1. Managerial Economics Applications, Strategy, and Tactics, 12h Edition
by McGuigan, Moyer, & Harris
PowerPoint Lecture Slides
prepared by
Richard D. Marcus
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
© 2011 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be scanned, copied or duplicated,
or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part. 1

2. Chapter 1 Introduction & Goals of the Firm
What is Managerial Economics?
The Decision-Making Model and the Responsibilities of Management
The Role of Profits?
The Principal-Agent Problem
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and the Real Option Value
Objectives in the Public Sector and Not-for-Profit Organizations 2

3. What is Managerial Economics?
Managerial Economics is the application of microeconomics to problems faced by decision makers in the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors.
Even questions of how best to abate nitrous oxide by coal-fired Power Plants involves economic issues of finding efficient, least cost solutions.
Managerial economics deals with microeconomic reasoning on real world problems such as pricing decisions, selecting the best strategy in different competitive environments, and making efficient choices. 3

4. The Decision-Making Process (Figure 1.2)
1. Establish Objectives
2. Identify the Problem
3. Examine Alternative Solutions
4. Analyze Alternatives
and Select the Best!
5. Perform Sensitivity Analysis
6. Implement and
Monitor the Decision
Consider
Organizational
& Input
Constraints
Consider
Societal
Constraints

5. Responsibility of Management
Managers solve problems before they become a crisis
Managers select strategies to try to assure the success of the firm
Managers create an organizational culture attune to the mission of the organization
Senior management establish a vision for the firm
Managers motivate and promote teamwork
Managers promote the profitability of the firm
And many managers see it in their long-run interest to promote sustainability of their enterprise in their environment.
Managers who fail at these responsibilities are reviled, be they be mangers of BP, Enron, or Bernie Madoff

6. To Expand Capacity or Not? An example of a simplified decision problem
Should Honda or Toyota expand its capacity in North America? In part, it must consider current and future demand and what other firms are likely to do.
Capacity for making cars is a long term project, so these firms should think in terms of the present value (PV) of future profits.
Objective Function:
Max PV of profits {S1(New), S2(Used)}
where S1(New) is expand capacity with new facilities and S2(Used) to purchase used facilities from GM.
Decision Rule:
Choose S1 if PV {Profits of S1 } > PV { Profits of S2 }
Choose S2 if PV { Profits of S1 } < PV { Profits of S2 }
If equal profits, then flip a coin
If negative profits for both, then don’t expand at all

7. The Role of Profits?
Economic Profit is the difference between total revenues and total economic cost (Economic cost includes the “normal” rate of return on capital contributions by the firm’s partners).
We’d expect high profit areas to attract investment
We’d expect low profit areas to lose investment
Shouldn’t then all industries earn the same profit eventually? 10

8. Theories of Why Profit Varies Across Industries
RISK-BEARING Theory of Profit
TEMPORARY DISQUILIBRIUM Theory of Profit
MONOPOLY Theory of Profit
INNOVATION Theory of Profit
MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY Theory of Profit 11

9. What Went Right? ● What Went Wrong?
Eli Lilly a Pharmaceutical company
It take12.3 years on average to get a new drug approved
Patents on Lilly’s Prozac created monopoly power and profits for a widely used medication for depression.
As the patent began to expire, Lilly requested s patent “extension” because of some alterations in Prozac’s formula
But when the patent extension was overturned, generic drug manufactures took 70% of the share of the market for anti-depressants.
Lilly missed the chance of finding a replacement in time for its blockbuster Prozac
This is an example of having and losing monopoly power. t

10. Shareholder Wealth Maximization [1.1}
t = REVENUE – COST = TRt – TCt = PtQt – VtQt - Ft
Value of the Firm = the present value of discounted future cash flows, both from current operations but also those that might be.
V0∙(shares outstanding) = 1/(1+ke)1 +2/(1+ke)2 + … + Real Option Value
or 
V0∙(shares outstanding) = (t ) / (1+ke)t + Real Option Value
t=1
The real option value of the firm comes from the flexibility that the firm has to find added cost savings or new revenue possibilities that have not yet come to pass, but could in the future because of following their current business plans.
V0 is the current value of a share of stock.
Whatever lowers the perceived risk of the firm (ke) will raise firm value.
Whatever raises the profits of the firm, raises firm value 7

11. This applies both to for-profit corporations &
To make good economic decisions, managers need to be able to forecast & estimate relationships
In this class, we will discussing how to forecast demand (both Pt & Qt)
This applies both to for-profit corporations &
Public & not-for-profit organizations
Hospital Administrators forecast patients
University Administrators forecast enrollment
Regression analysis, time series methods, and qualitative forecasting methods used for forecasting 9

12. Agency Problems
Modern corporations allow firm managers to have no participation (or only limited ownership participation) in the profitability of the firm.
The shareholders are principals, whereas the managers are agents.
Two common problems: (1) its often hard to observe managerial effort and (2) random disturbances in team performance (luck versus effort?) 12

13. The Principal-Agent Problem
Shareholders (principals) want profit
Managers (agents) want leisure & security
Divergent objectives between these groups are called agency problems.
Examples
Diversification by Exxon executives was designed to help smooth their bonuses, but led to worse stock performance
KKR’s takeover of RJR Nabisco to refocus on wealth-maximization
The LBO by O.M. Scott & Sons (a lawn fertilizer company) from ITT (a conglomerate) improved Scott’s performance 13

14. Agency Costs Extending grants of stock or deferred stock options
It helps to make workers act more like owners of firm to try to raise the price of the stock, but is a cost
Bonuses or other compensation can be an incentive, but clearly is also a “cost” of solving agency problems
Internal audits and accounting oversight boards to monitor the firm
Bonding expenditures and fraud liability insurance
Costs of complex internal approval processes to avoid adverse managerial discretion 14

15. What Went Right? ● What Went Wrong?
Saturn Corporation
Different kind of car company in 1991, but sadly permanently closed in 2009.
It used no-haggle pricing and designed cars to compete with Asian imports
Sales were above expectations at first because of tiny margin of only $400 per car to GM, so that GM earned only 3% on capital
Saturn customers wanted bigger Saturn cars rather than trade up to Buick, as GM hoped. Saturn was unable to adopt a change-management view to get customers to trade up to other GM products.
Sales later slumped in the late 1990s through 2009.

16. Caveats to Shareholder Wealth Maximization
COMPLETE MARKETS - liquid markets for firm's inputs and by-products (including polluting by-products).
NO ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION - buyers and sellers all know the same things.
KNOWN RECONTRACTING COSTS - future input costs are part of the present value of expected cash flows. 15

17. Goals in the Public Sector and the Not-For-Profit (NFP) Enterprise
Instead of profit, NFP organizations may have as their goals:
Maximizing the quantity and quality of output, subject to a breakeven constraint.
Maximizing the outcomes preferred by the NFP contributors.
Maximizing the longevity of the NFP administrators.
Knowing their goals, helps to understand their behavior.
Using cost-benefit analysis, we can evaluate their efficiency in terms of maximizing benefits for a given cost; or minimizing costs for a given benefit; or maximizing net benefits (Benefits – Costs). 16