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Outline QUIZ at start of next Tuesday’s class

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1 Outline QUIZ at start of next Tuesday’s class
Newspaper examples for next class discussion Key questions about institutions Variables, IVs, and DVs Why do institutions form? Two approaches: logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness Eight key questions of course

2 Prepare for 10 Minute In-Class Discussion on Thursday
Read news to find real-life examples of two problems and think about how they differ in terms of the 8 key questions of problem structure that we will discuss in class today Look at Newspaper of your choice before next class and find two INTERNATIONAL problems that differ along 8 key questions Show how one of the problems is of ONE type and another problem is of a DIFFERENT or OPPPOSITE type One is Cooperation / One is Harmony One involves Conflict over Norms/One involves agreement on Norms One is Inherently Transparent/ One is NOT Inherently Transparent

3 Key questions about institutions
Formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions in the first place? Design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them in the ways they do? Influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states? Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

4 Variables, IVs, and DVs Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values) Values: what a variable varies between E.g., Variable: color Values: ROYGBIV DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

5 Koremenos et al. DVs IVs Membership rules Scope of issues covered
Degree of centralization Rules for controlling institution Flexibility of rules IVs Distribution issues Enforcement issues Number of actors Uncertainty Norms Broader context

6 Variable Terms and Concepts Examples
Unit of analysis Variable Indicator Values of variable Values of indicator Problem Level of Difficulty Time til Start of Negotiations Malign Long Benign Short Time til Complete Negotiations Treaty Ambitious-ness Type of Obligations Ambitious Differentiated Not-ambitious Common Strength Monitoring Provision Strong Provision present Weak Provision absent

7 Some DVs for the Course Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it DVs for the course Whether institution forms or not What are the features of the institution Behavior of states We want to design our categories/variables to help us answer these questions!

8 Institutional formation
Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution? Variable: institutional formation Values: yes or no IVs: features of problem structure Capacities Incentives Information and knowledge Norms

9 Logic of Consequences vs. Logic of Appropriateness
States calculate what is best Independent self-interest (narrow) Independent self-interest ( broad) Interdependent self-interest Logic of appropriateness States behave to establish/maintain particular identity and/or to follow social rules Institutions alter of what is right/appropriate

10 What is problem structure?
Features of the problem that influence: Formation: How hard/easy to solve the problem? Design: What kind of solution states arrive at? Institutional influence: How effective is the solution? No need for single dimension of hard to easy Think about different problem features and implications for negotiation and effectiveness

11 Problem structure: Eight (8) key questions
Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony? Q2: Who are the actors? Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power Q4: Incentives/preferences Q5: Information/knowledge Q6: Norms Q7: Inherent transparency Q8: Response incentives

12 Problem structure: Eight (8) key questions
Mainly for comparing ACROSS problems Answers to all effect Whether states will form institution What features they will incorporate How states will respond to institutional rules

13 Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation or harmony?
Is it conflict or would it be if no institution? Is it harmony? If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable? Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute gains frame

14 Q2: Who are the Actors? How many actors are there?
What roles do actors have? What types of actors are involved?

15 Q3: Capacities and power
Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior? If not, it’s a “Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity”. E.g., Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons Reducing AIDS in developing countries Helping small countries defend selves from attack Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

16 Q4: Incentives/preferences
How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries? Types of incentive problems Upstream / downstream Coordination Collaboration All involve logic of consequences issues

17 Q5: Information/knowledge
Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them? Two types of info/knowledge problems Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games Largely still logic of consequences

18 Q6: Norms Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g., Human rights abuses Apartheid or treatment of women Choice of government Involves logic of appropriateness

19 Q7: Inherent transparency
Question: Is it easy to “see” violations and/or hard to conceal them? Hypothesis: If little inherent transparency, then strong monitoring provisions are likely.

20 Q8: Response incentives
Question: Will states respond to violations? Do violations matter a lot? Are states very concerned about them? Hypothesis: If strong violation INtolerance, leads to either preclusive strategies OR careful monitoring WITH enforcement. For example: Strong incentives to respond to trade violations ==> carefully devised dispute resolution systems

21 Types of problem Review
Deadlock Positive externality plagued by incapacity Upstream / downstream problems Coordination Collaboration Epistemic / knowledge problems Assurance problems Normative problems Plus inherent transparency and response incentives

22 Conclusion Is there a conflict? Who are the actors
Capacities and power Incentives Information / knowledge Norms Inherent transparency Response incentives

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