1. Trust and Distrust in International Relations
Dr. Vincent Charles Keating
Center for War Studies
University of Southern Denmark
1 February 2018

2. Introduction The role of ideas in social science What is “trust”?
Common usage of words
Social science usage of words
What is “trust”?
How/Why do we “trust”?
How can we tell when others are trusting?
How does trust matter for international politics?

3. What is Trust? Three models of trust in social science Rational model
Psychological model
Social model

4. Rational Trust
Trust is ‘a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation.’ (Kydd 2005, 3)
Is a rational prediction about the nature or characteristics of the other state based on information
To trust, we must observing others in the world, calculating:
The potential benefits of agreements/cooperation
The potential costs of the other state’s defection
The probability that the other state will cooperate (not defect)

5. Rational Trust
To put it into a formula, states will trust when 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0 where
B = benefit to successful cooperation
L = loss to the other side defecting
p = the probability of them cooperation and not defecting
If result not greater than zero, then no cooperation/ agreement will occur
One state will not trust in the other

6. High Trust
With very high trust, you will cooperate even if the benefits are low compared to the costs
Will you let your best friend take care of your dog?
𝐵 = 10
𝐿 = 5000
𝑝=0.999
𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0?
10(0.999)−5000(0.001)>0?
9.99−5>0?
IR example: Should Denmark share military capabilities with Norway?

7. Low Trust
With very low trust, you will not cooperate even if the benefits are high compared to the costs
Will you do something minor for the promise of large compensation from a compulsive liar?
𝐵=1000
𝐿=2
𝑝=0.001
𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0?
1000(0.001)−2(0.999)>0?
1−1.998>0? No, so you will not cooperate
IR Example: Should the North Korea sign a cultural exchange agreement with the United States?

8. Determining p How do we know what the probability p is?
Bayesian method
Start with an estimate (𝑝=0.5)
Calculate if you want to interact
If 𝐵 𝑝 −𝐿 1−𝑝 >0 , then interact, see if they cooperate or defect
If not, then do nothing, and estimate stays the same (𝑝=0.5)
Revise that estimate upwards (𝑝=0.7) if they cooperate or downwards (𝑝=0.3) if the defect
Repeat the process with new p value

9. Rational Trust Based on a calculation of
Benefits and losses for cooperation
Probability that the other will cooperate and not defect
Probability of cooperation/defection based on iterative Bayesian method
More interaction = better estimate of true p for every state

10. Implicit Rational Trust Models

11. Implicit Rational Trust Models

12. Psychological Trust
All leaders of states have general propensity to trust or not – called ‘generalised trust.’
Is ‘moralistic,’ based on the assessment of the general benevolent character of the other
Not just an assessment of the others’ interests like in rational trust
Two types of people in the world
Generalized trusters
Generalized distrusters
IR Example: Difference between Democrats and Republicans in the Iranian nuclear deal

13. Social Trust Clusters around a four ideas
Social factors are important for developing trusting relationships
Trust as a response to preexisting norms of reciprocity
Trust in relation to other preexisting norms
Trust itself as a type of habitual norm

14. Rational versus Social Trust
Rational trust: a belief that the other side is trustworthy
Social trust: a special relationship that cognitively reduces or eliminates risk
Trusting relationship allows states to set aside existing risk in favour of assumption that agreement will hold
Where possible, trusting relationships become habitual, not calculative
Social connections allow actors to ‘overdraw’ on information
IR example: Security relationship between Denmark and Sweden

15. Hedging and Trust
How can we tell if a relationship is trusting or not?
Trusting relationships can be indicated by the reduction or elimination in hedging strategies
Paying a cost in the present that you believe will reduce a future cost (aka buying the tank)

16. Hedging and Trust Purpose of hedging in international relations
Reduces vulnerability
Self-insurance against defection
We can see the direction of the trusting/distrusting relationship by looking at changes in hedging policies
When states are in habitual trusting relationships, they do not perceive the risk, so they do not hedge
IR Example: Canada/US security relationship

17. Research Example 1: Trust and NATO
How can NATO help to build trust among member states?
Alliances
Create basic new relationship of recognition between distrusting states (they are allies) with important responsibilities
Keep feuding states together institutionally: exiters have the alliance set against them
Trust created by continued engagement in the alliance, particularly during times of crisis

18. Research Example II: Small State Influence in Alliances
Why do big states come to the aid of small states?
Expanded domain of trust through over-commitment
Danish-US relationship and the 2005 cartoons crisis
Denmark had ‘gone beyond the call of duty’ in their military support for US wars
Created expanded form of reciprocity outside of strict NATO commitments
Allowed Denmark to successfully appeal to US to intervene on its behalf during the crisis

19. Research Example III: NGOs and Accountability Measures
Do accountability measures help to build donor trust in NGOs?
Rational model – yes: provides more information
Social model – sometimes create distrust
NGOs rely on social bond of shared commitment to a cause to create trusting relationships
These can be habitual – individual donors might not think about defection
Forced accountability measures can disrupt these habitual relationships
Examples from experimental psychology literature