couple households
11,394
11,727
12,060
Lone parent households
1,607
2,035
2,495
Other multi-person households
1,318
1,287
1,268
Male one-person households
3,100
3,944
4,787
Female one-person households
3,924
4,614
5,407
All households
21,344
23,608
26,016
Source: 2008-based projection tables made available by DCLG

23. Components of Change of the Housing Stock in England
2006 – 07
2007 – 08
2008 – 09
2009 – 10
Average
(rounded, thousands)
New build completions
193,080
200,300
157,630
124,200
169
Net conversions
7,600
9,020
8,640
6,230 8
Net change of use
20,150
17,640
16,640
13,600 17
Net other gains
460
1,020
270
970 1
Demolitions
22,290
20,500
16,590
16,330 19
Net additional dwellings
198,770
207,370
166,570
128,680
175
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government, Live Table 120

24. Barriers to Development: the Way Forward
Short term: availability of funds for developers and purchasers – both for owner-occupation and for private renting; uncertainty about the future
Longer term – loss of capacity in development industry; nature of the industry; planning and land availability; need for equity investment in housing; is there really demand?
Government strategy includes: restructuring housing support through affordable rents regime and welfare reform – but no changes in tax policy to reduce benefits to owner-occupiers or to support institutional funding for prs;
Government growth and output agenda: planning reform; contracts for 170,000 new affordable homes by 2015; 100,000 homes on public land; 100,000 95% mortgages; 100,00 additional homes from Right to Buy and 100 plus more initiatives.

25. New Building: Current Local Government Finance and Planning System
Under existing system little or no tax benefit to local authority from enabling more housing – business rate unaffected; tiny, dampened, change in grant from population increase
But real costs to the authority and the community in terms of physical and social infrastructure and loss of amenity
‘Insiders’ benefit from constrained supply; ‘Insiders’ have vote
Neighbours of new development lose out most
S106 a partial recompense. Tensions between affordable housing and public realm/infrastructure
‘Localism’ agenda – presumption in favour of development within local framework; neighbourhood initiatives; New Homes Bonus

26. The New Homes Bonus
£200m 2011/12; £250m p.a ; rest from Formula Grant
Based on net new additions – 160, /11
Per unit payment equal to the national average for the relevant council tax band for 6 years (around £650)
Enhancement for affordable homes of £350 p.a (including ‘affordable rent’ homes)
Bringing empty homes into use and traveller sites also benefit

27. New Home Bonus: Incentives
Hypothecated funding – but can use bonus as the LA wishes
Larger grant for larger homes
Easiest for greenfield/large sites
Disincentives
Net additions not new build – will not be known for some years?
Reducing Nimbyism? - how are benefits to be linked to those who suffer from the development
Relationship to Community Infrastructure Levy
And is the scale of the payment adequate?

28. The Current Housing Market
Transactions/mortgage lending levels remain low although rising slowly
House prices have risen to the point where average is around 6% below peak
Major differences between houses and flats; between areas and regions
Some investment demand from overseas – but mainly existing owner-occupiers
A possible increase in new build activity from very low levels
No real sign of self sustaining improvement but view that bottom has been reached and double dip unlikely
And are house prices at a reasonable equilibrium?

29. Unprecedented uncertainties?
More reports than houses?
It’s the economy stupid – the world economy/the UK economy? – still in top 5 but a decade of low/zero growth
Housing market currently dependent on funding availability but also confidence.
Possibility that prices way out of equilibrium – or in line with (bad) fundamentals? A backlog of those who want to move and could afford to do so.
Policy - rhetoric over reality? Anyway little traction? Asking for house price stability; shift away from grant to demand side subsidies; integrating tenures; lower welfare benefits; and more flexible responses to problems. But already shifting ground.
And what is the longer term role of social housing – and of income related support?
Do these add up to a more stable system?

30. Where Next?
Optimistic scenario: funding increases slowly; improved affordability and products enable lower risk purchases; local authorities support investment; slow adjustment back to levels of output of mid-2000s
Pessimistic scenario: funding remains weak; reduced government support for both supply and demand undermines supply and rents; interest rates rise; lower investment/lower demand
But as and when economy improves, demand increases faster than supply; localism constrains new supply; prices rise and the cycle recommences?
Even so, problems in the housing market more an outcome of the macro-economy than the cause of macro-economic problems?