1. Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics
Sergey Gorinsky
Developing the Science of Networks
NPSec 2013, the 8th IEEE workshop on Secure Network Protocols
Göttingen, Germany, 7 October 2013

2. Preview Security vs. economics of Internet traffic
How to deal with uncertainty in network protocols?
Personal research retrospective (with ICNP anecdotes)
Security against inflated multicast subscription
RD network services
Economics of traffic attraction
Cooperative IP transit
Attempts to generalize and conclude
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

3. Prehistory (before Security and Economics)
Performance is the king
Internet traffic management needs to be improved!
Obsession with perfection
Optimal algorithms
Scalability without a limit
“Good enough is not good enough”
Frustrations of perfectionism
NP-complete problems
Physical constants
Researchers with alternative ideas
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

4. Receiver-driven Layered Multicast (McCanne et al. 1996)
1 Mbps group
Sender
3 Mbps group
1 Mbps receiver
1 Mbps receiver
4 Mbps receiver
Idea: control congestion by the receivers subscribing
to multicast groups in a multiple-group session
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

5. To Security (“I am a Control Freak”)
Expecting others to follow my design
Others doing things their own way?
This would be less efficient
This is a misbehavior
This has to be secured against
“My way or the highway”
ICNP 1998 (Austin, Texas), Hui Zhang’s tutorial
“Traffic Control and
QoS Management
in the Internet”: TCP,
router mechanisms,
IntServ (Integrated Services), DiffServ (Differentiated Services)
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

6. Security against Inflated Subscription (Gorinsky et al. 2003)
Updated key
Idea: link the group access
with the congestion status
Packets
Sender
Receiver
No updated key
Receiver
Receiver
Updated key
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

7. Security Mechanism Details (Gorinsky et al. 2003)
Packets of group 4: 16 17 18 19 20 3
Packets of group 3: 11 12 13 14 15 2
Packets of group 2: 7 6 8 9 10 1
Packets of group 1: 1 2 3 4 5
Time slot
Top key for each group g
where is XOR, is a component in packet p of group j
Each packet of group g carries a decrease key for group g-1
When an increase is authorized, the increase key is
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

8. How dangerous is the outside world?
How common is this misbehavior?
How strong is the need for solving the problem?
Allan Borodin and Stephen Cook,
University of Toronto, 2003
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

9. Network Service Differentiation
11/18/2018
IntServ
performance guarantees for end-to-end flows
end-to-end delay and throughput
high complexity
no end-to-end deployment
DiffServ
reduced complexity
performance guarantees for classes of flows
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

10. Towards Economics Others have the right to have a choice
This is not an Internet. (© Magritte)
ICNP 2007 (Beijing, China)
panel discussion by NSF
Others have the right to have a choice
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

11. Internet of Multiple Stakeholders
11/18/2018
Internet of Multiple Stakeholders
legacy user
adopting user
: legacy network
: adopting network
Networks (and users) with different economic interests
Ineffective service differentiation under partial deployment
No ability to charge differently for different services
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

12. RD Network Services (Podlesny and Gorinsky 2008)
11/18/2018
RD Network Services (Podlesny and Gorinsky 2008)
RD router
R queue
output link
D queue
Differentiation with free choice between two services
R (Rate) service of higher throughput
D (Delay) service of lower delay
Router implementation via link scheduling and buffer sizing
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

13. In Economics What others want? How much do they value it?
How can I provide it?
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

14. Internet Traffic Value (Bangera and Gorinsky 2013)
Sender
traffic
Receiver
How valuable is traffic for transit networks?
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

15. Internet Traffic Value (Bangera and Gorinsky 2013)
Sender
traffic
path announcement
Receiver
Can a network attract traffic to increase transit revenue?
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

16. Economics of Attraction (Bangera and Gorinsky 2013)
Traffic attraction
can substantially increase transit revenues
pulls traffic up the transit hierarchy
reduces peering traffic
is effective despite countermeasures
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

17. Reduction of Transit Costs
Network interest in reducing its transit costs
Solutions that reduce transit traffic
Peering, multicast, content delivery networks, …
(4) animations
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

18. Tuangou of CIPT (Stanojevic, Castro, and Gorinsky 2011)
Reduction of transit costs without altering traffic
Economies of scale in transit pricing
CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit)
multiple ISPs jointly purchase transit in bulk
Shapley value to share the savings $ $
(4) animations
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

19. Individual Savings (Stanojevic, Castro, and Gorinsky 2011)
Each CIPT network reduces its own transit cost
Absolute savings grow with the network size
Relative savings drop with the network size
(1) animation
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

20. CIPT and the Internet (Castro, Stanojevic, and Gorinsky 2013)
Reaction by transit providers
CIPT as a new customer
Bypass of the middleman
Overall impact on the Internet ecosystem $
(4) animations
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

21. Attempt to Conclude Be open to alternative ways Accept inefficiency
Securing own design is fine
Forcing my security on others is not
Working with the environment, not against it
Accept inefficiency
My designs are not perfect and never will be
Diversity is valuable in itself
No “price of anarchy” blues
Think globally, act locally
Improve global traffic management via local improvements
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

22. Thanks! Maxim Podlesny Harrick Vin Yongguang Zhang Sugat Jain
Rade Stanojevic
Ignacio Castro
Pradeep Bangera
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018

23. ICNP 2013 (Göttingen, Germany)
What will we learn here?
Sergey Gorinsky, “Internet Traffic Management: Security vs. Economics”
18 November November 2018