1. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS Safety and Environmental Analysis presented by Neill P. Taylor EURATOM/UKAEA Fusion Association Culham Science Centre Work performed by EURATOM Associations and European industry, including: ENEA, UKAEA, VR Studsvik, FZK, TEKES EFET-Belgatom, EFET-Framatome ANP, EFET-Ibertef, University of Pisa

2. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Outline Neutron activation calculations Neutron activation calculations Accident analyses Accident analyses Bounding accident modelling Bounding accident modelling Maximum public doses Maximum public doses Waste categorisation Waste categorisation Conclusions Conclusions

3. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Neutron activation modelling Complete knowledge of activation and related quantities essential for S&E assessment Complete knowledge of activation and related quantities essential for S&E assessment –source term for potential release in accident scenarios –origin of occupational radiation exposure –long-term activation and waste management issues Computation for all PPCS models using 3-D geometry Computation for all PPCS models using 3-D geometry –MCNP4C3 calculations of 175-group neutron spectra in all cells of 3-D model out to TF coils –FISPACT calculation of inventories, activation and derived quantities (dose rates, decay heat, clearance index etc.) in every cellin every cell at various decay times up to 10,000 yearsat various decay times up to 10,000 years –Calculations supervised by in-house code system HERCULES

4. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Geometry of activation models Divertor regions represented only by homogenised composition ABCD

5. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Assumed operation history for activation 2.5 years at full power, then 2 months for divertor replacement 2.5 years at full power, then 2 months for divertor replacement Further 2.5 years full power, then 10 months blanket + divertor replacement Further 2.5 years full power, then 10 months blanket + divertor replacement Repeated 5 times (25 full-power years total) Repeated 5 times (25 full-power years total)

6. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Model B activation - inboard midplane

7. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Model B activation - poloidal variation

8. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo First wall (outboard) activation - all models

9. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Accident sequence analyses Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FFMEA) used to identify sequences for study Functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FFMEA) used to identify sequences for study –functional breakdown of plant –loss of functions identified : Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) –PIEs grouped according to type and their impact Four scenarios selected for deterministic analyses: Four scenarios selected for deterministic analyses: –ex-vessel LOCA –ex-vessel LOCA leading to in-vessel LOCA –loss of coolant flow, no plasma shutdown, leading to in-vessel LOCA –loss of heat sink, no plasma shutdown

10. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Assumed source terms for accident analyses

11. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Outline of confinement schemes Model AModel B

12. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Codes used for accident analyses

13. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Accident analyses - example of results Model A ex-vessel LOCA Model A ex-vessel LOCA

14. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Accident analyses - example of results Model A ex-vessel / in-vessel LOCA Model A ex-vessel / in-vessel LOCA

15. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Loss of flow / ex-vessel LOCA Pressure in vacuum vessel Pressure in vacuum vessel ECART results for Model B MELCOR results for Model C

16. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Release from loss of flow / ex-vessel LOCA Plant Model B Plant Model B

17. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Assumptions in bounding accident modelling Complete loss of all coolant from every loop in the plant Complete loss of all coolant from every loop in the plant –all first walls, blankets, divertors, shields, vacuum vessel –loss is instantaneous No operation of any active safety system for indefinite period No operation of any active safety system for indefinite period Heat rejection is only by passive transport: Heat rejection is only by passive transport: –conduction through layers of material and radiation across gaps Very conservative assumptions Very conservative assumptions –to ensure result is bounding –assumptions may be non-physical or contradictory

18. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Calculation methods for bounding accidents Full 3-D models (or 2-D with toroidal symmetry) Full 3-D models (or 2-D with toroidal symmetry) Automated coupling of codes (HERCULES) Automated coupling of codes (HERCULES) Activation and related quantities computed in all cells of model Activation and related quantities computed in all cells of model Temperature histories in postulated total loss of active cooling Temperature histories in postulated total loss of active cooling 3-D neutronic model (MCNP4C) Activation calcs. in all cells (FISPACT) 2-D finite element thermal models (COSMOS/M) Mobilisation (APMOB) Source termsRelease, dispersion and dose calcs. HERCULES These steps were performed for Models A and B only.

19. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Bounding accident temperature distributions after 100 days Plant Model BPlant Model D

20. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo First wall decay heat - all models

21. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Bounding accident first wall temperatures

22. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Bounding accident peak temperatures

23. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Release from bounding accidents Assumed mobilised source term: Assumed mobilised source term: –1kg in-vessel tritium (as HTO) –10 kg dust (7.6 kg steel, 2.4 kg tungsten) –500g activated corrosion products (Plant Model A only) –volatilised activated structure as computed by APMOB (based on empirical data from INEEL tests) Confinement and aerosol modelling using FUSCON Confinement and aerosol modelling using FUSCON

24. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Dispersion and dose Dispersion and dose calculations using COSYMA Dispersion and dose calculations using COSYMA –results from 95% percentile point on real weather distributions based on Karlsruhe, Germany –10m release height –dose commitment to Most Exposed Individual at 1km site boundary in 7-day exposure

25. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Maximum 7-day doses to MEI Compare with target of 50 mSv maximum (trigger for public evacuation according to IAEA guidelines) Compare with target of 50 mSv maximum (trigger for public evacuation according to IAEA guidelines)

26. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Occupational Safety Largest ORE doses predicted for water-cooled Plant Model A Largest ORE doses predicted for water-cooled Plant Model A –(but no new detailed study) Study of ORE from fuel cycle system Study of ORE from fuel cycle system –vacuum pumping system largest potential contributor

27. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Effluents from normal operation Earlier SEAFP results re-assessed for PPCS Power Plant Earlier SEAFP results re-assessed for PPCS Power Plant Maximum public doses μSv/year

28. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Categorisation of active material Summation of all active material from plant, including Summation of all active material from plant, including –blanket and divertor replacements during operation –all fixed components at end-of life Categories adopted as in earlier SEAFP studies: Categories adopted as in earlier SEAFP studies: –Clearance according to IAEA recommendations (1996) –non-cleared material assessed for recycling suitability on radiological criteria: –Limits for complex (remote handling) recycling now believed to be very conservative

29. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS Plant Model A

30. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS Plant Model B

31. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS Plant Model C

32. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS Plant Model D

33. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo Categorisation of waste - summary No No permanent disposal waste after 100 years –result holds for all power plant designs and variants –except when TZM molybdenum alloy used in divertor (reminder of importance of materials selection) Recycling of fusion material seems possible on radiological grounds Recycling of fusion material seems possible on radiological grounds But there are other factors But there are other factors –Will there be feasible recycling operations for the relevant materials? –Will the processing be economically viable? Proper evaluation of potential for recycling is essential Proper evaluation of potential for recycling is essential

34. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS overall conclusions on S&E (1) The broad features of all the safety and environmental conclusions of earlier studies have been sustained, and demonstrated with increased confidence and understanding. The broad features of all the safety and environmental conclusions of earlier studies have been sustained, and demonstrated with increased confidence and understanding. If a total loss of active cooling were to occur during the burn, the plasma would switch off passively and any temperature increase due to residual decay heat cannot lead to melting of the structures. This result is achieved without any reliance on active safety systems or operator actions. If a total loss of active cooling were to occur during the burn, the plasma would switch off passively and any temperature increase due to residual decay heat cannot lead to melting of the structures. This result is achieved without any reliance on active safety systems or operator actions. The maximum radiological doses - assessed with deliberate pessimism - to the public arising from the most severe conceivable accident driven by in-plant energies would be below the level at which evacuation would be considered and needed and would not be much greater than typical annual doses from natural causes. This result also is achieved without reliance on active safety systems or operator actions. The maximum radiological doses - assessed with deliberate pessimism - to the public arising from the most severe conceivable accident driven by in-plant energies would be below the level at which evacuation would be considered and needed and would not be much greater than typical annual doses from natural causes. This result also is achieved without reliance on active safety systems or operator actions.

35. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS overall conclusions on S&E (2) Confinement damage by an extremely rare (hypothetical) ultra- energetic ex-plant event, such as an earthquake of hitherto never experienced magnitude, would, on pessimistic assumptions, give rise to health effects smaller than the typical consequences of the external hazard itself. On realistic assumptions the maximum dose would be lower, and this very hypothetical scenario could be removed by design provision: essentially, this would be an economic issue. Confinement damage by an extremely rare (hypothetical) ultra- energetic ex-plant event, such as an earthquake of hitherto never experienced magnitude, would, on pessimistic assumptions, give rise to health effects smaller than the typical consequences of the external hazard itself. On realistic assumptions the maximum dose would be lower, and this very hypothetical scenario could be removed by design provision: essentially, this would be an economic issue.

36. Japan/US workshop on Fusion Power Plants, with EU participation, 11-13 January 2005, Tokyo PPCS overall conclusions on S&E (3) The radiotoxicity of the materials decays relatively rapidly – very rapidly at first and broadly by a factor ten thousand over a hundred years. The radiotoxicity of the materials decays relatively rapidly – very rapidly at first and broadly by a factor ten thousand over a hundred years. Much of this material, after an adequate decay time, falls to levels so low that it could be cleared from regulatory control. Other material could be recycled or reused in further fusion power plant construction, with no need for repository disposal. Thus the activated material from fusion power stations would not constitute a waste management burden for future generations. The decision on whether to actually recycle the recyclable material is a matter for future generations to determine, possibly on economic criteria. Much of this material, after an adequate decay time, falls to levels so low that it could be cleared from regulatory control. Other material could be recycled or reused in further fusion power plant construction, with no need for repository disposal. Thus the activated material from fusion power stations would not constitute a waste management burden for future generations. The decision on whether to actually recycle the recyclable material is a matter for future generations to determine, possibly on economic criteria.