1. Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors
National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference
Charleston, SC
May 3, 2016
Ken Evans, HS/ER-5 Committee Chair
Ken Yale and Stephen Woods, HS/ER-5 Committee

2. Support of Southern Exposure
Ken Evans and Steve Woods served as FRMAC evaluators for Southern Exposure
Ken Yale played the ROSS role during Southern Exposure

3. The Role of the Radiological Operations Support Specialist (ROSS)

4. ROSS Concept DHS and DOE Initiative Radiological Technical Experts
Provide support to Incident Command
Tested in support of IND and NPP

5. ROSS at Southern Exposure
Plume Phase
Support to Field Team Incident Commander
Transitional Phase
Briefing to Incident Management Team (IMT)
Post-Plume Phase
Support to IMT responsible for field activities

6. Plan for the ROSS Identify Technical Staffing Gaps
Determine If You Need More Than One
Identify Critical Interface Points

7. Plan for the ROSS Know How the ROSS Differs From a Liaison
Understand What Skills the ROSS Brings
Can Serve as a Force Multiplier

8. Prepare for the ROSS Develop Briefing About Your Organization
Have Contact List Available
With Multiple ROSS Have a Bridge Line

9. Prepare for the ROSS Have Pre-Planned Tasking
Have Plume and Post-Plume Tasking
Have A Copy of Your Plan Available

10. Respond with the ROSS Communicate, Communicate, Communicate
Provide Direction
With a Little Information a ROSS Can Do A Lot

11. Respond with the ROSS Free State/Locals to Support Decision Makers
ROSS Not a Policy Maker
Share the Wealth (You Will be Overwhelmed)

12. Other Lessons Learned An IMT Can Be Very Effective
Involve the IMT Early
Avoid Evaluated Exercises for New Concepts

13. Other Lessons Learned Even Well Practiced Plans Have Gaps
Use Regional/Compact Resources
Use Standardized ICS Forms

14. CONTROLLING A LARGE EXERCISE
HOW TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CONTROLLERS ARE IN PLACE WHERE NEEDED

15. SE 15 JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP
The SE 15 Exercise was conducted using HSEEP guidance
Most REP Exercises currently do not fully embrace the HSEEP methodology
As a result most REP Exercises do not have a Joint Exercise Control Group

16. REP Exercises
The FEMA REP Program maintained a parallel control structure for day 1 for evaluated portion of the exercise
Problems developed on day 2 when FEMA was still trying to finish evaluation of REP objectives.

17. REP Exercises
There is a difference in the number and type of controllers needed in a REP exercise vs. HSEEP exercise

18. MSEL VS. REP TIMELINE
As this was an HSEEP exercise there was a MSEL as opposed to the traditional timeline of events for a REP exercise
When the release on day 1 was extended three hours longer than planned the MSEL suffered
A MSEL is harder to change than a timeline.

19. MULTIPILE LOCATIONS
There is always a challenge controlling multiple locations
Most personnel from South Carolina were at the SEOC

20. MULTIPILE LOCATIONS
Only one dose assessor from South Carolina was collocated with FRMAC
No State controllers were at the FRMAC

21. COMMUNICATIONS
Communications among players and facilities and organizations are key
Controllers are needed to ensure that communications breakdowns are not the result of scenario artificiality
Unfortunately this breakdown in communications was observed in several instances

22. Advance Party Meeting
No advance party meeting was observed at the SiMT when FRMAC was activated at the end of day 1
Large scale exercises require pre staging personnel
Controllers are needed to ensure these artificialities are handled as realistically as possible

23. RASCAL SOURCE TERM
FRMAC and the state were delayed in their assessments due to problems obtaining the RASCAL Source Term
This release being extended three hours on day one contributed to the delay

24. RASCAL SOURCE TERM
There were not enough controllers present to answer players requests
The point is that realistically this information would have been available to players

25. PLANNING A LARGE EXERCISE
An exercise of this scope will consume most of your staff
It is difficult to have a sufficient number of controllers and evaluators
This is because good evaluators and controllers must be experienced and familiar with the area observed
In 2016 most agencies do not have the staff they once did

26. SUMMARY
The evaluated objectives of a REP exercise do not lend themselves to the free play that is needed for a large Federal HSEEP Exercise
Even in a huge and long exercise there are artificialities and time compression that controllers must deal with
The integration of the State of South Carolina with FRMAC was hampered by the physical separation

27. SUMMARY CONTINUED
The learning opportunities of a large exercise are worth the time and effort that goes into the exercise
No amount of planning can take the place of actually verifying that the plans are workable
Special thanks goes out to all the Federal, State, local and utility partners who made SE15 a reality

28. PLANNING FOR A LARGE EXERCISE

29. Southern Exposure FRMAC Operations

30. Things to consider when planning for a large exercise
Minimum of one year of planning is recommended
Commitment includes planners, venue selection, objectives, time shifts selection, players and controller and evaluator staff
Key planners identified, turnovers lead to confusion and setbacks
Finding of venues - Free state or local facilities are great

31. Things to consider when planning for a large exercise continued…..
Agreed to Objectives and the need to stick to them
REP exercise or not, based on SE lessons learned, recommend not combining REP with large scale federal exercise

32. FRMAC Advance Party
Critical in getting federal assets aligned with state and local responders
Location needs to be addressed in planning for the exercise.
State and Local key staff should participate if available. Delegates work if needed.
Key state and local objectives identified

33. South Carolina Briefing to the FRMAC

34. Keys to a successful response
Situational awareness is key
NIMS/ICS provides key structure
Importance of development and daily use of a coordinated action plan
Data products are critical for decision making
FRMAC Liaisons can provide key interpretations of FRMAC data products

35. Aerial Measurement System asset

36. DOE AMS Helicopter

37. Keys to a successful response continued…..
ROSS can provide assistance if needed
Advisory team will provide recommendations, based on state and local questions and FRMAC data products
Joint media center will be a key coordination point for the media
Laboratory capacity can be a bottleneck for key data

38. EPA Mobile Lab Asset

39. Other considerations Large scale exercises vs regional exercises
Use of RadResponder and other electronic tools
Timing issues, during a response, things will get better with time
Handling of stress, staff burnout is a real issue
Policy issues are critical

40. EPA Aspect

41. Advisory Team

42. Contact Information
Ken Evans, Illinois Emergency Management Agency ; Ken Yale, Michigan Dept. of Environmental Quality ; Stephen Woods, California Dept. of Public Health (916) ;

43. Special Thanks SC Dept. of Health and Environmental Control
SC Forestry Commission
Dept. of Energy
Dept. of Homeland Security
CRCPD
Many Others