1. Airpower in the Post Cold War

2. Overview I Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack
Objectives
Concept of Operations
Five Strategic Rings
Targets
Phases of the Campaign
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH
The Conflict and Lessons Learned

3. Overview II Operation SOUTHERN WATCH History of the Balkans
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
History of the Balkans
Background
Ethnic Groups
Operation DENY FLIGHT

4. Overview III Operation ALLIED FORCE Evolution of Airpower Background
NATO Actions
Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins
Lessons learned by US Military
Political Lessons Learned
Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
Evolution of Airpower

5. Gulf War Background Conflict began 2 August 1990
Iraq and Kuwait could not settle grievances over oil
Saddam Hussein sent armies to invade Kuwait

6. US Objectives
Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government
Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf
Protection of American citizens abroad

7. Operation DESERT SHIELD
CENTCOM CINC—Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf
CENTAF Lt Gen Charles A. Horner
Became JFACC during the war
In first 5 days:
Five fighter squadrons, contingent of AWACS, and part of 82d Airborne Division
Equaled Iraqi force in first 35 days
Air Reserves/Air National Guard called to active duty

8. DESERT STORM Begins
16 Jan—An 11th-hour appeal for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait drew silence
17 Jan—Operation DESERT STORM began as allied forces answered Iraq’s silence
Within 10 days, air sorties reached the 10,000 mark

9. Iraqi Threat 4th largest armed force in world
Well over 1 million troops
750 combat and 200 support aircraft
Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities
SCUD Missiles

10. Air Defense Threat
Iraq’s air defense system thought to be the best outside of the Soviet Union
United States was probably the only nation in the world with the airpower to “disintegrate” an integrated system of this type

11. Article: Horner’s Anxious Moments
What vulnerabilities did Lt. Gen Horner have to contend with in the build-up of Desert Storm?
How did commanding a young, non-combat experienced, Air Force weigh on Lt Gen Horner’s conscience?
When it comes to education and training what is your role as a young officer?

12. Leadership Focus

13. Objectives Isolate and incapacitate Iraqi command structure
Win air superiority
Destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities
Eliminate Iraqi offensive military capability
Eject Iraqi Army from Kuwait

14. Concept Of Operations
Powerful and focused air attacks on strategic centers of gravity over a short period of time
Target Hussein Regime, not Iraqi people
Minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage
Minimize Coalition losses
Pit US and Coalition strengths against Iraqi weaknesses

15. Instant Thunder
Developed by Colonel John Warden and his Checkmate staff in Washington
Named in direct response to Vietnam’s unsuccessful Rolling Thunder campaign
Based on a unique five-ring model of the modern nation-state

16. The Five Strategic Rings

17. Target Systems

18. Article: The Presentation of a Lifetime
Even though Col Warden was considered an expert in his field why did he encounter resistance from leadership?
How can your subject matter expertise actually work against you?
Why is it important to consider the inputs of key people?
What is the value of knowing the experience levels of your team members? At different levels in the chain?
Why do you think Lt Col Deptula was successful?
Do you think that Col Warden’s knowledge about the employment of military capabilities hindered him? Why or why not?

19. Leadership Focus

20. Campaign Overview Four Part Campaign: Phase I: Strategic Air Campaign
Phase II: Suppression of enemy Air Defenses over Kuwait vicinity
Phase III: Air Attacks on ground forces in Kuwait and vicinity
Phase IV: Ground Operations as directed

21. And in the end…
On 27 Feb 1991, the Iraqi military was scattered and defeated
Iraq lost 90 aircraft to coalition forces
122 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran
Stealth provided the needed edge
The Persian Gulf War officially ended on 11 Apr 1991

22. Leadership Focus

23. FOCUS ON LEADERSHIP GEN MERRILL A. McPEAK
Why do you think it was important that Gen McPeak not become paralyzed by the legacy and tradition
What is you role as young officer in supporting institutional change?ns of yesterday’s Air Force?

24. The Crisis in Iraq—ONW
UN Security Council established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks by Saddam Hussein
Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 1991 as a humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees
C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 1991
Lasted approximately 8 years and was then replaced by Operation NORTHERN WATCH

25. The Crisis in Iraq: Lessons Learned—ONW
The need to avoid fratricide
The limitations of airdrops
Host-country tensions
The need for alternate bases
Lack of an exit strategy

26. The Crisis in Iraq—OSW
OSW was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the 32nd parallel (extended to 33rd in 1996) in southern Iraq
Not an aggression against Iraq—executed as a self-defense measure
Coalition partners included the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait
Fire from more than 850 Iraqi SAMs and AAAs directed at coalition aircraft
Iraq violated the no-fly zone more than times
More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998

27. “What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…”
General Ronald R. Fogleman Jul 1995

28. The Crisis in Iraq: Lessons Learned—OSW
Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995
Quality-of-life changes needed due to high Ops-Tempo
Reorganized Security Forces

29. Leadership Focus

30. FOCUS ON LEADERSHIP POLICING POSTWAR IRAQ
The US was tasked with constantly deploying troops to support Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Northern Watch, and Operation Southern Watch. What type of stress did constant engagement put on the force?
Why do you think it was important to institute the AEF concept?
In the early stages of AEF, commanders used to fight to keep troops on home station rather than forward deployed. What was the impact of such action?
As new flight commander what are your responsibilities in supporting the AEF schedule?

31. Background to the Crisis in Bosnia
The anti-Nazi Josep Broz Tito came out of World War II with a difficult task—keeping Yugoslavia together as a nation. He used Communism and the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” to refocus ethnic differences on a common ideology. Forty percent of the population of postwar Yugoslavia was Serbian. To dilute the influence of the Serbs, Tito created six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. He recognized the Muslims in Bosnia as an ethnic group and further created the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo within the Republic of Serbia, incorporated in a constitutional change in These republics and provinces shared equal power under a rotating presidency within the government; however, ultimate power rested with Tito and the Communist Party.

32. Background to the Crisis in Bosnia
The 1974 constitution minimized centralized control and, with the introduction of the two new autonomous regions, effectively reduced the influence of Belgrade as the capital of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. Once Tito died, there would be no opportunity for a new Communist or nationalist leader of his stature to emerge under the collective arrangement. With individuals representing provincial interests, there would be little chance of swift or authoritative leadership whenever crises might call for it.
After Tito’s death in 1980, the Serbs continued to be frustrated with a power-sharing arrangement where they had 40 percent of the population but only one-eighth of the vote. With veto power, any republic could override any proposed legislation, so nothing of substance came out of the government

33. Background to the Crisis in Bosnia
As both Yugoslavia’s economy and Communism declined in the late 1980s, Slovenia and Croatia pressed for more autonomy, while Serbia clamored for tighter central control. The economic disparity between Croatia and Slovenia on the one hand, and Serbia on the other exacerbated these tensions. Serbia had half the per capita gross national product of Croatia and Slovenia. The richer republics in the north were not happy to see their tax revenue going into coffers in Belgrade or supporting a national army that did not have their republics’ best interests at heart. The republics in the south wanted to see a redistribution of wealth.
The army, including the officer corps, was a demographically ethnic mirror of Yugoslavia throughout the Tito years. Serbs represented about 40 percent of the nation’s population, and that percentage was generally maintained in the military force.

34. Background to the Crisis in Bosnia
As the nation broke apart, the percentage of Serbs increased proportionately as the other republics’ soldiers resigned or deserted from the national army. Therefore Serbian dominance within the contemporary Yugoslav army grew primarily by default. 
The 1980s represented a period of economic turmoil within Yugoslavia and continuing ethnic problems within the autonomous province of Kosovo. Ninety percent of Kosovo’s population was ethnically Albanian and wanted to merge with Albania, where they felt their rights would be better protected. Yugoslavia, with its historic and symbolic ties to Kosovo, would never let this happen 

35. Background to the Crisis in Bosnia
Periodically, the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) mobilized in Kosovo, throughout both the Tito and post-Tito eras, to quell ethnic unrest there. Politically, anytime a vote came up in the collective Communist leadership, the Kosovo representative could always be counted on to vote against any measure of substance the Serbians favored.
In 1987, an ambitious Communist party official, Slobodan Milosevic, went to Kosovo from Belgrade to investigate a charge made by the Albanians of human rights violations committed by the minority Serbs living there. Instead, he sided with his brother Serbs, who felt they were being mistreated, and made a famous speech that propelled him to ultimate leadership within the Yugoslav Communist Party. Milosevic told the Serbs in Kosovo that they would not be treated as minorities within their own country, because he would not allow this to happen. “You will not be beaten again” was his battle cry.

36. The Balkans: A Brief History
After World War II, monarchy abolished; Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime Minister
Eliminating opposition, the Tito gov’t executed Mihajlovic in 1946 Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent

37. Three Ethnic Groups In Conflict
Serbs—Dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia
Croats—Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western Influences
Muslims—Living mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina

39. Operation DENY FLIGHT
Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781 established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina
Operation DENY FLIGHT
Enforced the no-fly zone
Provided close air support to UN troops
Conducted approved air strikes under a dual-key command arrangement with the UN
28 Feb 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina
This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance

40. Operation DENY FLIGHT NATO objectives
Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas
Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo
Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and nongovernment officials
Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport

41. Operation DENY FLIGHT NATO missions of Operation DENY FLIGHT
To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 816
To provide close air support for UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces
To conduct approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas

42. Operation DENY FLIGHT
Operation DENY FLIGHT lasted from 12 Apr Dec 1995
Almost 100,000 sorties flown
A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on 21 Dec 1995
Forces associated with Operation DENY FLIGHT were then transferred to Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR as part of the overall NATO operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

43. The Crisis in Bosnia: Lessons Learned
Lack of doctrine
Tactical air and space power problems
Bases weren’t large enough to accept the contingency surges
Coalition/Joint problems
Technological problems

44. Kosovo
Operation ALLIED FORCE. Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population, the majority of which are ethnic Albanians. Until 1989, the region enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within the former Yugoslavia, but then Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy, and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital. The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed this move. During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes. The international community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries. President Milosevic’s disregard for diplomatic peace-making efforts and the destabilizing role of militant Kosovar Albanian forces were also of concern

45. Kosovo
Kosovo was once an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, with a functioning, multiethnic government. When Milosevic took away that autonomy he implemented apartheid-like policies that excluded Kosovar Albanians from virtually all positions of responsibility. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush warned Milosevic of the consequences of Serb violence against, or forced expulsion of, Kosovar Albanians. In 1998, this discrimination turned into systematic violence against the Kosovar Albanians, precipitating the crisis that forced NATO to act on both diplomatic and military fronts. In October 1998, under pressure of impending NATO military action, Milosevic agreed to deployments of international observers into Kosovo, and the violence subsided significantly; but, by late winter, the violence had resumed. NATO was again reviewing military options, and the parties were summoned to negotiations at Rambouillet, France. The negotiations ultimately failed because of Serb inflexibility. On 21 March 1999, the international community initiated one last diplomatic effort. Ambassador Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade to deliver a warning to Milosevic.

46. Kosovo
On 22 March, in response to Belgrade’s continued intransigence and repression, and in view of the worsening of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) gave NATO Secretary General Solana authority, subject to consultations with the allies, to order a phased air operation. Ambassador Holbrooke departed Belgrade on 23 March having received no concessions of any kind from Milosevic, which then led Secretary General Solana to direct General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On 24 March 1999, the United States and its NATO allies turned from a path of diplomacy backed by the threat of force to a military campaign supported by diplomacy.

47. KOSOVO

48. Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population, the majority of which are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital
The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move

49. United States & NATO Interests at Stake
Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region
Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions
President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

50. NATO Action
After the failure of repeated international diplomatic efforts since the spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo
North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes
Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government

51. NATO’s Objectives
A stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression
The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police, and paramilitary forces
The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence

52. NATO’s Objectives (cont’d)
The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons
Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law

53. Allied Force Begins
The campaign over Kosovo was not a traditional military conflict. There was no direct clash of massed military forces in Operation ALLIED FORCE. Milosevic was unable to challenge superior allied military capabilities directly. Therefore, he chose to fight chiefly through indirect means: use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians, attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage, creation of enormous refugee flows to create a humanitarian crisis, and the conduct of disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

54. Allied Force Begins
Milosevic’s military forces were forced into hiding throughout most of the campaign, staying in caves and tunnels and under the cover of forest, village, or weather. He was forced to husband his antiaircraft missile defenses to sustain his challenge to our air campaign. He chose his tactics in the hope of exploiting our legitimate political concerns about target selection, collateral damage, and conducting military operations against enemy forces intermingled with civilian refugees. Despite all these efforts, he failed.

55. Significance of Air Power in Allied Force
B-2s make combat debut
30 hour flight
JDAM technology enables all weather bombing
F-117s used in majority of strike packages
Lost F-117 and recovered pilot

56. Significance of Air Power in Allied Force
UAVs:
Provided target information
Conducted battle damage assessment
Monitored refugees
ISR synchronized combat operations

57. NATO’s Strategic Objectives
Demonstrate the seriousness of their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the Balkans
Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians, and reverse ethnic cleansing
Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

58. Military Objective
“Degrade and damage the military and security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.” William Cohen, SECDEF 15 April 1999

59. Lessons Learned on Kosovo War Objectives
US Grand Strategy
Maintain a peaceful, prosperous US-led Europe
Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition
Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct out of area military ops
European Strategy
Maintain a peaceful, prosperous, and independent Europe
Prevent spillover into Albania and Macedonia, then to Greece and Turkey
Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis
Demonstrate European unity
Kosovo War Aims
Stop the Serbian slaughter and expulsion of ethnic Albanians
Remove Milosevic from power
Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties
Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives

60. Lessons Learned by US Military
United States air refuelers were stretched thin during operation
Force structure numbers and resources were inadequate for current level of commitments (all services); support and training as important to victory as strike
Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough; smart weapons may be better than smart platforms
Need the right force structure for the future
C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint and coalition ops
On the brink of another “hollow force”

61. Political Lessons Learned by Europeans
Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans
Best technology, weapons, and platforms “Made in USA.”
Politicians unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique US capabilities
United States cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests
US focus shifted with opinion polls
Fear US commitment could falter if US forces take heavy casualties

62. More Political Lessons Learned by Europeans
European Union can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day); many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations
Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism
Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing)
Need to build external identity
Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion
German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945
Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition
Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases

63. Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget Trends
No DOD/Allied spending surge like post-Desert Storm
International defense market continues to shrink
Readiness and retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for modernization
Inevitable tax cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets
Services must eventually deal with the bow wave
Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough
Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms (JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21)
Support forces will need big $$$$ too
“We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.”
Jacques Gansler
Former Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics

64. Evolution of Airpower
What were significant airpower achievements and changes during this period?
Who were some of the key leaders?
What doctrinal changes occurred during this period?

65. Air Power during the 1990s Key People Gen McPeak Lt. Gen Horner
Col Warden
Key Weapons
Precision Guided Munitions
Stealth Technology
UAVs and Space Technology
Key Doctrinal Focus
Precision Engagement
Air Superiority
Building Partnerships

66. Summary I Gulf War Background The Enemy The Plan of Attack
Objectives
Concept of Operations
Five Strategic Rings
Targets
Phases of the Campaign
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH
The Conflict and Lessons Learned

67. Summary II Operation SOUTHERN WATCH History of the Balkans
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
History of the Balkans
Background
Ethnic Groups

68. Summary III Operation DENY FLIGHT Operation ALLIED FORCE
The Conflict and Lessons Learned
Operation ALLIED FORCE
Background
NATO Actions
Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins
Lessons learned by US Military
Political Lessons Learned
Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget
Evolution of Airpower