1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT: WHY?

2. WHY VENEZUELA? An apparently stable two-party democracy
Rómulo Betancourt and Generation of 1928
Pact of Punto Fijo (1958)
No military threat
Awash in petroleum (“Venezuela Saudita”)
OPEC (1960)
PdVSA
Positive international profile
Socialist International
Diplomacy in Central America/1980s

3. SEEDS OF RESENTMENT Socioeconomic inequality
Reliance on state patronage
Petroleum as “devil’s excrement”
Concentration of power and wealth
Rural-to-urban migration
Partidocracia:
Absence of clear programs
Closed-list slates
Ageing leadership

4. POLITICAL DECAY Carlos Andrés Pérez (CAP) Voter disenchantment
Neoliberal reforms and caracazo
Attempted coups 1992
Impeachment 1993
Voter disenchantment
Turnout: 96% (1973) to 60% (1990s)
AD + COPEI vote share: 90% (1970s-80s) to 45% (1993) to 11% (1998)
Rafael Caldera wins as independent in 1993

6. THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION
Domestic agenda:
Strengthening state
Redistributing wealth
Monopolizing power
Global agenda:
Opposing U.S. hegemony
Building continental solidarity
Becoming leader of developing world
Consolidating oil-producing alliances

7. INTERNAL WEAKNESSES Judiciary, rule of law and “due process”
Absence of representative institutions—e.g., courts, legislature, unions
Concentration of presidential power
Chávez’s own charisma
Economic inefficiencies
NB: defeat in November ’07 referendum, victory the following year

8. CURRENT ISSUES Leadership: Economic performance: Foreign policy:
Tightening circle of advisers
Accusations of corruption
Economic performance:
Rationing of water and electricity
Attempted price controls
Foreign policy:
Threats of war with Colombia
Rise of Lula (and Dilma) and Brazil
Curtailing opposition:
Redistricting for elections of National Assembly
Shutdown of RCTV International

9. WHY ELSEWHERE? Juxtaposition of inequality and wealth
Organizational basis for mass mobilization
Timing (why ca. 2005?):
Changing approach to electoral politics (rejection of revolutionary option)
Constraints and moderation resulting from “pacts”
International incentives:
Respect for democracy
Neoliberal economics and regional integration
“… the same factors that prevent the left from pursuing more radical economic policies are also responsible for the ability of the left to remain in power without provoking antisystemic behavior on the part of opposing political forces.”

10. AND THE FUTURE…?
“… the left is back, and it will remain competitive in much of Latin America well into the future”
Threats and challenges:
Corruption scandals
Concerns with public safety
Break with policy moderation
Politicization of military
“The future of the left in Latin America will largely depend on its ability to strike a balance between the pragmatic need for moderation and the moral imperative to pursue strategies for poverty reduction, redistribution, and development.”

11. UPDATE: POVERTY LEVELSN
__%__ __(millions)__

12. CHANGES IN INEQUALITY 1980-2000 = rising
increasing lower-higher skilled gap
uneven effects of international trade
absence of public policies
= declining (slightly)
reduced lower-higher skilled gap (due to education)
government programs (including remittances)
unclear impact of global crash
still high by world standards

13. QUESTIONS
1. Do these developments mean that radical policies are unnecessary?
2. Or might they provide more opportunity for radical policy (e.g., land reform)?
3. Does moderation mean survival of the “left”—or the extinction of the left?
4. What impact might come from political change in Cuba—or Venezuela?