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Prasad Narayana, Yao Zhao, Yan Chen, Judy Fu (Motorola Labs)
Vulnerabilities Prasad Narayana, Yao Zhao, Yan Chen, Judy Fu (Motorola Labs) Northwestern Lab for Internet and Security Technology (LIST) Lab for Internet & Security Tech, Northwestern Univ.
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Project Objective Study the system specifications with the goal of identifying any security vulnerability present in various functions/ processes documented. Report any discovered vulnerability along with any proposed solutions. Change the circle
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Project Tasks Study of 802.16 (2004) Specifications
Discovery of security vulnerability (ies) (If practical) Simulation of vulnerability situation (s) Proposal of solution (s)
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Vulnerabilities discovered
Initial Ranging based Denial-of-Service attack Service Interruption/ Denial-of-Service attack using TEK invalid message vulnerability Talk about outline
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Initial Ranging based Denial-of-Service attack
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What can an attacker do? If successful, the attacker can deny all Subscriber Stations, serviced by a BS within one of its sectors, entry into the network to send and receive user data
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Network Entry and Synchronization
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Initial ranging process
BS allocates contention-based initial ranging slots Entering SS waits for its transmission opportunity and sends range request BS evaluates ranging parameters and sends its response If all is well, SS moves onto the next step, else it continues the ranging process till it has fine tuned all parameters.
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Frame Structure
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Attack Procedure (1) Rogue SS adjusts its ranging parameters
Communication link between BS and its SS is brought down (e.g.: thru jamming) Rogue SS waits for contention-based initial ranging slot announcement by the BS Rogue SS sends a valid RNG-REQ message at every transmission opportunity of the initial ranging slot Talk about outline
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Attack Procedure (2) 4.Normal SSs detect collision whenever they attempt to send their RNG-REQ and hence, back off each time 5.This continues until the normal SS has exhausted ranging attempts in all valid channels, in the end, reports MAC initialization error
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Limitations of the Attack
Need to modify the MAC To ignore the requirements of exponential back-off algorithm and transmit data in each transmission opportunity Need tools for jamming Need to fine tune the parameters Much harder for OFDMA as it uses many ranging codes
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Attack Detection Not straightforward
Need sophisticated detection mechanism based on data patterns from normal network behavior As with other detection schemes, may not be always accurate
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Service Interruption/ Denial-of-Service attack using TEK invalid message vulnerability
Measuring the distance to landmarks, then estimate the distance between two nodes
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What can an attacker do? If successful, the attacker can either severely disrupt communication between an SS and BS or totally deny the SS a chance to communicate with the BS.
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Authorization State Machine of PKM protocol
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TEK State Machine of PKM protocol
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TEK invalid message properties
BS sends a TEK invalid message to an SS when it cannot decrypt an encrypted data frame sent by the SS TEK invalid is unsolicited TEK invalid is authenticated with the use of HMAC-Digest TEK invalid message content may not change for a given SA session when AK and CID do not change
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State diagram for the attack
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Limitations of the Attack
Capability to inject messages both in uplink and downlink. The messages injected should be capable of both overriding and corrupting valid messages coming from valid sources Spoof packets Can only attack one SS at a time
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Attack Detection Stealthier than ranging based attack, hence harder to detect Need sophisticated detection mechanism based on data patterns from normal network behavior
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Backup slides
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OFDM frame structure Build virtual coordinates and define a special distance metric
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OFDMA frame structure with ranging sub-channel
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TEK invalid message structure
|AB| <= |AL| + |BL| L->C
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