1. Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the Second Nuclear Age Andrew Krepinevich Jacob Cohn

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Presentation Roadmap
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Project Overview
Why Scenarios?
Five Scenarios
Selected Observations and Insights
Next Steps

3. Project Overview

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Project Objectives
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How can scenarios support efforts to craft policies designed to reduce the chances of nuclear use?
What would constitute a representative set of scenarios that are characteristic of the Second Nuclear Age, rather than the preceding age?
Given these scenarios, what are some of the first-order implications they raise with respect to nuclear policy, strategy, and force posture?

5. Why Scenarios?

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Scenarios
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Scenarios: A tool for helping us plan in an uncertain world; an antidote to “willful ignorance”
A need for effective strategic thinking is most obvious in times of accelerated change
While the future is fundamentally unpredictable; it is not wholly uncertain

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Why Scenarios?
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Do not “predict” the future; rather, they help us to think about the future
Help identify what factors will most shape the future
Understand how the environment might change
Recognize when the environment is changing
Know how to respond when change is detected

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“Drivers”
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Geostrategic: Multipolar regional and global competitions
Geopolitical: Regime characteristics; external sources of influence
Geographic: Proximity and “interspersing”
Cultural: The Human Condition; differing perspectives on cost, benefit and risk

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“Drivers”
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Military-Technical:
Advanced design nuclear weapons
The maturation of the precision-guided weapons regime
Advanced air and missile defenses
Cyber munitions
Military Capabilities: Size and composition of strategic forces
Proliferation Dynamics: Static, linear or non-linear?
Temporal: Mobilization, early warning, command-and-control

10. Five Scenarios

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Scenarios
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Iran, Israel and the Crisis Neither Sought
An “N-Player” Middle East Confrontation
Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” threat
North Korea’s “Rational” Option
China and the Long-Term Great Power Competition
4 crisis scenarios – 2 in ME, 1 in Eastern Europe, and 1 in East Asia
1 long term competition – US, China, Russia
For each scenario – what are the key drivers and what characteristics of the second nuclear age do the scenarios identify

12. Middle East

13. Iran and Israel to the Brink
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Scenario (2016 – 2020)
Economic: Joint Agreement unfreezes Iranian assets and ends many economic sanctions
Proxies: Tehran’s “slow squeeze” of Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Israel
Crisis: Third Lebanon War expands to direct conflict between Israel and Iran; both sides concerned about preemptive nuclear attack
Destabilizing Factors
Geographic proximity and limits of Early Warning/C2
Predelegation of authority
Nuclear doctrine
Proxies – assert regional dominance
Crisis – instead of continuing to fight increasingly effective proxies; Israel goes for the head of the snake. NOW two undeclared powers facing off
Nuclear:
July 2020 – estimated stockpile of four to six weapons + two to three additional weapons annually
Crisis:
November 22, 2020 Hezbollah rocket attack strikes oil refinery at Haifa killing 34 Israelis and wounding nearly 200. Tens of thousands are evacuated due to the intensity of the fires and the presence of toxic fumes. Severe economic damage as the refinery is one of only two in the country.
Israeli people demand retaliation – SLCMs & air strikes target Iran’s Abadan oil refinery on December 6, 2020.
Israeli retaliation produces far greater destruction and loss of life than Hezbollah attack (oil surges from $71/bbl to $108/bbl).
RESULT – nuclear standoff
Planning Considerations:
Iran concerned about EW/C2 vulnerabilities since Iranian IADS did not attack Israeli strike on Abadan oil refinery in advance
Enhanced missile defense capacity (if the U.S. deployed more forces to the region) would reduce the potential of a “Haystack” attack
Iran can’t maintain alert status indefinitely, within a week or two at most some forces will have to stand down creating a window of opportunity for Israel
CYBERCOM says could launch CAN against EW/C2 systems making it difficult/impossible for Iran to launch with 90% chance of success.
Israeli arsenal is sufficiently large that the addition of U.S. nuclear forces would be irrelevant. Also, Israeli nuclear forces are more flexible and closer allowing Israel to execute a prompt attack more effectively than STRATCOM

14. The “N-Player” Problem
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Scenario (2016 – 2020)
Excursion from previous scenario focusing on the “N-Player” problem
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE expect same nuclear freedom as granted to Iran
Saudi Arabia jumpstarts nuclear program with Pakistan’s assistance
September 2018, Pakistan deploys nuclear IRBMs to Saudi Arabia
Destabilizing Factors
Attribution problem
Will the U.S. protect its allies equally?
Nuclear:
Egypt and Turkey undertake modest increases in nuclear enterprise investments
UAE purchases several thousand centrifuges as part of significant expansion of nuclear infrastructure
Saudi Arabia (with Pakistan’s assistance) constructs a large-scale, distributed, and hardened nuclear infrastructure. Imports thousands of advanced centrifuges and large quantities of uranium ore from Jordan
Pakistan supplies technical know how and potentially HEU
September 2018, Pakistan deploys 16 IRBMs to deter both Iran and Israel
Riyadh insists missiles have dual key control (NATO model); Iran believes missiles are under the sole control of Saudi Arabia
Crisis:
Potential for conflict to extend to South Asia if Pakistan defends Saudi Arabia. Would a Saudi Arabian nuclear strike (if not under dual key control) be viewed as having occurred with Pakistan’s approval, thus broadening the conflict regardless of Pakistan’s actual support for Saudi actions?
Planning Considerations
For instance, suppose Iran’s EW/C2 capabilities are interrupted by a CNA as a precursor to a nuclear attack. How would Iran know if Israel or Saudi Arabia was responsible?
Will the U.S. limit the interceptors used in defense of Saudi Arabia to guarantee a minimum reserve to defend Israel
Missile defense systems are a high demand/low supply asset. Shifting weapons could create vulnerability in another region. Likewise, shifting weapons create incentive to attack now, before redeployment is complete.

15. Eastern Europe

16. Sub-Conventional Aggression in Latvia
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Scenario (2016 – 2018)
Economic: Falling oil and gas prices, continued economic sanctions
Security: Increasing insecurity as ISIS attributed terror attacks mount
Timing: Low domestic approval and weakening internal control near election
Crisis: Creeping aggression in Latvia, incorrectly assuming NATO would not intervene, Russia backed into a losing conventional position
Destabilizing Factors
Alliance management
Deterring the “escalate to deescalate” threat
Ability of non-nuclear weapons to fill nuclear missions
Gaps in the escalation ladder
Mobilization race – can Russia consolidate its gains before NATO can deploy sufficient forces to restore Latvia’s territorial integrity

17. North Korea

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North Korea
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Scenario (2016 – 2021)
Economic: Economic reform backfires, by 2019 the situation is desperate
Nuclear: Believed to have nuclear capable Taepodong-3s and Nodongs
Arms Control: Concessions viewed as a path to regime change
Crisis: Nuclear strike on Japan as last ditch effort to stave off regime collapse
Destabilizing Factors
(Mis)perceptions of leaders
Alliance management
Vulnerability of missile defenses to Haystack tactic
Vulnerability of small arsenals to missile defense
Economic:
Following weak harvest in 2016 and declining foreign support, Kim Jong-un creates a FEZ west of Pyongyang along the West Korea Bay coast and leverage low labor costs to attract Chinese and South Korean investment and technology
Also allows farming for personnel consumption or tax-free sale (quarter hectare per farmer)
Successful in 2018 (record harvest and significant Chinese investment), but by late 2019 economic liberalization has failed
Corruption and skill mismatch with respect to industry favored by the regime results in failure of the FEZ
Agricultural growth from 2018 is squandered as the regime imposes additional regulations, hampering incentives to work, and a drought stunts crop growth
China unwilling to expand its subsidies economic growth is ~4% and the drought that effected North Korea is effecting China too
Nuclear:
Taepodong-3 tested between 2,500 and 3,700 miles, which can threaten U.S. forces in Japan, Guam, and out to Singapore (three successful tests)
20 KT underground test
15 – 25 nuclear weapons total with roughly 10 – 20 mated to ballistic missiles
Arms Control:
The U.S., South Korea, and Japan recognize Pyongyang’s gambit and insist upon major up-front concessions that must translate into concrete action and be fully implemented prior to the North receiving any assistance
Kim Jong-un views the “Iranian model” of nuclear development as preferable, seeing concessions on arms control (like Muammar Qaddafi) as a path towards death and/or regime change.
Crisis
Target Kitakyushu (Kyushu) with a 54 missile salvo (only five with nuclear warheads) - tens of thousands of casualties from 9 KT blast
Offensive against South Korea rule out since the KPA lacks the ability to mount a major combined-arms offensive and the KPA’s limited inventory of ballistic missiles must be reserved for Haystack strikes
Demonstration shot is ruled out since Pyongyang’s arsenal is too small to justify “wasting” a warhead like that and also because Kim does not want to give the US time to deploy more BMD assets
EMP shot ruled out since North Korea does not have the rocket technology or a sufficiently large warhead to reliably generate an EMP effect (must be at least 30 km above the earth) and to have a widespread effect, it requires a large warhead (at least 1 MT)
Planning Considerations
Japan and South Korea want different degrees of assurance from the U.S.
POTUS believed that trading assistance for real restrictions on nuclear capabilities provides Kim a “win-win” option – complete misunderstanding of Kim’s calculus

19. Long-Term Competition with China and Russia

20. Long-Term Multipolar Competition
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Scenario (2017 – 2020)
Economic: Economic slowdown leaves regime reliant on nationalism
Geopolitical: Setbacks in South China Sea/East China Sea stress last pillar
Military-Technical: U.S. CPGS development and Russian violation of INF treaty raises concerns over vertical escalation vulnerability
Nuclear: Fissile material is the principal near-term barrier to growing China’s arsenal; decision made to seek balance with U.S. and Russia
Destabilizing Factors
What force structure is needed for a multipolar competition?
Avoiding an arms race & the role of arms control
Effect of geographic proximity – nuclear overflight
Four pillars of legitimacy: democracy; ideology; economic growth; nationalism
Economic growth threatened by…
Slow growth in rest of world (hamper China’s export driven growth)
Unfavorable demography with growing dependency ratio
Environmental degradation/water shortages
Internal corruption
Rise of relatively cheap/skilled labor in South and Southeast Asia
Geopolitical
USN continues FONOPS despite Beijing’s protests
In September 2017, Beijing declares ADIZ over SCS. U.S. ignores the ADIZ and USAF and USN elements conduct regular FONOPS
Putin concerned over Chinese nationals in Siberia – if we don’t do something soon, the Russian population will be speaking Chinese, Japanese, and Korean – and is strengthening nuclear capabilities along the frontier (deployment of RS-26)
Nuclear
Estimated PRC nuke inventory of 500 weapons in 2020, growing at a rate of 100 – 150 weapons annually
MIRV all ICBMs
Equip MRBMs with nuclear warheads
Planning Considerations
Update the escalation ladder to include CPGS, cyber weapons, and advanced air and missile defenses? Is there a need for a tailorable weapons and a greater variety of delivery systems (e.g., IRBMs)?
U.S. vs China conflict would overfly Russia
Short flight times and vulnerabilities of EW/C2 could create movement to reconstitute Soviet-style Perimeter system

21. Selected Insights and Observations

22. Selected Insights and Observations
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The “Nuclear Balance” is now the “Strategic Balance”
Wide range of capabilities; many non-nuclear
New vertical and horizontal escalation ladders
The Bipolar structure is transitioning to a Multipolar structure
Global and regional competitions
Strategies for deterring one rival may weaken deterrence with another
A nuclear “great game”
Potential for non-nuclear powers to play

23. Selected Insights and Observations
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The Challenge of Extended Deterrence
What is reassuring for one may not be for another
Need to review along with revised escalation ladders
The Death of “Rational Strategic Man”
Single, rational unitary actor model long discredited
Crises lead to thinking “fast,” not “slow”
Prospect Theory suggests coercion strategies may be a “dead end”

24. Selected Insights and Observations
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The Erosion of Crisis Stability
Geographic Proximity, Early Warning, Command-and-Control, Pre-delegation Authority and Human Cognitive Limitations
Cyber Munitions and Catalytic War
Problems with Prompt Attribution
Blurring of Strategic and Non-Strategic Strikes
Undeclared Arsenals
Multiple Extended Deterrence Commitments
Haystack Attacks
1914 Redux: The Mobilization of Missile Defenses

25. Selected Insights and Observations
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Arms Control
From New START to the Washington Naval Treaty
“Multidimensional” Problems
“Multipolar” Problems
Enforcement and Verification Challenges
Implications for the U.S. Strategic Posture
Old metrics may no longer apply
More options needed
Position matters in a mobilization race
Potential gap between commitments and capabilities (extended deterrence)
Which scenarios are accorded priority?
A need to think long term

26. Next Steps

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Selected Next Steps
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Undertake Strategic Net Assessments on global, regional and functional aspects of the competition
Comparative assessment of strategic doctrines
Identify strategic planning issues that emerge across scenarios
Develop a set of the “missing” scenarios (e.g.; India-Pakistan; nuclear war termination)

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Selected Next Steps
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Develop a revised set of metrics to guide efforts to assess the strategic force balance(s)
Update horizontal and vertical escalation ladders
Assess prospects for regulating the strategic competition (such as a contemporary version of the Washington Naval Treaty)
Examine ongoing efforts among the competitors to enhance their strategic forces, identifying major asymmetries in doctrine, forces and their implications

29. Questions?