1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING THE ISLAMIC STATE’S WORTHY BUSINESS C OL. B ESENYŐ J ÁNOS, P H D.2016.

2. C ONTENT 1. Current situation of the Islamic State 2. Operations inside Syria and Iraq 3. Global spillover 4. Three main motivators: Financial benefits Social reasons Military tool 5. Conclusion, a vision for the future

3. T HE I SLAMIC S TATE  „ The Islamic State”:  1999: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad  Al-Qaida links  Interrupting the organizational connections with Al-Qaida, greater independency, expansion.  2010: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadí – ISIL, (DAESH), ISLAMIC STATE (IS)  Radical Wahhabist/Salafist interpretation of Sunni Islam  Spillover of the Syrian civil war (2011- ; Bashar al-Assad, rebel groups)  Calls for an international jihad  Influence in a huge variety of illegal transactions (human trafficking)  International coalition and military intervention against the organization (2014-, USA, RUS engagement)  Air strikes, boots on the ground.  Battle for Falluja, battle for Mosul (2016.05.)  Territory shrinks

4. T HE INTERNATIONAL COALITION ’ S AIR - STRIKES IN 2015 Source: BBC (2016):Islamic State group: Crisis in seven charts, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034, date of access: 2016.05.30.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034

5. D IRECT AREA OF OPERATIONS  Syria, Iraq, Libya  Establishing the „caliphate”  Hard-power influence  Limited social- and public administration services  Sharía law, fundamentalist ideology  Training camps  Human rights abuses  Violence, persecution of „kafirs” (Yazidi, Christian minority and other non- believers)  Diverse sources of income (decreased to $56 million/year 2016 March)  Oil, agricultural trade  Black-market transactions  Income from illegal, military operations  Human trafficking  …

6. G LOBAL THREATS  Indirect influence in a greater scale of territories  Spillover-effect  Worldwide propaganda, recruitment  Humanitarian considerations  Illegal trade and financial transactions (donors)  Active contact with forward bases of fundamentalism in the European region (Balkans)  Terrorist attacks (2015. November – Paris, 2016. March – Brussels)  Push factor for migrant flow  Connections with human-traffickers: uncontrolled wave of immigrants may provide opportunity for infiltration

7. H UMAN TRAFFICKING – F INANCIAL BENEFITS  Income required for:  Maintaining the moderate standard of living  Providing basic social services  Planning and executing the operation of the terrorist organization  Monthly payment between $300 and up to $2,000 per jihadists  Expanding international system for illegal trade and smuggling.  regular income from people, money, black-market items or artifacts.  Smuggler groups of migratory routes are linked up with the terrorist organization  Value of human smuggling in Libya: $20m (2010)  $323m (2014)  Route from Syria to Turkey could reach over $8000 for an individual,  Some smugglers may also charge $400 to $500 to "insure" migrants against abductions.  Approximately $320m yearly income for the terrorist organization.  Hardly-detectable, routes and methods are diverse and constantly adapting  secured way of income with minimal risks for the organization.

8. M AIN MIGRATORY ROUTES Source: Frontex (2016): Migratory routes map, URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/, date of access: 2016.05.30.http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/

9.  Distracting and destabilizing the local communities – war on „kafirs” – cleansing and unifying society  Trafficking highly intimidates population, generates fear and contributes to the push-factors of migration (Nigeria or Iraq)  Enslavement and rape of women (2014: 2500 civilians)  Historical roots  Meet the jihadists’ needs  Sale centers: Syria, Iraq, Turkey (Antep).  Trafficking from the West to Syria – recruitment of foreign fighters  Women: forced marriages, ideological persuasion: holy war, honored to be a mother of a future jihadist.  Trafficking from Syria to the West:  The possibilities of the migrant flow – infiltration, propaganda, generating fear. H UMAN TRAFFICKING – S OCIETAL REASONS

10. W OMEN PRICELIST Source: The Mirror Post (2016): ISIS executes 19 teenage girls for refusing to have sex with fighters, URL: http://www.themirrorpost.com/2015/08/isis-executes-19-teenage-girls- for.html, date of access: 2016.05.30.

11.  From 2011 to 2015:  7.6 million Syrians internally displaced  4 million refugees.  Followers infiltrated in the unchecked crowd of migrants.  Recent months terrorist attacks and the known expansion of insurgencies.  European radical units’ reassurance, active connections (Bosnia, Belgium)  Al Dabiq: ideological legitimacy  Enhances determination and increases morale.  Eliminating the opponents’ human capabilities:  2014. July 9.: 60 former Iraqi Army officers from were kidnapped to pre-empt a potential rebel strike in Mosul.  Collecting and recruiting children:  Recruiting to training camps, front lines.  Syrian army, pro-government militias, opposition forces and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) are also involved in similar processes. (HUMINT) H UMAN TRAFFICKING – A WEAPON OF WAR

12. C ONCLUSION  Multidimensional support for radical organizations.  Diverse and extensive network  Smuggling groups in Libya and Turkey: from West to Syria, from Syria to the West  Routes dynamically adapting for the current changes  A tripartite threat:  It generates income for both the linked organized crime groups and indirectly for the Islamic State.  It improves morale among jihadists, ideologically legitimates actions against its enemies, thereby human trafficking improves the propaganda. (sex trafficking)  By human trafficking, the terrorist organization’s military actions should be intensified and capabilities should be further increased. (enemies’ kidnapping, recruitment)  Tracking and elimination of these routes requires a complex counter-trafficking procedure.

13. BIOGRAPHY  János Besenyő: Not the invention of ISIS: Terrorists among immigrants, Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, (2015) Volume5, Number 1, pp. 5–20. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2015.5.1(1) http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2015.5.1(1)  János Besenyő: Security preconditions: Understanding migratory routes, Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, (2016, September) Volume 6, Number 1, pp. 5–26. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2016.6.1(1) http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2016.6.1(1)  Besenyő János: Low-cost attacks, unnoticable plots? Overview on the economical character of current terrorism, STRATEGIC IMPACT (ROMANIA) (ISSN: 1841-5784) (eISSN: 1824-9904) 62/2017: (Issue No. 1) pp. 83-100. (2017), https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=531307 https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=531307

14. T HANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION ! C OL. B ESENYŐ J ÁNOS, P H D.2016.