1. Moral Sense Theory

2. “Scottish Enlightenment”
18th-Century philosophers
Francis Hutcheson
David Hume
Adam Smith

3. Hutcheson
In addition to 5 senses we’re familiar with, Hutcheson posits others:
Self-perception
Sense of beauty
Sense of the ridiculous
Sense of honor
Public sense
Moral sense

4. Hutcheson
Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”

5. Hutcheson
Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”
Contrasts with 16th-Century idea of Thomas Hobbes – we only act on self-interest

6. Hutcheson
Public sense - a natural “determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery”
Contrasts with 16th-Century idea of Thomas Hobbes – we only act on self-interest
Benevolence cannot be reduced to self-interest

7. Hutcheson
Moral sense - natural faculty “by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others”

8. Hutcheson
Moral sense - natural faculty “by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others”
Distinction between good and bad discovered by our emotional responses to experience

9. Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections.
Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections.
Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason.

10. Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections.
Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections.
Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason.
Follows Hutcheson: Moral judgments arise from our sentiments.

11. Hume Moral judgments have an influence on our actions and affections.
Conclusions of reason can never, by themselves, influence our actions or affections.
Therefore, moral judgments are not conclusions of reason.
Follows Hutcheson: Moral judgments arise from our sentiments.
“When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”

12. Hume
“Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas

13. Hume
“Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas
Nevertheless, moral sense theory shows us how to adopt “rules” which facilitate social living

14. Hume
“Is-Ought” gap – contrasts with Kant, Bentham, Mill, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas
Nevertheless, moral sense theory shows us how to adopt “rules” which facilitate social living
Justice
Property
Virtue

15. Hume
Many virtues are artificial, but sympathy and benevolence are natural
Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel some propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if everything else be equal.”

16. Smith Friend of and collaborator with Hume
Two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

17. Smith
Like Hume, influenced by Hutcheson; emphasizes role of sentiment

18. Smith Like Hume, influenced by Hutcheson; emphasizes role of sentiment
But:
Disagrees with Hutcheson about a specific “moral sense”; stresses sympathy

19. Smith
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

20. Smith
“Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance

21. Smith
“Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance
Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others

22. Smith
“Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance
Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others
Form moral habits from attempts to secure mutual sympathy

23. Smith
“Impartial Spectator” – how we imagine others to be perceiving and feeling about their circumstance
Can apply to self-monitoring as well – and we want to be thought well of by others
Form moral habits from attempts to secure mutual sympathy
Just as we naturally seek trade, we naturally seek mutual approval and sympathy