1. Using an “Angel in the Box” to Secure MANETs
Wu-chang Feng, Ed Kaiser
Nirupama Bulusu, Wu-chi Feng
Jesse Walker, Erik Johnson

2. Angel in the Box
A trusted, tamper-resistant processor that is hidden from the applications and operating system running on the host
Ring “–1”
Only runs code signed by appropriate authority
Intel, DARPA, IETF
Has access to key components of running system
Paradigm
Run anything you want on the untrusted part of the box, but the angel is watching
Angel in the Box - Halevi 2004 DIMACS

3. Stopping unwanted traffic Authentic measurements
Platform integrity
Fail-safe operation
Angel disables host when applications and/or OS are in an unknown state
Adversary injects malware into application or disables security
Angel quarantines entire system when integrity check fails
Angel disables host when “captured”
Adversary removes node from network to reverse engineer it
Angel disables system upon losing contact with rest of network or when moved outside allowable geographic locations
Stopping unwanted traffic
Authentic measurements
Angel provides data integrity for remote measurements
Adversary modifies measurements sent in MANET
Angel verifies and certifies data integrity for mission-critical measurements
Angel drops unwanted traffic before it reaches the network
Adversary floods network
Angel tracks public proof-of-work in protocols, verifies that each request contains valid work, and drops those that do not
Angel watches over host 2) Angel will self-destruct in 5 seconds
3) Angel will not talk when no one is listening (shade of gray access control)
4) Angel will tell no lies

4. Angel in the Box example
Intel’s Active Management Technology platform
Tamper-proof network access control at ingress based on security “posture” (i.e. hardware/software inventory)

5. Good hammer, looking for nails
Detect cheating in online games
Similar platform integrity issues as MANETs
Adversary has physical control over target machine
Extensions to AMTv2 to solve cheating problem
Detect software injection of keyboard/mouse input
IAMANETs
Use existing AMTv2 to solve IAMANET problem
Intel’s DTK
Work on platform additions to AMTv2 to support new requirements
Intel CTG