1. What can you remember about Emotivism?

2. So what do moral statements do?
Ayer (Emotivism): Moral judgements express positive or negative emotions
Importantly - They are not true or false!
“X is good” = “X hurrah!”
“X is bad” = “X boo!”
Abortion hurrah!
Abortion boo!

3. Emotivism Vs Subjectivism
Important – don’t confuse with subjectivism!
Subjectivism: Moral statements report feelings or opinions, and are therefore factual and can be true or false. My statement of “Murder is wrong” is true to me because that’s what I think.
Emotivism: moral statements express feelings, and are therefore non- factual and can’t be true or false. “Murder is wrong” just means “Boo murder!” and there is nothing true or false about this. It’s similar to me cheering at a football goal – how could you describe that act as true or false?

4. C. L. Stevenson’s addition to emotivism:
Moral statements also have a social function
They attempt to arouse similar feelings in others and get them to act accordingly. They have a persuasive force, similar to an argument.
Abortion boo!
You abortion boo too!

5. Starting Point: Prescriptivism
Like Emotivists, Prescriptivists believe:
Values are not types of facts. They cannot be true or false (non- cognitive).
Moral judgements do not state moral facts about the world (anti- realist).
Moral discourse is therefore not informative or descriptive. It’s not about the facts of the world.
They also make use of the Open Question argument highlighted by Moore to demonstrate that no definition of ‘good’ is adequate.

6. What’s in a name?: Prescriptivism
Where Prescriptivists differ from Emotivists is what they think moral statements do.
If a doctor gives you a prescription, what is he intending?
For Prescriptivists, moral statements are not just expressions of emotions, but commands or recommendations related to behaviour.

7. “The function of moral principles is to guide conduct”
R. M. Hare
“The function of moral principles is to guide conduct”

8. Prescriptivism Non-cognitivist Anti-realist
Moral judgements prescribe, which means they guide action or make recommendations
Anti-realist
Agrees with Moore that naturalism is wrong to say moral statements just describe: they also express something.
They don’t attempt to persuade or influence (as emotivism claims): they are commands, moral imperatives to act.
Different to Ayer: they don’t express emotions.

9. Prescriptivism – 2 Uses of Moral Language
Imperatives to act – Most common terms are ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Using moral language like this implies that someone should do something or act in a particular way. For example ‘Eating meat is wrong’ entails the imperative ‘Don’t eat meat’. If you accept the moral judgement then you will act accordingly. This means if you ask ‘should I eat meat?’, and I answer ‘eating meat is wrong’, I have answered your question.
Stealing is wrong.
Helping the homeless is the right thing to do.
You are doing the right thing in saving those animals.
Why would you defend that man? It’s wrong!
What imperatives are contained in the following moral judgements?

10. Prescriptivism – 2 Uses of Moral Language
Value Judgements – Most common terms include ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Using moral language like this is intended to commend or criticize something. Although this commendation is not explicit about what we should do, it does serve as guidance for our choices later. So when I say ‘Ameerah is a good student’ I am commending Ameerah for something that she has done and implying she should probably continue to do it in future.

11. Quick Summary So Far…
Term’s like ‘ought’ / ‘should’ / ‘right’ – prescribe By using these terms we are stating that someone should be behaving in a particular way.
Terms like ‘good’ / ‘bad’ – commend. By using this term we want to identify something or someone as praiseworthy.
Either way our words are intended to guide / command someone’s behaviour.

12. Looking a little bit closer at ‘Good’
This difference between describing and commending is what Hare thinks Hume got right with his Is-Ought gap and Moore got right with the naturalistic fallacy.
Moral judgements are very different types of thing than factual statements about the world, they operate in a different way and are intended to do something different. Realists (naturalists in particular) are wrong to claim them as simple facts.
By commending something we are making a value judgement, we are saying the thing we are commending is praiseworthy in some way.
This is different from describing something – Suppose I say ‘This is a good strawberry, because it is sweet and juicy’. If we think ‘good’ as applied to strawberries is just a matter of whether they have particular qualities (sweet and juicy) then all I have said is ‘This is a sweet and juicy strawberry because it is sweet and juicy’.
But this does not seem to be what I mean when referring to the strawberry as ‘good’, I am not merely describing some extra quality it has instead I am commending it for having particular qualities.

13. But there is more to ‘Good’
‘Good’ is not just a term of praise however for Hare. He argues that when we call something good there is a set of standards that we are implicitly judging it against.
What standards do you think we might use to judge:
Good chocolate?
Good teachers?
Good musicians?
Good people?
For Hare, a good person (as in morally ‘good’) is just someone who is the way we think we ought to be as people. They have achieved a standard that we consider to be important.
These standards though are not absolute, they’re not something that everyone has access to and should follow (as a virtue ethicist might claim) instead we have to adopt them. Your idea of a ‘good’, commendable person might be different to mine.

14. Finally…
Since, in describing something as good, I am appealing to a particular set of standards, it would be illogical if I had two identical things to call one ‘good’ and the other ‘not good’. Either they both achieve the standards, or neither does. If I say one chocolate is good and the other is not, I must be appealing to some key difference between the two. This also extends to moral imperatives – terms like right and wrong are intended to guide someone towards a particular standard. Two actions, in similar circumstances must both therefore be right or wrong. To have one right and the other wrong, with no relevant difference between the two would be odd and contradictory. Hare says we must therefore be willing to ‘universalise’ our moral judgements.

15. Quick Check So Far…
What do prescriptivists think are the two key uses of moral judgements?
How do we judge whether something is good or not according to prescriptivists?
Why does Hare think we should be able to ‘Universalise’ our judgements?

16. Key Points…
When we use moral language (e.g. say: ‘giving to charity is right / good’) we are either giving a command (e.g. ‘you should give to charity’) or commending something.
We also assume a set of standards by which that thing / action would be judged e.g. Charity supports others, this is something we should want.
Because of these standards, our moral judgements for similar situations should be the same. Otherwise we’re contradicting ourselves.
The distinctive feature of moral principles is that we follow and make them consistently, and our principles don’t contradict each other.

17. Emotivism Vs Prescriptivism
There is a key difference in the way emotivism sees moral language as an attempt to influence others, whereas prescriptivism sees it as guiding action. So for emotivists, if Theresa May tells us 'it is wrong to join terrorist organisations fighting in other countries' then she is trying to affect our attitudes and behaviour so that we don't join a terrorist organisations. It is the equivalent of a persuasive argument. But, for the prescriptivist the essence of moral language is not to influence but to guide: May is actually saying 'Do not join terrorist organisations'. Presumably some persuasion is also needed.
The emotivist doesn't think Theresa has much more to add, as for them ethical language is non-rational. The words are meaningless so any discussion is about the facts rather than the judgements.
Hare’s prescriptivism accounts for our expectation that Theresa would be able to offer reasons for her instruction, and be able to enter into a discussion with us about these reasons.

18. Quick Check
According to prescriptivism, what would be meant by these moral statements?:
Happiness is good.
Killing is wrong
It is right to make charitable donations.
Drinking and driving is bad.
Helping someone cheat is not a good thing.

19. What does Hare mean by the claim that moral statements are prescriptive (3 marks)?
What’s the difference between prescribing and persuading?
Extra: How might the universalisability aspect allow for moral reasoning (where Ayer’s emotivism couldn’t)?

20. Moral Reasoning
Although I can’t reason about my purely emotive expressions (emotivism) being able to universalise moral principles means being able to give reasons as to why they are logically consistent:
For example: Singer argues there is no relevant difference between hurting animals and hurting humans, therefore both are wrong. We can discuss this, say the prescriptivists, because we can look for that very difference between the two.

21. Moral Reasoning
We can also infer prescriptions from other prescriptions. An argument against abortion using ‘Abortion is wrong’ as the moral judgement could be phrased using prescriptive imperatives: “Do not take human life. Abortion is taking human life. Therefore do not commit abortion.” To reject the conclusion requires that we reject one of the earlier premises. Since in cases like this our prescriptions are logically related to one another it means we can use reason to discuss these relations.
These things combined allow the prescriptivist to have meaningful ethical discussions, despite holding a non-cognitive, anti-realist view.

22. Summary – Prescriptivist Moral Language…
It is used to commend, to provide guidance for choosing what to do.
It assumes a set of standards, features in virtue of which something counts as e.g. good / bad / right / wrong etc.
These standards are moral standards but they are adopted, rather than being true or false.
Two relevantly similar things must both be good / bad / right / wrong etc. or not. To think otherwise is logically contradictory.
When we engage in ethical discourse we are attempting to show that our own prescriptions are consistent (not logically contradictory), are the best standards for that situation, and follow from any other relevant prescriptions.

23. Advantages over emotivism?
Also non-cognitivist – No odd moral properties to explain.
Stronger than emotivism – Moral statements are not just expressions of emotions, but are rational. Explains why we give reasons for them, and can have moral debates.
How important are each of these points? Pick a phrase and say why.
Crucial - Significant - Valuable but not essential to an explanation of moral language - Seemingly important, but actually not so - Irrelevant

24. Do moral statements involve something other than commands?

25. Criticism 1 Geoffrey Warnock
Not all moral language involves prescriptions or commands!
We may use moral terms to undertake, implore, resolve, confess etc.
Response
This is not what Hare means
Prescriptivism intends to stress that all moral language has some commitment to action. Usually this is a command or commendation but not always.
Accepting a principle means acting in a certain way, if a situation arises in which that action is relevant.

26. Criticism 2
Universalisabilty tries to explain rationality of morality, but it is flawed. The problem is, Hare focuses on form rather than content, he thinks anything is a valid moral view as long as it can be universalised. There is nothing out there in the world that can be used as a measure of our prescriptions. What problems does this present?

27. Criticism 2
First, there are trivial prescriptions that could be universalised (such as, 'It would be good to always tie my left shoe before my right). As we saw with Kant’s categorical imperative, although such statements are prescriptions, and are universalisable, they don’t seem to be moral imperatives.
Secondly, and more importantly, Hare allows prescriptions that emerge from a fanatic culture that we would want to condemn.
Prescriptivism appears to say that so long as people are consistent in putting forward horrific judgements then their consistency makes the judgement a moral one.

28. What does this all mean?
Both of these cases undermine Hare's claim that he has shown how prescriptivism retains the rationality of moral discussion. It turns out that universalisability isn't enough to save moral argument, as you might universalise a prescription that I disagree with ('Eating meat is right'), and I might universalise a judgement that you disagree with ('Eating meat is wrong') and we want a successful moral theory to be able to show how we can have this disagreement in a way that doesn’t just come down to a difference of opinion.

29. Cognitivism Vs Non-Cognitivism
Whilst we’ve seen some issues with Cognitivism, the opposition also suffers some problems: Cognitivists, because they think morality describes something in the world, do give us a foundation to argue from; but non-cognitivists, including prescriptivists, find it difficult to give independent grounds that we can both appeal to, and so we may end up agreeing to disagree, or drifting towards relativism. This is an unappealing position to end up in, as it leaves no room to question the morality of particular socially accepted practices and no way to explain the possibility of moral progress.

30. One paragraph
Weigh up the advantages and criticisms of prescriptivism to come to a conclusion about whether it shows that moral language simply expresses prescriptions.

31. What is meant by the term ethical naturalism? (3 marks)
What does it mean to say an ethical theory is realist? (3 marks)
Briefly explain Hare’s prescriptivism. (5 marks)
Explain what Mackie means by the ‘queerness’ of ethical properties. (5 marks)
Outline Moore’s open question argument for non-naturalism. (5 marks)
Compare and contrast emotivism and prescriptivism. (12 marks)
Do moral terms refer to the world? (25 marks)

32. Emotivism
What is it?
Prescriptivism
What is it?
Arguments for:
Arguments for:
Arguments against:
Arguments against:

33. Ethical Non-Naturalism
Ethical Naturalism
What is it?
Ethical Non-Naturalism
What is it?
Error Theory
What is it?
Arguments for:
Arguments for:
Arguments for:
Arguments against:
Arguments against:
Arguments against: