1. Midterm Eval of Teaching
Get out piece of paper
Do NOT put your name on it
What should Prof. Mitchell
Start doing?
Stop doing
Continue doing

2. Readings
Young and Osherenko
Koremenos et al.

3. Young and Osherenko: Institutional Formation
Argument about factors that make likely for institution to form
Interests: leadership; terms of institution must fit interests
Some actors must want an institution enough to create one that fits
Power: hegemony; various forms of polarity
Forming institution must be in interests of powerful states in system
Knowledge: shared; epistemic communities
Must have shared view of problem
Context: broad shifts, crises
Processes: substitutions; interactions

4. Koremenos et al. Predictions
An alternative way to structure the same things that Young and Osherenko are trying to explain

5. Koremenos et al. Predictions re: Institutional Design
Distribution
Prediction: distribution problems => HARDER to resolve
Enforcement
Prediction: enforcement problems => HARDER to resolve
Number of actors
Prediction: more actors => HARDER to resolve
Uncertainty about:
Behavior of other actors
Preferences of other actors
State of world
Norms
Broader context

6. Distribution issues Distribution matters because power matters
Not all issues pose same distributional issues
Harder: territorial disputes, satellite slots, resource access
Easier: free trade, human rights
Matters most when states in “relative gains” mode
Prediction: distribution problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

7. Enforcement issues How much do states care about enforcement?
How readily do violations come to light?
If they come to light, will actors stop?
How “violation tolerant” are others?
Issues pose different enforcement problems
Harder: nuclear weapons, free trade
Easier: environment, human rights
Enforcement matters more for “high politics” issues
Prediction: enforcement problems make it HARDER to reach agreement

8. Number of actors
Differs from membership: how many important actors needed to resolve problem
Harder (many): human rights, trade
Easier (few): river basins, satellite slots
Prediction: More actors (usually) make it HARDER to reach agreement
Types of actors also matter: is problem due to states, corporations, individuals, society? Relationship of gov’t to actor causing problem.

9. Uncertainty Behavior of Others
Can victim tell what perpetrator is doing?
Does technology offer promise or does transparency require their cooperation?
Harder: military problems, NTBs, human rights, corruption
Easier: tariffs, satellite orbits, radio spectrum, climate change
Prediction: behavioral uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

10. Uncertainty State of World
What are consequences of individual or collective actions
Scientific knowledge
Harder: environmental problems, health problems
Easier: trade, arms control
Prediction: state of world uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

11. Uncertainty Preferences of Others
Does each side know preferences of other?
Are domestic politics obvious to others?
Harder: non-democracies, monetary policies, environmental policy, divided domestic politics
Easier: health policy, air traffic control
Prediction: preferences uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

12. Norms Is the issue itself normative at all?
No: communication, trade VS.
Yes: environment, human rights
Are states trying to change existing norms or reinforce them?
Reinforce: trade (today) VS.
Change: environmental protection, new human rights
Who/how many support new norm?
Prediction: institutions EASIER to create when consistent with existing norms

13. Broader context Regional variation Time variation
Degree of interdependence, shared values, etc.
Time variation
Cold War, end of Cold War, War on Terror
Linkage of issue with other issues
Trade as one issue vs. not
Sustainable development

14. My take on Institutional Formation
My structure
Bring in Young/Osherenko ideas and Koremenos et al. ideas

15. Review of Variables
Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values)
Values: what a variable varies between
E.g.,
Variable: color
Values: ROYGBIV
DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain
IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

16. Review: DVs for the Course
Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it
DVs for the course
Whether institution forms or not
What are the features of the institution
Behavior of states

17. Institutional formation
Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution?
Variable: institutional formation
Values: yes or no
IVs: features of problem structure

18. Institutional Formation
States do NOT always create solution to problems
Four assumptions of institutional design
States are rational
Future gains are large enough to support cooperation
International institutions are costly
States are risk averse
Two obstacles to formation: distribution / enforcement

19. When do states create international institutions?
Institutions form when powerful actors responsible for a problem become convinced that a situation is suboptimal and that taking action to resolve it is in their interests
Conflict that involves deadlock: no institutions
Exogenous shocks or crises
Shared concern re: problem and need for action
Leadership matters
Contextual factors also matter

20. Theoretical predictions Hardest to Easiest, and Why
Deadlock: no relevant actors see a problem needing fixing
Upstream/downstream: getting upstream state to join
Normative: getting states one wants to influence to join
Collaboration: distribution AND enforcement problems
Positive externalities plagued by incapacity: convincing capable states to contribute Coordination problems: hard distribution problems
Epistemic: coordinating and standardizing research

21. Institutional Design Institutional type Membership Primary rule system
Information system
Response system

22. Institutional type
Let’s make some predictions

23. Institutional type Regulatory Procedural Programmatic Generative
Coordination, collaboration, and upstream/downstream problems
Procedural
Epistemic/knowledge problems
Programmatic
Positive externalities plagued by incapacities
Generative
Normative problems

24. Membership
Capacity issues: if some actors can prevent others from bad behavior, membership limited to capable
Limit membership if enforcement problems and uncertainty about preferences
Inclusive membership if distribution problems or symmetric problems

25. Primary rule system Ambitiousness Basic type of rules
Vague/specific
Depth of cooperation
Basic type of rules
Proscriptions/prescriptions
Incentive issues
Capacity issues
Scope: broad/narrow
Common vs. differentiated obligations

26. Information system Strength of information system
Strong: collaboration, up/down, normative, and low inherent transparency
Weak: coordination, high inherent transparency
Type of information system
Centralized?
Self-reporting / monitoring / verification
Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how is info to be used

27. Response system Response strategies
Altering consequences
Deterrence: increase expected costs of violation
Remuneration: increase expected benefits of compliance
Altering opportunities
Generative: create new opportunities to comply
Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate
Altering perceptions
Cognitive: provide new information that changes perception of best choice
Normative: re-educate regarding values
Reciprocity of response: diffuse / specific
Strictness of response: violation tolerance
Sources of “institutional crises”
Enforcement school vs. management school: what is “behavioral model” and how does response play