1. Counter UAV program within NATO Joint Capability Group on Ground Based Air Defence by Fred Klumpers (NLD-MoD) Chairman JCGGBAD
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

2. Content of the briefing
Recognition of the emerging UAV threat by NATO
Actions taken by NATO up to now
Differences and commonalities with Homeland defence
Opportunities for cooperation
Conclusions

3. Emerging threat by UAV’s
Threat of UAV’s for military operations recognized around 2005
Part of the a-symmetric threat environment
Rockets Artillery Mortars (RAM)
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
Part of the symmetric threat environment
UAV itself: can disturb military air operations
Airfield, helicopter / own UAV operations
UAV load: can disturb all military operations
Camera’s, explosives, chemical / Biological agents

4. Actions taken up to now
Since 2007 incorporated in the threat paragraph of the NATO Staff Requirements for Ground Based Air Defence Systems (GBAD)
System concept studies, based on the 7 pillar concept to engage the RAM threat:
Focus on:
Detect
Warn
Intercept or neutralize
Command and Control

5. Actions taken up to now
Invited the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) to perform feasibility studies on the topics detect and engage / neutralize
international industries around the world
Funded by NATO and industries
Sponsored by the JCG GBAD
Supported by national military operational / material experts
Invited other Subject Matter Expert groups within NATO to study the topics within their area of work
Joint Capability Groups on C2, UAS and C-IED
Operational experts within NATO
Scientific and Technology Organisation within NATO
Monitored and reported within NATO by the JCG GBAD

6. NIAG Studies
NIAG SG170: Engagement of Low, Slow and Small Aerial Targets by GBAD (finalized June 2013)
45 experts from 13 NATO and Partner nations and 36 companies
Scope: to engage LSS threat today and for the next decade, study:
•UAS Characteristics and Missions
•Current and evolutionary sensor technology
•Current and evolutionary weapons and effectors technology
•The evolutionary integrated existing GBAD concepts

7. NIAG Studies Outcome of the study:
Definition in quantifiable terms, the target/threat set, payloads and missions that are likely to be faced by NATO forces.
The performance- and technical requirements for a ground based air defence system to counter this target/threat set.
Identification of the requirements in technologies for sensor/classification, effector and command, control and communication capable to counter such platforms;
Proposal of a GBAD generic system construct capable of countering the current V/SHORAD threat, perform the mission and engage the threats.

8. NIAG Studies
NIAG SG188: GBAD SENSOR MIX OPTIMISATION STUDY FOR EMERGING THREATS (finalized July 2015)
51 experts from 13 NATO and Partner nations and 44 companies
Scope: to develop an optimized mix of sensors to detect, track and identify emerging threat for mid and long term:
•Update the UAS Characteristics and Missions from the 170 study
•Review the evolutionary sensor technology
•Review the sensor fusion, required for a sensor mix

9. NIAG Studies Outcome of the study:
Examination in greater detail the GBAD sensor requirements and recommendation of an optimized mix of sensors (including the sensor fusing)
Re-identification, characterization and documentation of potential UAV’s and identification the platform vulnerability to countermeasures.  
Identification of a mix of sensors and their processing techniques currently available and those that could be developed and fielded within five years, having the capability to detect, identify, classify and track the LSS threat and at what ranges.
Identification of sensor fusion technologies current and available within five years.

10. NIAG Studies
NIAG SG200: Low, Slow and Small (LSS) Threat Effector (started July 2015)
Identification of current, new and evolving effectors and effector technology that can be used to neutralize the new low cost and rapidly evolving LSS UAV threat .
Unintended collateral damage, especially in urban environments, must be addressed, together with recommendations for mitigation.

11. NIAG Studies NIAG SG200: Effectors (Started July 2015)
The study shall focus on the analysis of
conventional effectors (guns, missiles, laser and high power microwave)
counter measures (communication/GPS counter measures)
spoofing technologies
low cost (man portable, more mobile and more improvised) effectors (urban environments)

12. Differences in requirements
Operational differences:
Homeland
Air threat limited to UAV’s
Limited range of environmental conditions
Short/long/permanent duration of operations
Mostly urban environment
Military
Air threat : from mini UAV and RAM up to Air Breathing Targets and Ballistic Missiles
Very broad range of environmental conditions (temperature, dust, sun, wind, salt, etc)
Short/long duration of operations
Many scenario’s in respect to land- and see operations, including troops on the move and urban environments.

13. Differences in requirements
Logistical differences:
Homeland
Limited size and relatively safe area. Maintenance to be performed by civilians
An option to outsource the logistics to industry
Military
Long logistical distances, only partly to be supported by industry
Operations not in save areas, maintenance to be performed by military personnel

14. Commonalities in requirements
Same threat
Same urban situation
Same concept
Solution (for both) will be the System of Systems concept
Modular and can be optimized for every mission
Same requirement for Low Life Cycle cost
Use of Commercial of the Shelf modules (militarization by external protection)
Smart (common) procurement
Smart logistic support (including management and contracts)
Common training and exercises

15. Opportunities Information exchange Optimization of the Life Cycle cost
All parties are in the feasibility phase
Development of operational (threat) scenario’s
Technical feasibility studies
Development system concepts
To be arranged through the national security authorities
Optimization of the Life Cycle cost
Smart procurement
Smart logistic support
Common training and exercises

16. Conclusions
The threat in an urban environment is for Homeland defence the same as for a military mission in an urban environment
Systems for a urban environment can have commonality in respect to homeland defence and military missions
Both parties are in a feasibility phase and don’t have developed the technical requirement for such systems
There are opportunities for cooperation, which can lead to savings in feasibility studies, procurement and life cycle cost

17. Questions
NATO UNCLASSIFIED