1. Chapter 7: The Operational Dimension

2. Contents of Chapter 7: (Introduction of Military Interventions)
Preventive Operations
Planning for Military Intervention
Carrying Out Military Intervention
Following Up Military Intervention
A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations

3. Introduction 7.1: Military Intervention is different from:
Warfighting
Traditional Peacekeeping Operations
7.2: Requires more ‘robust’ action than the Traditional Peacekeeping
7.3: Military Intervention = the Last Resort

4. Preventive Operations
7.4: Two Categories of Preventive Military Operations
First is: ‘’Preventive Deployment’’
(7.5): Example of ‘’Preventive Deployment’’ =
UNPREDEP in Macedonia ( )
(7.6): Second is: Deployed resources without actual intervention on the territory
7.7: IF both 1 and 2 fail then they may be turned into an Intervention Tool to begin Military Interventions

5. Planning for Military Intervention
7.8: Careful advance planning is required:
Military preventative actions
Post-conflict operations
Coalition Building:
7.9: Multinational Coalitions have disadvantages and must be prepared for them
7.10: UNITAF, UNOSOM I, NATO, UNFROFOR, etc.
7.11: Common political resolve and common political military approach
7.12: Greatly important to stress BOTH

6. Contintued... Planning for Military Intervention
Objectives:
7.13: ‘’coalition partners may well have different ideas about the objectives through intervention action.’’
7.14: ‘’Differences in objectives often emerge in discussion over the ‘exit strategy’.’’

7. Contintued... Planning for Military Intervention
Mandate:
7.15: Clear and unambiguous mandate = Most important requirement
7.16: Objective of Mandate = military commanders understanding their mission
7.17: Mandates will inevitably need to be adjusted to meet new demands during intervention

8. Contintued... Planning for Military Intervention
Resources and Commitment:
7.18: Careful preparation of required resources
7.19: Level of Resources, Broad international support

9. Carrying Out Military Intervention
Command Structure:
7.20: Unity of command is essential for the successful conduct of operations
7.21: Tight Political Control with Clear Objectives

10. Continued… Carrying Out Military Intervention
Civil-Military Relations:
7.22: Tensions usually arise between collaboration of Military Forces, Civilian Authorities, and Humanitarian Agencies
7.23: Dedicated humanitarian organizations
7.24: Required military force may sometimes make it impossible for humanitarian workers to help
7.25: Attempts of Coordination, can also create additional turmoil

11. Continued… Carrying Out Military Intervention
Applying Force:
7.30: The strategy of Surprise; not always possible
7.31: Amount of military power, ‘’The operation is not war but an operation to protect populations’’
7.32: Compensation for disadvantages must be focused on during the beginning planning stages

12. Continued… Carrying Out Military Intervention
Casualties:
7.33: Casualities caused by lost purpose of Responsibility to Protect Humanitarian Interests
7.34: Defense from intervening force is Important, but Should Not Be the Principle Objective

13. Continued… Carrying Out Military Intervention
Media Relations:
7. 35: Media will expose and give worldwide criticism to anyone that attempts to excessively use overwhelming military power
7.36: Media has an impact on enforcement and public support therefore, deadly force must be used at a tolerated level
7.37: Planning for Operation to Protect should include detailed sub-concept for public information

14. Following Up Military Intervention
Transfer of Authority
7.38: Main Mission = to provide the safe environment necessary for the restoration of good governance and law
7.39: Transition of Responsibility from Military Authorities to the Civilian Authorities as soon as possible

15. Continued… Following Up Military Intervention
Peacekeeping and Peace Building
7.40: Post-intervention requirement to remain engaged to sustain the peace and stability
7.41: Internal security challenge remaining = ‘’old’’ habits will return + immediate aftermaths spawn:
Organized crime
Revenge attacks
Arms proliferation
Looting and theft

16. Continued… Following Up Military Intervention
Five Protection Tasks
7.42: Five Protection Tasks that emerge from post-enforcement experiences; 1) Protection of Minorities
7.43: 2) Security Sector Reform: build up local authorities in the society and transfer knowledge and insights
7.44: Civilian Police = high priority for a society’s growth of stability

17. Continued… Following Up Military Intervention
Five Protection Tasks continued…
7.45: 3) Disarmament, Demobilization, and reintegration
7.46: Consent/Voluntary Disarmament = challenged by issues
7.47: No doctrinal political and military descretion to pursue a coercive strategy for purpose of Disarmament and etc.
7.48: 4) Mine Action:
United Nations Mine Action Service
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
additional Mine Action Centres

18. Continued… Following Up Military Intervention
Five Protection Tasks continued…
7.49: 5) The Pursuit of War Criminals; possible demand of military forces during/following these enforcement actions due to possible hostility

19. A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations
7.50: Summary
Responsibility to Protect = Different from:
Traditional War-fighting
and UN Peacekeeping Operations
Close reference Chapter 4, ‘’Doctrine for Human Protection Operations’’
Request for solution of the open ended: Coercive Intervention in Article 7.47

20. Continued… A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations
7.51: What the requested Doctrine of Coercive Intervention Should Include:
Clearly defined political objective with matching resources and rules of engagement (see Articles 7.13 – 7.14)
Politically controlled intervention with a specified military commander with a single military chain that follows with unity of purpose (see Article 7.20)
Aim to enforce compliance, NOT for the purpose of defeat of the state; must have objective to protect and maintain the peace

21. Continued… A Doctrine for Human Protection Operations
7.51: What the requested Doctrine of Coercive Intervention Should Include:
Guarantee maximum protection of the civilian population
Adherence to International Humanitarian Law
Defense of the intervening force should never take priority over resolve to accomplish the mission (see Article 7.34)
Maximum coordination between Military Authorities, Civilian Authorities, and Humanitarian Organizations (see Article 7.22)